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vSamenvatting
Economische integratieakkoorden (EIA) zijn steeds belangrijker geworden
in de laatste twee decennia: zowel wat het aantal landen betreft dat
handelsakkoorden afsluit, de getroffen handelsstromen, de verwijdering van
handelsbelemmeringen als de betrokken beleidsdomeinen.
Dit proefschrift wil bijdragen tot het begrijpen van hoe deze overeenkom-
sten worden onderhandeld en welke impact ze hebben, aangezien dit be-
langrijk is voor zowel academici als beleidsmakers en goed ge¨ınformeerde
burgers.
In de eerste twee essays van deze verhandeling bestudeer ik de impact
van EIA’s tussen de Europese Unie en de rest van de wereld op product-
niveau. Ik vind dat EIA’s een handelscrerende impact hebben, dit zowel
voor alsook nadat handelsakkoorden in werking treden. De handelsstromen
beginnen toe te nemen vanaf het moment dat de onderhandelingen over
de handelsovereenkomst beginnen en dit handelscree¨rend effect houdt aan
tot vijf jaar na de inwerkingtreding van het handelsakkoord. Vooral het
aantal producten dat wordt uitgevoerd naar een bestemming (de extensieve
marge) neemt toe, maar er is een grote heterogeniteit tussen de verschillende
handelsakoorden en EU-lidstaten.
In een derde essay bevestig ik deze bevindingen op bedrijfs-niveau met
behulp van gedetailleerde data van Belgische exportbedrijven. Ik vind dat
handelsakkoorden grote kansen bieden voor bedrijven en dat bedrijven
hiervan gebruik maken. Toch vind ik opnieuw grote heterogeniteit in de
effecten van handelsakkoorden: vooral oudere bedrijven en bedrijven met
50 tot 99 werknemers halen hier voordeel uit.
In een vierde en laatste essay bestudeer ik het onderhandelingsproces van
EIA’s. Ik vind dat de market power van een product een goede voorspeller
is van de uitkomst van de bilaterale handelsbesprekingen voor dat product,
alsook het lobbywerk van bedrijven. Producten met meer market power
en producten uit import-concurrerende sectoren die politiek georganiseerd
zijn om te lobbyen, hebben een grotere kans om uitgesloten te worden van
liberalisering in een vrijhandelsakkoord.
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Summary
Economic Integration Agreements (EIAs) have been gaining importance
in the last two decades in terms of number of countries concluding them,
trade flows covered, trade barriers removed and policy domains covered.
This dissertation wants to add to the understanding of how these agreements
are negotiated and what impact they have, as this is important for academics
as well as policymakers and well-informed citizens.
In the first two essays of this dissertation, I study the effects of EIAs
between the European Union and the rest of the world on the product-
level. I find that EIAs have trade-creating effects. This before as well
as after entry into force of the agreement. Trade flows start increasing
from the moment negotiations of the trade agreement start and this trade
creating effect continues up to five years after entry force of the agreement.
Especially the number of products exported to a destination (the extensive
margin) increases, yet there is great heterogeneity between agreements and
EU member states.
In a third essay, I confirm these findings on the firm-level using detailed
data from Belgian firms. I find that trade agreements present great oppor-
tunities for firms, and firms make use of them. Yet, there is again large
heterogeneity in the effects of trade agreements: mainly older firms and
firms with 50 to 99 employees benefit from trade agreements.
In the fourth and last essay, I study the negotiation process of EIAs. I
find that the market power of a product is a good predictor of the outcome
of bilateral trade negotiations for that product, as well as the lobbying
efforts of firms. Goods with higher market power and goods from import-
competing sectors that are politically organized to lobby are more likely to
be excluded from liberalization in the trade agreement.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Once upon a time, in a small kingdom that would later be known as
Belgium, there was a small brewery. In that brewery, unlike in other
breweries, they made beer that spontaneously ferments by being exposed
to wild yeasts and bacteria native to the area. This process gives the beer -
which is now known as Lambic - its very distinctive flavour: dry, vinous,
and cidery, usually with a sour aftertaste. People liked the beer, and so
the founder and head brewer passed on the recipe and all his knowledge
to his son. A tradition was born. The brewery flourished, and generations
of Timmermans were employed in the brewery, passing on the secrets of
the delicious beer from father to son. Today, Timmermans Oude Gueuze
has been crowned World’s Best Sour Beer (World Beer Awards 2015), and
brewery Timmermans is the oldest Belgian brewery of Lambic beers.
Business was going well, and so brewery Timmermans looked for oppor-
tunities to expand. However, when they wanted to export to Mexico, they
ran into a problem. Not only did they have to fill out some paperwork to be
allowed to export their fabulous Gueuzes, the Mexican customs authority
also charged their product called “22030001”1 a 20% import tariff. This
outpriced their product compared to local Mexican beers.
All of this changed in the year 2000. After long talks between the
European Union and the Mexican government, the EU and Mexico signed
the EU-Mexico Free Trade Agreement. In the agreement, which entered
into force on July first, 2000, it was decided that Mexico would abolish its
tariffs on malt beers. As exporting Gueuze to Mexico now became 20%
cheaper, the Timmermans brewery saw an opportunity and introduced its
delicious beers into the Mexican market.
1This code refers to the product codes used by the Mexican customs authorities
to identify imported goods. The first six digits refer to the Harmonized Commodity
Description and Coding System, generally referred to as Harmonised System (HS), a
multipurpose international product nomenclature developed by the World Customs
Organization (WCO). The system is used by more than 200 countries and economies as
a basis for their Customs tariffs and for the collection of international trade statistics.
The last two digits are defined by the Mexican authorities.
1
2 Chapter 1. Introduction
Today, multilateral and bilateral trade agreements define and shape
almost all of world trade. While big parts of world trade were liberalized
multilaterally, there has been a strong shift towards more bilateral and
hence discriminatory trade liberalization in the last two decades. Once the
driver of trade liberalizations worldwide, the World Trade Organization
(formerly the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or GATT) has not
made much progress in liberalizing trade further in recent years. The latest
round of multilateral trade negotiations started in 2001 in Doha. But after
a breakdown in the negotiations in 2008 over disagreements over agriculture,
industrial tariffs and non-tariff barriers, services, and trade remedies, no
substantial progress has been made, leaving the future of the liberalizations
of the Doha Development Round uncertain. As a result, countries have
increasingly resorted to bilateral trade agreements. It is therefore important
- for academics, as well as policymakers and well-informed citizens - to
understand the impact bilateral trade agreements have on the economy,
and on society and the world more in general. This dissertation wants to
contribute to this growing body of knowledge.
So what are trade agreements? And why do they exist? The remainder
of this chapter introduces the concept of trade agreements, and puts them
into a wider context. The organisation is as follows. Section 1.1 gives a
definition of trade agreements and discusses certain central points of the
definition, while section 1.2 puts trade agreements in a historical perspective.
Section 1.3 presents some stylized facts, and section 1.4 focuses on the
reason why countries decide to conclude trade agreements. Finally, section
1.5 discusses the costs that trade agreements can entail, while section 1.6
presents a road map of this dissertation.
1.1 A definition of trade agreements
Preferential trade agreement, partial scope agreement, preferential trade
arrangement, regional trade agreement, regional integration agreement, free
trade agreement, free trade area, association agreement, economic partner-
ship agreement... The economics literature uses different terms for trade
agreements interchangeably, without a clear definition. Moreover, some
terms and acronyms have been used by different scholars and institutions to
denote different things. PTA for example, is used by economic scholars to
denote any discriminatory trade agreement, while in the framework of the
WTO, the term is used to denote a very specific kind of trade agreements,
namely non-reciprocal trade preferences given to developing countries and
non-reciprocal preferential schemes that have been granted a waiver by the
General Council (WTO, 2016).
In this dissertation, I will use the inclusive term “economic integration
agreements” (EIA) to denote trade agreements, clearly defined by Baier et
al. (2008) as “treaties between economic units - in the case of international
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EIAs, between nations - to reduce policy-controlled barriers to the flow of
goods, services, capital, labour, etc”.
This definition consists of some crucial points. First of all, EIAs are
concluded between two or more countries and hence may be bilateral,
regional, interregional or plurilateral2. These countries may belong to the
same geographical region or continent, or not. As such, EIAs are inherently
discriminatory. This is especially true when juxtaposing EIAs with the more
inclusive multilateral WTO system. By their nature, EIAs create multiple
sets of rules: one set of rules that applies to all countries that are members
of the group, and another set of rules that applies to the other countries, and
that are less favourable than the first3. By only negotiating with a subset
of countries, EIAs can move “beyond the minimum common denominator
established by the existing multilateral system and undertake new and
complex policy initiatives that are difficult to broach at the multilateral
level” (UNCTAD, 2006).
Second, EIAs facilitate international trade and cross-border movement
of the factors of production somehow. As such, economic integration
agreements may address integration of the goods, services, capital, or
labour market or a combination of them. They may cover transactions
that take place between countries and they may also address activities that
occur inside the borders of a country that may affect such international
flows. The depth of integration in terms of the barriers to trade it tries to
remove and the range of activities it covers, can vary considerably across
agreements.
Third, EIAs can be reciprocal or non-reciprocal. Countries can unilater-
ally grant better market access to one or multiple partner countries without
asking for better market access in return. Or the removal of barriers to
trade in one country will be accompanied by the removal of barriers to
trade in the partner country or countries4. Countries can also choose
2This excludes multilateral agreements, which are concluded between a large
number of countries, usually including all contracting parties of an agreement such as
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or all countries that are members
of a large international organization such as the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Within the context of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in particular, plurilateral
agreements are signed by, and apply to, only those countries that choose to do so (see
for example the ’Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft’ which has thirty signatories
today), while all WTO members must be party to the multilateral agreements. Given
that multilateral EIAs are not addressed in this dissertation, I will use the term “EIA”
or “trade agreement” throughout this dissertation to indicate non-multilateral EIAs,
unless otherwise stated.
3Note that this second set of rules does not imply that every partner country to
the EIA has the same rules for non-member countries. While there are types of EIAs
where the members decide jointly on external trade policy, in the more general case,
each EIA partner country sets its own trade policy independently.
4Note that I use reciprocity of trade agreements in a broad sense here, as is common
in the economics literature. Reciprocal trade agreements - where all partners of the
agreement remove some of the barriers they impose on trade - are the opposite of
unilateral trade agreements in this perspective. This in contrast to the notion of
reciprocity in trade negotiations in the context of the WTO, where reciprocity implies
the exchange of a reduction in the level of protection in one country in return for an
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to remove virtually all barriers to trade, or just single out some sectors.
Finally, the definition does not specify the motivation for concluding an
EIA. And hence, EIAs can be concluded for any number of reasons, ranging
from purely economic motives, to purely political motives, and anything in
between.
Baier et al. (2008), based on Frankel (1997), distinguish six types of
EIAs, reflecting different intensities of trade integration.
1. Non-reciprocal PTAs (NRPTA or OPTA) provide one-way preferential
tariffs. They grant access to a larger market without a demand
for reciprocity. The Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) is
the largest initiative, with a handful of developed countries such
as Australia, the EU and the US granting a substantial number of
developing countries access to their market.
2. Reciprocal PTAs (RPTA or TWPTA) provide two-way preferences
on only part of the trade, e.g. the Latin American free trade area,
which started in 1960.
3. Free Trade Areas (FTA) provide two-way preferences and elimi-
nate substantially all tariff and non-tariff barriers between partner
countries. The most well-known FTA is the North-American FTA
(NAFTA) between the US, Mexico and Canada.
4. Customs Unions (CU) are similar to FTAs, with the exception that
member states adopt a common external tariff on imports from third
countries. Examples are the Turkey-EU Customs Union, and the
Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM).
5. Common Markets (CM) are customs unions that are supplemented
with free factor mobility across national member frontiers. Capital,
labour, technology and firms are thus allowed to move unhindered
between the member states of the common market. A classroom
example is the European Union.
6. Economic Unions (EU) are common markets with additional monetary
and fiscal policy coordination such as the Euro area countries.
The process of integration does not necessarily have to be gradual from one
type to another, nor does it have to be linear nor monotonically increasing.
equivalent reduction in the level of protection of another country. Reciprocity may be
intra- or inter-issue, with the former entailing concessions of an identical nature, and
the latter the exchange of concessions of a dissimilar nature. Finally, reciprocity may
be product-specific or more general in nature (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2009).
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Table 1.1: Components of the different types of economic integration
agreements.
OPTA TWPTA FTA CU CM EU
Removal of some tariffs yes yes yes yes yes yes
Removal of some tariffs both partners no yes yes yes yes yes
Removal of most tariffs both partners no no yes yes yes yes
Common external tariff no no no yes yes yes
Free movement of factors no no no no yes yes
Common monetary and fiscal policy no no no no no yes
1.2 A brief history of trade agreements
The history of trade agreements is inevitably a history of nations. Before
the rise of the concept of the nation state, it is difficult to speak of trade
agreements, as there is little need for cooperation on trade matters when
empires are so vast the sun never sets on them5. Moreover, the many
caravans transporting silk, spices, perfume and other exotic goods along
the Silk road are only one of the countless examples of periods of free trade
during history. It is only when nations start restricting trade that the
opportunity for bilateral trade cooperation arises. Finally, the idea that
international agreements can secure trade interests is relatively modern,
dating mainly from the 18th and 19th centuries (Trebilcock and Howse,
1995). Early commercial treaties were less concerned with opening up new
markets and liberalizing trade than with ensuring that a country’s traders
enjoyed protection from arbitrary arrest and seizure in foreign countries.
Though England and Portugal signed the Methuen Treaty in 1703 –
stipulating among other things that Portuguese wines imported to England
would be subject to a third less duty than wines imported from France,
and that English woollen cloth imported to Portugal would enter duty free
(WTO, 2011) - the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty is often considered to be the
first “real” free trade agreement (IMF, 1997). Signed on 23 January 1860
in Paris, it held the promise of freer trade between Britain and France,
by including significant reciprocal tariff reductions and a Most Favored
Nation (MFN) clause. The treaty helped pave the way for more trade
liberalization initiatives in quickly industrializing Europe. A veritable
explosion of bilateral trade pacts followed, with an additional 56 treaties
being signed within fifteen years. By 1875, virtually all of Europe was party
to a low-tariff zone through a web of agreements that included the linchpin
MFN clause (Grossman, 2016).
The first modern customs union was concluded in 1933, when German
states signed the Zollverein treaties, forming a coalition to manage tolls
after the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire. The splintering of territory
5The phrase was originally used to refer to the Spanish Empire in the 16th and
17th empire, but has most notably been used in reference to the British Empire in the
19th and 20th century. A similar concept also existed in Ancient Egypt.
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and states over generations meant that by the 1790s in the German-speaking
Holy Roman Empire in Central Europe, there were approximately 1800
customs barriers. Even within the Prussian state itself there were at the
beginning of the 19th century over 67 local customs and tariffs with as many
customs borders. To travel from Knigsberg in East Prussia to Cologne, for
example, a shipment was inspected and taxed 18 times (Seidel, 1971; Price,
1949).
By the late 19th century, however, the momentum towards a more open,
less preferential trading system was gone. The worldwide depression from
1873 to 1877 increased pressure for more domestic protection and weakened
the drive for access to foreign markets (Shafaeddin, 1998), while the First
World War wiped out any remnants of the more open and integrated
world trading system that had been built up over the previous century.
To make matters worse, the Great Depression of the early 1930s and the
spread of “beggar-thy-neighbour” trade policies, resulted in the collapse of
international trade and the rise of trade frictions (Irwin, Mavroidis, and
Sykes, 2008). One bright spot in these chaotic times was the enactment of
the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act by the US Congress in 1934. This Act
gave the Roosevelt administration the authority it needed to conclude more
than twenty bilateral tariff reduction agreements in the late 1930s. This
initially with Latin American countries, but later also with Britain and
Canada (Irwin, Mavroidis, and Sykes, 2008). Even though these bilateral
agreements only had a marginal effect on world trade, they signalled a new
liberal direction in US trade policy, and laid the foundations for much of
the multilateral trade system after the Second World War.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) went into effect
on January 1, 1948, and incorporated more than 45,000 tariff concessions
by its original 23 signatories, while also providing a broader framework for
regulating international trade. Seven subsequent rounds of negotiations
by these and additional participants led to innumerable further tariff cuts
and to the introduction of rules governing various non-tariff barriers to
trade. The creation of the GATT, however, did not diminish the attraction
of bilateral or regional approaches to international trade relations. On
the contrary, the push for new regional agreements, especially in Europe,
re-emerged less than five years after the GATT was launched. I distinguish
three waves of regionalism since the second half of the 20th century.
The first wave of regionalism occurred in the late 1950s and 1960s. At
its centre was Europe’s push for continental integration – starting with
the sectoral European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, leading to the
broader European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, and building
outwards to current or past colonial possessions through a complex network
of preferential, but non-reciprocal trade arrangements (Winters, 1993).
This evolving European Community helped spark the creation of the rival
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1957 among countries that
had chosen to stay outside of the Community. The EEC was also taken
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as a model by groups of developing countries in Africa, the Caribbean,
Central and South America which rushed to form their own regional and
subregional unions during this period. However, most of these arrangements
– including even the most promising, the East African Community and the
Central American common market – had collapsed or were put on the
backburner by the end of the 1970s (de Melo and Panagariya, 1993).
The second wave of regionalism began roughly in the mid-1980s and
extended well into the 1990s. Once again Europe’s drive to expand and
deepen its economic integration was a central impetus. The mid-1980s saw
Europe embark on its Single Market programme, aimed at dismantling the
remaining physical, technical and tax barriers within the community by
1992. The European Community was also pushing to create a new cluster
of bilateral PTAs with Central and Eastern European countries following
the break-up of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) (Lester and Mercurio, 2009).
In the mid-1990s, the EU also concluded a number of bilateral agreements
with countries in the Middle East and North Africa with the intention of
forming an open trade area around the Mediterranean Sea.
While the first wave was mainly a European affair, momentum behind the
second wave of regionalism also came from the United States. This partly
because of its frustration with delays in launching and then advancing the
GATT’s Uruguay Round negotiations. Having steered clear of regionalism
in favour of multilateralism for almost forty years, the United States shifted
strategies and started bilateral negotiations that led to the free trade
agreement with Israel in 1985 and the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement in
1988, later converted into NAFTA by including Mexico in the early 1990s
(Anderson and Blackhurst, 1993).
As with the previous wave of regionalism, this wave had a demonstration
effect with groups of developing countries establishing and strengthening
their own regional groupings. In Latin America, old integration arrange-
ments such as the Central American Common Market and the Andean
Community were revived in an effort to build a broader and more am-
bitious Latin American Common Market. Perhaps the most prominent
example of a new generation of developing-developing country EIAs was
Mercosur (Southern Common Market). Envisaged as a full customs union
among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, it reflected a desire to
strengthen political relations between Argentina and Brazil, as well as to
counterbalance other emerging continental EIAs, and to create a stronger
and more unified voice for the member countries in the multilateral trade
system (Mansfield, Pevehouse, and Bearce, 2000).
In Asia, regionalism gathered pace as well. The South Asian Associ-
ation for Regional Cooperation was created at this time in part to try
to reduce political tensions between India and Pakistan (Dash, 1996). It
was later transformed into the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA).
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) embarked on plans
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for a Free Trade Area (AFTA), in order to strengthen the resilience of
ASEAN member countries to economic crises and to enhance cooperation
in non-traditional trade areas such as science and technology, agriculture,
financial services and tourism. Most ambitious of all, the Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) was launched in 1989 with the goal of
“pursuing free and open trade and investment” among its founding twelve
members on a non-preferential basis (Pomfret, 2006). Around the same
time, Australia and New Zealand deepened their free trade area into the
Closer Economic Relations (CER).
In Africa too, initiatives were launched to revitalize existing regional
groupings and to form new ones with the objective of accelerating in-
dustrialization, diversifying economies, developing regional infrastructure,
encouraging the adoption of common negotiating positions, and promoting
peace and security on the continent. In particular, the Common Mar-
ket for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) was seen as a stepping
stone towards the realization of an African Economic Community, while
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) represented an
effort to reintegrate South Africa into the post-apartheid regional economy
(Hwang, 2007).
Over the past decade, another wave of regionalism has been gathering
force, driven as before by key trade powers, such as the EU and the United
States, but for the first time also including many Asian countries that
had previously been the strongest supporters of multilateralism and non-
discrimination. Their conversion to regionalism can be traced in part to
the international community’s inadequate reaction to the collapse of Asian
trade following the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the high-profile collapse of
the WTO’s Seattle Ministerial Conference in 1999, and the diminishing sig-
nificance of pan-Pacific initiatives, especially the APEC Forum (Aggarwal
and Koo, 2005). Even more importantly, the proliferation of regional agree-
ments in Asia also appears to reflect and reinforce an underlying process of
deep economic integration. This was caused by countries being woven ever
more tightly together by the trade and investment flows associated with
regional and subregional production networks.
This most recent wave of regionalism covers a much wider network of
participants – including bilateral, plurilateral and cross-regional initiatives
– and encompasses countries at different levels of economic development
– including developed-developed, developing-developing, and developed-
developing alliances. And although these new agreements involve prefer-
ential tariff reductions, they focus even more on so-called WTO-plus type
issues such as services, capital flows, standards, intellectual property, regu-
latory systems (many of which are non-discriminatory) and commitments
on labour and environment issues.
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1.3 Stylized facts
So how many trade agreements are in force today? Which countries conclude
the most trade agreements? And how long does it take to negotiate a trade
agreement? In this section I present some stylized facts on trade agreements.
• Acceleration of the number of EIAs being concluded since
1990. As described in the previous section, EIA participation has
accelerated over time and become more widespread over time. Not
counting NRPTAs, the number of active EIAs increased more or less
continuously between 1950 and 1990 (see figure 1.1). Thereafter, EIA
activity accelerated noticeably, with the number of EIAs more than
doubling over the next five years and more than quadrupling until
2010 to reach close to 300 EIAs presently in force (WTO, 2016). As
of 2016, all members of the WTO have at least one active EIA. Today,
the only countries without any EIAs are poor islands and North
Korea. The other side of this coin is the increase in the number of
trade agreements per country. While a big majority of participating
countries only had one active EIA in 1980, this share has declined
tremendously since the 1990s. This was compensated by a big increase
in the number of countries with two to five EIAs, six to ten EIAs and
more than ten EIAs.
• Increase in deepness of integration. Not only the number of
Figure 1.1: Evolution of trade agreements worldwide by type of agreement.
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EIAs has increased tremendously in the last three decades, so has the
depth of EIAs being concluded. While more than two thirds of EIAs
in 1990 were non-reciprocal preferential trade agreements, concluded
mainly in the context of the Generalised Scheme of Preferences, today
a lion’s share of trade agreements are EIAs with a deeper level of
integration. In 2010, 44% of all trade agreements notified to the
WTO were FTAs, corresponding to more than 20% of all EIA trade
links worldwide.
• Increase in negotiation time. Given this increase in depth of
integration, it comes as no surprise that trade negotiations are be-
coming increasingly complex. This results in longer negotiation times.
While the average negotiations for EIAs signed between the European
Union and third countries in the 1990s took slightly longer than two
years, this has increased to five years for EIAs signed since 2000.
The increase in negotiation time is not only driven by an increase in
complexity of the content of EIAs, but also by the politicization of
the process and an increase in the number of partners in trade talks.
Mo¨lders (2015) investigates negotiation times of FTAs notified to the
WTO and concluded worldwide between 1990 and 2011, and finds
that trade negotiators need on average 2.30 years and 7.3 rounds to
reach an agreement. When there are only two parties at the negotia-
tion table, trade talks progress significantly faster: only 1.80 years
are needed to negotiate a bilateral FTA, compared to 2.32 years for
FTAs with more than two parties.
• Geographical scope of EIAs. A majority of EIAs is concluded
between partner countries on the same continent (see figure 1.2). This
is especially the case for Europe, where almost 90% of all trade links
between European countries were mitigated by a trade agreement,
namely the European Union. While Europe is the integration cham-
pion when it comes to intra-regional trade agreements, this is not the
case for cross-regional trade agreements. Africa spans the crown when
it comes to concluding trade agreements with other regions. This
can mainly be explained by the colonial ties Africa shares with other
continents, and the many non-reciprocal trade agreements concluded
between developing and developed countries in the framework of the
Generalised Scheme of Preferences. This is confirmed by figure 1.3,
which describes the importance of different types of EIAs in terms of
trade flows.
1.4 The purpose of trade agreements
So why do countries decide to form EIAs? What makes trade agreements
valuable to the governments concluding the agreement? To answer this
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Figure 1.2: Evolution of relative number of trade agreements worldwide by
region.
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Figure 1.3: Trade flows by level of integration.
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question, I examine which problems trade agreements try to solve. Any
theory of trade agreements must identify a means by which the negotiating
governments can enjoy mutual gains from the agreement. I take an eco-
nomic perspective, and identify three classes of problems in the economics
literature that trade agreements might try to solve.
Terms-of-trade-driven externality. The oldest and most established
strand of the literature explains the value of trade agreements in terms of
the terms-of-trade externality. This theory states that governments acting
unilaterally will tend to overuse tariffs and other trade restrictions to the
extent that they are able to shift the cost of protecting a domestic industry
onto foreign producers. This cost-shifting is made possible through lower
foreign exporter (“world”) prices, thereby improving the terms of trade
of the importing nation. While maximizing the domestic governments
objective function, this non-cooperative optimal tariff is inefficient from
an international point of view as it imposes a negative externality on the
trading partners. The purpose of a trade agreement is then to escape
from this terms-of-trade-driven prisoner’s dilemma by undoing this policy
inefficiency and improving the welfare of each government. This is made
possible by giving foreign exporting governments a voice in the trade
policy choices of their trading partners, so that tariffs can be reduced to
internationally efficient levels (Bagwell and Staiger, 2004).
While empirical evidence supporting the terms-of-trade theory of trade
agreements is mounting, there is a commonly held view that the motives and
behaviors of trade negotiators cannot be understood in terms of economics6.
Policy makers might not (only) be driven by economic motivations, and
hence might not be interested in maximizing national welfare by manip-
ulating the terms of trade. Rather, they might be concerned with the
distributional consequences of their tariff choices. They might want to
redistribute income to swing voters in the electorate or to groups that offer
campaign support (see for example Grossman and Helpman (1994), Gross-
man and Helpman (1995a), and Grossman and Helpman (1995b), Baldwin
(1987) and Helpman (1997). It can be shown, however, that even though
including political-economy variables into terms-of-trade models greatly
improve the realism of the models, it does not offer any separate purpose for
trade agreements (Bagwell and Staiger, 2004). Note also that policymakers
in the real world who negotiate trade agreements rarely, if ever, speak
of the terms-of-trade consequences of trade policy choices. Rather, they
stress how free trade agreements will create new opportunities for exporters
by opening up markets. However, this is only an apparent contradiction
between economic models and the real world, as an improvement of the
6This argument is expressed eloquently by Paul R. Krugman (1997), who argues
that if economists ruled the world, there would be no need for trade agreements. This
because “global free trade would emerge spontaneously from the unrestricted pursuit
of national interest”.
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terms of trade of the importing country is equivalent to better market
access for the exporting country.
Credibility. A second problem trade agreements might solve is when
governments are unable to make credible commitments to their own pri-
vate sector. According to the commitment theory of trade agreements,
governments conclude trade agreements as a way to tie their hands against
their own lobbies and citizens. There are multiple reasons why govern-
ments would want to lock-in policy. First of all, by using trade agreements
as a commitment device, governments can make lobbies steer clear from
wasting resources or distorting the sectoral allocation of resources. Second,
countries could also undertake unilateral liberalizations, but the lock-in
effect of making these commitments a part of a trade agreement adds
credibility to these commitments. This in turn contributes to providing
policy stability, transparency, reliability and reducing uncertainty. The
investment-related provisions in trade agreements signed by Central, East-
ern and South-Eastern European countries during their transition towards
market economies, for example, were mainly intended to achieve this ef-
fect (UNCTAD, 2006). Third, trade agreements can serve as commitment
devices for future governments. As such, EIAs can for example lower the
probability of democracy failure or avoid that future governments overturn
decisions (Liu and Ornelas, 2014).
Non-terms-of-trade externalities. Finally, trade agreements can solve
negative externalities that go beyond the terms-of-trade externality. I
distinguish two additional externalities that arise when I allow for imperfect
competition. As to date, however, there is no empirical evidence on
the importance of either theories. Therefore I only discuss them briefly.
The delocation/profit-shifting theory of trade agreements argues that an
additional externality arises because governments use trade protection to
delocate firms or shift firm-profits from foreign locations to the domestic
market. The offshoring theory of trade agreements argues that offshoring
has changed the way international prices are determined. With the rise
of offshoring, international prices are increasingly determined by bilateral
bargains that are not disciplined by standard market clearing conditions,
introducing additional externalities. The presence of either externalities
implies an inefficiency from an international perspective. Governments
can therefore increase welfare by concluding a trade agreement which will
evanesce the externality (Lima˜o, 2016).
While these theories explain why countries would want to sign a trade
agreement, they do not tell us with which partner country they will do it.
Baier and Bergstrand (2004) shine some light on the economic determinants
of trade agreements. Using a qualitative choice model, they empirically
identify five key economic factors influencing the likelihood of pairs of
countries to form an FTA in a given year. They find strong evidence
14 Chapter 1. Introduction
that pairs of countries’ governments tend to form FTAs (i) the closer
two countries are in distance, (ii) the more remote a pair of continental
trading partners is from the rest of the world (ROW), (iii) the larger and
more similar in economic size two trading partners are, (iv) the greater
the difference of capital-labor ratios between two partners is and (v) the
smaller the difference of the members’ capital-labor ratios with respect to
the ROW’s capital-labor ratio. These characteristics predict accurately
85% of the 286 FTAs existing among 1431 country pairs in 1996 for which
data were available and 97% of the remaining 1145 country pairs with no
FTAs.
1.5 The costs of trade agreements
While trade agreements can lead to welfare improvements for the par-
ticipating countries, they do not come without any downside - as the
many demonstrations and protest actions against the potential EU-USA
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and the EU-Canada Com-
prehensive Economic and Trade Agreement vehemently show.
I identify three potential sources of costs of trade agreements. I distin-
guish between costs of trade agreements for the participating countries and
costs for third countries.
That EIAs are potentially costly to third countries, is easy to see. By
their nature, EIAs are discriminatory. While they improve the market
access of the participating countries, this is not the case for third countries,
which will see a decrease in their relative competitiveness compared to
the participating countries. This can lead to a phenomenon called trade
diversion, when trade is diverted from a more efficient exporter towards
a less efficient one because of the conclusion of an EIA. This is a strong
motivation for countries to participate in EIAs is to counteract the potential
negative effects of discrimination and marginalization as other countries
conclude them.
Trade agreements do not only have (potentially) negative effects on
third countries, but also on the partner countries themselves. In a world
with increasing global value chains and more and more overlapping EIAs,
trade agreements can entail a negative externality. Jagdish Bhagwati
(1995) was the first to point out the complications that arise from the
application of different sets of Rules of Origin. The phenomenon has led
to paradoxical, and often contradictory outcomes amongst bilateral and
multilateral trade partners, as one product can be subject to different
tariffs and tariff reduction trajectories, depending on how and where the
different parts were produced and assembled. This overlapping and complex
worldwide web of Rules of Origin can raise transaction costs for firms to
a degree that makes utilization of FTA preferences uneconomical. This
so-called “spaghetti bowl effect” becomes especially likely given the low
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margins of preference of certain agreements.7
Moreover, another potential cost of trade agreements is the loss of a
certain degree of policy autonomy. This is especially true for deeper inte-
gration agreements, which require more policy coordination and integration
of policies on a supra-national level. This might also entail administrative
costs on the national level, as policymaking for national governments can
become more complex.
Finally, EIAs might entail a cost to the extent that they pose as “stum-
bling blocs” to global free trade. Some trade experts take a pessimistic
view of the latest explosion of EIAs, arguing that there is a link between
the surge of bilateral and regional deals and the slow pace of the latest
Doha Round of the WTO (Bhagwati, 2008). Others are more optimistic,
suggesting the proliferation of bilateral and regional deals will eventually,
as in the past, have a domino effect, and force the pace of the Doha ne-
gotiations. Still, others argue that there is no correlation or causal link
between the pace of multilateralism and regionalism, pointing to the fact
that regional initiatives did not take off when the Uruguay Round stalled
between 1990 and 1994, and only accelerated after the Round’s conclusion
in 1994 (Freund, 2000b). In fact, there is evidence that recent regional and
multilateral initiatives have actually advanced in tandem. This adds weight
to the view that they can, and do, represent complementary aspects of an
increasingly complex and sophisticated global trade architecture – one in
which bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements coexist and cohere in
a kind of “multispeed” system.
1.6 What to expect
As already mentioned, given the importance of EIAs today and in the future
in shaping world trade, and increasingly investments, trade in services,
public procurement, phytosanitary standards, working conditions, migration
and so much more, studying their impact is important8. This not only
for academics, but also for policymakers and well-informed citizens. This
dissertation wants to contribute to this blooming field of literature. Two
main research questions will guide this dissertation: (1) What are the
7According to Baldwin (2006), the spaghetti bowl effects has two aspects: 1)
different rules of origin and/or the exclusions of different lists of sensitive goods can
mean that a triangle of three bilateral FTAs between three countries could produce
trade that is less than fully free, and 2) bilateral cumulation as opposed to diagonal or
full cumulation can distort the purchase pattern of intermediate inputs in a way that
does not occur under MFN free trade.
8The recent turmoil concerning the negotiations of the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Treaty (TTIP) between the US and the EU have demonstrated this once
again very clearly. While there is no shortage of impact assessment studies predicting
the effects of TTIP on the economies of the partner countries, the public debate does
not seem to believe these numbers. This partly because many studies yield different
(and contradicting) results. This underlines the need for precise and correct impact
studies of trade agreements. Not only ex ante, but also ex post.
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economic effects of the trade agreements that have been concluded between
the EU and the rest of the world? (2) How are trade agreements negotiated?
I start with the ex post evaluation of trade agreements. I focus on
the trade creation effects of EIAs on the countries concluding them. I
adopt several perspectives: I start with a macro-perspective and analyze
product-level responses to trade agreements. I then refine the results by
taking a micro-perspective and studying the response of firms to trade
agreements. I finish by studying the negotiations of trade agreements. In
particular, I try to find factors determining the liberalization process of
goods in FTAs. This dissertation consists of four main papers, and a more
detailed overview of the content of every paper follows in the subsequent
paragraphs. The first, third and fourth paper were co-authored with Jan
Van Hove, while the second paper was co-authored with Scott L. Baier and
Jan Van Hove.
Chapter 2. In this chapter we quantify ex post the effects of trade
agreements on trade flows between the European Union and the rest of the
world. We use a panel on aggregate trade flows between 27 EU countries and
201 third countries and territories for the period of 1988-2013. Following
the empirical approach by Baier and Bergstrand (2007), we account for the
endogeneity of EIAs by including three sets of fixed effects (importer-time,
exporter-time and country pair).
We contribute to the literature by thoroughly disentangling the het-
erogeneous effects of EIAs. We do this in several different ways. First,
we not only look at the effects of EIAs on total trade flows, but we also
consider the impact on the intensive and extensive margin. We find that no
effects on the total trade flows sometimes hide effects on the intensive and
extensive margin. Both margins appear thus to be important for capturing
the true trade effects of EIAs.
Second, we allow for differential timing of effects, by including five and
ten year lags and calculating average treatment effects. While there are
already papers that explore differential timing of EIA effects or the effects
of EIAs on the margins, Baier, Bergstrand, and Feng (2014) and Florensa,
Ma´rquez-Ramos, and Recalde (2015) and Ma´rquez-Ramos, Florensa, and
Recalde (2015) are the only papers so far that allow for differential timing
of different types of EIAs, while at the same time looking at the margins,
controlling for endogeneity of EIAs and multilateral resistance. Consistent
with this literature, we find that medium term reaction effects are important.
Longer term effects do not seem to play a substantial role in the European
context.
Third, we allow for heterogeneity across EIAs. We start by considering
various types of EIAs by including separate dummies for preferential trade
agreements (PTAs), free trade agreements (FTAs), and customs unions
and common market agreements (CUs). Next, we also look at the trade
effect of each EIA separately. We find that most EIAs increase trade flows,
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but the magnitude of effects varies strongly across agreements. This is
obscured when only looking at a general EIA dummy.
Fourth, we look at the different motivations for concluding EIAs and
how this affects trade. Our findings indicate that EIAs that were concluded
by the European Union for economic reasons stimulate trade more than
EIAs concluded for mixed or political reasons.
Fifth, we estimate the effects of EIAs on trade flows for each EU country
individually. We find that the effects for most countries have the same sign.
However, there is a lot of variation in the magnitude of effects, with effects
not reaching statistical significance for a substantial number of countries.
Finally, we allow for directionality of the effects of EIAs on trade flows, as
most EIAs have different stipulations for imports and exports. As expected,
we find that EIAs do not have symmetric effects on imports (from the rest
of the world into the EU) and exports (from the EU to the rest of the
world); while FTAs strongly increase import competition in the EU market,
their effect on European exports is much more complex.
Chapter 3. This chapter dives deeper in precisely determining what the
impact is of trade agreements. We do this by examining whether trade
agreements have anticipation effects. As such, this chapter picks up where
chapter two left off: where chapter two only looked at what happens after
the entry into force of a trade agreement, this chapter extends the analysis
to what happens before entry into force and hence shines a light on the
impact EIAs have during their whole lifetime.
We contribute to the literature by looking more closely at the different
stages of the lifetime of an EIA and estimating the impact each stage has
on trade. We do this by augmenting the gravity model with a dummy
for each stage in the lifetime of an EIA. We use the same dataset as used
in chapter two, but supplement it with data on every stage in the life of
a trade agreement, and control for endogeneity of EIAs and multilateral
resistance.
Our results clearly indicate the existence of anticipation effects. These
anticipation effects are non-negligible in size. Sometimes they are even
more important than the impact on trade flows of trade agreements after
they enter into force. It is therefore important to take anticipation effects
into account when estimating the total partial equilibrium impact of trade
agreements on trade flows.
On average, trade between parties starts increasing from the moment
official negotiations start. Trade flows get another boost when the EIA
enters into force. Moreover, we find heterogeneous anticipation effects of
EIAs on the different Member States of the EU and according to the depth
of integration of the EIA, but not according to the pace of the negotiations.
Chapter 4. With firm-level data becoming more widely available in the
last couple of years, firm-level analysis has become an invaluable tool for
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scholars in international trade. Empirical analysis using information on
firm-level export transactions and firm characteristics has unlocked a wealth
of information, testing existing models in international trade as well as
driving new theoretical models. We continue on this path, pioneered by
Roberts and Tybout (1997) and Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998), and
make a first attempt at determining the impact of trade agreements on
firms.
While there is a rich empirical literature on the impact of WTO accessions
on firms, this is not the case for bilateral trade liberalizations. There are
some papers exploring the impact of a specific trade agreement on firm-level
exports - especially NAFTA seems to be a popular subject of study, but to
the best of our knowledge, there are no papers estimating a more general
effect of a multitude of trade agreements on firm-level exports. This chapter
wants to start filling that gap.
We do this by using a rich panel dataset for Belgium on the firm-level
for the period 2002-2014. Next to standard gravity variables and data on
trade agreements, our dataset comprises of two main sources: the National
Bank of Belgium’s Trade Database consisting of all Belgian manufacturing
exporters and a dataset with firm characteristics such as firm size, age and
productivity obtained from the Belgian Business Registry of firms. We can
link both datasets together through a common firm identifier, resulting in
a very rich panel. This allows us not only to estimate the impact of EIAs
on firms, but also to look at the interaction between the impact of EIAs
and firm characteristics.
ur analysis proceeds in several steps. We start by estimating a general
partial equilibrium effect of trade agreements on firm-level exports, by
translating the gravity equation to firm-level exports. We augment the
gravity equation with firm characteristics to control for firm heterogeneity,
and try different fixed effects structures. We find a positive effect of trade
agreements on firm-level trade flows.
We continue our analysis by zooming in on the timing of trade policy ef-
fects. We do this by exploring whether trade agreements have effects before
they enter into force officially and for how long they keep on stimulating
trade after entry into force. We find clear indications that firms anticipate
trade agreements: the average firm starts exporting more once FTA ne-
gotiations start. Whether or not trade agreements keep stimulating trade
up to five years after their official implementation is less clear. Moreover,
firms anticipate trade agreements by entering FTA markets ahead of entry
into force.
Next, we look at the heterogeneous impact of EIAs on different types of
firms. We first include interaction effects of our trade agreement dummy
and firm characteristics in our model, and then allow for a non-linear
relation between firm characteristics and the effects of a trade agreement
by estimating quantile regressions. We find that trade agreements have a
homogeneous impact on firm-level exports in terms of firm productivity and
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profitability, but a heterogeneous impact in terms of age and firm size. We
find that especially firms with 50 to 99 employees tend to take advantage
of the opportunities presented by trade agreements, as well as old firms.
Finally, we look at the impact of trade agreements on different margins of
trade. We find that the probability of firms starting to export new products
to a market is higher when there is a trade agreement with market. This
regardless of whether the firm is already active on that market (product
diversification) or not (product-market diversification).
Chapter 5. In this last chapter, we take a step back from evaluating the
effects of trade policy, and instead look at how these trade policies come
about. More in particular, we zoom in on determinants of bilateral tariff
negotiation outcomes.
We contribute to the literature, by providing evidence on the practical
importance of the terms-of-trade framework as an explanation for the
presence of trade agreements. While the terms-of-trade hypothesis is
more than a century old, evidence to support or reject the theoretical
arguments has long been non-existing. This paper is the first paper to
test the augmented terms-of-trade hypothesis in relation to bilateral trade
agreements. We do so in a comprehensive manner by combining different
factors in the process of trade negotiations.
Our analysis proceeds in two stages. We start by estimating the impact
of market power on the probability of a product to be exempted from
liberalization in free trade agreements on the one hand, and the speed of
liberalization of a product on the other hand. We then extend our baseline
model and include variables capturing lobbying efforts and reciprocity in
negotiations in our estimations.
Using a novel dataset on 15 recently concluded FTAs, we find support for
the terms-of-trade hypothesis. We find that products with higher market
power are exempted more often from liberalization and have a slower
liberalization path. While economists often assume that most countries are
“small”, i.e. they do not have market power for any good, our results show
that this is not the case. Even small countries have considerable market
power for certain products, and manage to exclude these products from
liberalization in free trade agreements. Moreover, extending our baseline
model and including variables capturing lobbying efforts and reciprocity
of trade negotiations, also results in findings that are consistent with
the theory. We find that products in import-competing sectors that are
politically organized to lobby are excluded from liberalization more often,
while we find the opposite for products from exporting sectors that are
politically organized. Our results are robust to using different measures of
market power and lobbying.
Finally, our findings suggest that countries that are already willing to
go further when it comes to opening up trade in terms of free trade of
goods, seem to also be more open to including more WTO+ and WTOX
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provisions. However, our results do not support the idea that countries can
include more WTO+ and/or WTOX provisions when granting the partner
country less liberal tariff conditions.
Chapter 2
Dissecting the trade creation
effects of Europe’s Economic
Integration Agreements
2.1 Introduction
In the past two decades, the number of economic integration agreements
notified to the WTO has exploded. In 2016 alone, six new FTAs entered
into force1. This brings the total number of active trade agreements notified
to the WTO to a stunning 432 as of January 1, 2017. All WTO members
have signed at least one trade agreement. Though EIAs differ in terms of
integration intensity, their popularity signals that they have become the
main instrument of current international economic integration.
Not only has the number of EIAs being signed and negotiated exploded
in recent years, the economic literature investigating the impact of EIAs
has grown equally fast. This has led to tremendous improvements in
methodology. While earlier studies report very mixed results on the trade
effects of EIAs (see Cipollina and Salvatici (2010) for a comprehensible
meta-analysis), recent studies have found more consistent results (see for
example Baier and Bergstrand, 2007;Magee, 2008; Kohl, 2014 and Baier,
Bergstrand, and Feng, 2014).
Especially the European Union (EU) has been a driving force behind
the explosion of EIAs signed and negotiated in recent years. A substantial
share of trade between the EU and the rest of the world is currently covered
by EIAs, and this share will increase because of ongoing negotiations. Not
counting intra-EU trade, 70% of all imports to the EU27 in 2013 and 27% of
all EU27 exports were mitigated by EIAs. When we also take into account
1rtais.wto.org
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trade agreements that had not yet entered into force or that were being
negotiated, these numbers go up to 94% for imports and 63% for exports2.
Despite the EU’s active role in international EIAs, surprisingly little is
known about the EIAs’ overall actual impact on European trade. So, far,
the literature has mainly focused on two alternative and related questions:
first, the impact of the EU itself on intra-EU trade flows; second, the impact
of specific EIAs on European trade. Given the specific characteristics of
each bilateral trade relationship, the latter findings cannot be generalized.
Therefore, this paper aims to fill this gap in the literature by providing
a complete and systematic impact assessment of all recent EU EIAs on
European exports and imports.
The two related strands in the literature provide inspiration for this goal.
First, studies assessing the trade impact of the EU itself point to substantial
trade-creation effects from the gradual process of European integration.
Bussie`re, Fidrmuc, and Schnatz (2008) and Spies and Marques (2009),
among others, point to large trade-creation effects from EU enlargements.
The introduction of the euro has also enhanced intra-EU trade (see for
example Micco, Stein, and Ordon˜ez (2003); Baldwin, Frankel, and Melitz
(2006) and Kelejian, Tavlas, and Petroulas (2012)). However, EU integration
also caused trade-diversion effects for the rest of the world Magee, 2008;
Geldi, 2012 providing a strong rationale for international trade agreements
between the EU and its trading partners.
The second related strand in the literature focuses on the impact of EU
EIAs on EU trade. However, these studies are restricted to only an analysis
of one or a few specific EIAs. For example, Bensassi, Ma´rquez-Ramos, and
Mart´ınez-Zarzoso (2012) study EuroMed trade agreements between certain
EU Member States (France, Germany, Italy, and Spain) and four North
African countries (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia) for the period
1995 2008. They find that the FTAs have a positive and significant effect on
the exports of the North African countries to their main European partners.
Persson and Wilhelmsson (2007) study the impact of EU trade preferences
for developing countries, using data on the imports of EU15 countries
from developing countries over the period 1960 2002. They find that trade
preferences, in general, increase exports from developing countries to the
EU15 countries, but this is not the case for all preferential schemes. While
the focus of Camarero, Go´mez, and Tamarit (2012) is estimating the effect
of the euro on the trade of 26 OECD countries, they also provide some
evidence on the effects of FTAs between the EU15 and Chile, Iceland,
Mexico, Norway, and South Korea. Finally, Lakatos and Nilsson (2015)
quantify the impact of the 2011 EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement on
trade flows between the EU and South Korea.
Generally speaking, these specific studies (also called specialist studies in
the literature), conclude that EU EIAs increase both imports and exports
2Own calculations based on data described in section 2.3.
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between the EU and its trading partners. These findings may, however,
be driven by the specific features of each bilateral trade relationship or
by differences in the applied methodology. Therefore, the quantitative
effects of these specialist studies cannot be compared and generalist studies
are required if one is interested in the overall effect of EIAs (Kohl 2014).
Generalist studies involve the construction of a large dataset with many
EIAs to measure their impact on world trade, while specialist studies
typically examine the effect of a single agreement. Moreover, these previous
studies neglect the probable interaction between trade agreements that can
only be taken into account when studying the impact of all EIAs at the
same time. The specialist focus on a specific EIA obviously has merit, as
it provides an insight into the agreement-specific impact. However, this
approach lacks generalizability. Therefore, this paper opts for systematically
analyzing the effects of EU EIAs by combining the specialist and generalist
approaches. By taking a hybrid approach and combining the methodological
strength of generalist studies with the sensitivity to the heterogeneity of
specialist studies, we obtain sound results that are specific, yet allow for
comparison.
In this paper, we quantify ex post the effects of these agreements on
trade flows between the European Union and the rest of the world. We
use a panel on aggregate trade flows between 27 EU countries3 and 201
countries and territories that make up the rest of the world for the period
of 1988-2013. Following the empirical approach by Baier and Bergstrand
(2007), we account for the endogeneity of EIAs by including three sets of
fixed effects (importer-time, exporter-time and country pair).
We contribute to the literature by thoroughly disentangling the het-
erogeneous effects of EIAs. We do this in several different ways. First,
we not only look at the effects of EIAs on total trade flows, but we also
consider the impact on the intensive and extensive margin. We find that no
effects on the total trade flows sometimes hide effects on the intensive and
extensive margin. Both margins appear thus to be important for capturing
the true trade effects of EIAs.
Second, we allow for differential timing of effects, by including five and
ten year lags and calculating average treatment effects. While there are
already papers that explore differential timing of EIA effects or the effects
of EIAs on the margins, Baier, Bergstrand, and Feng (2014), Florensa,
Ma´rquez-Ramos, and Recalde (2015) and Ma´rquez-Ramos, Florensa, and
Recalde (2015) are the only papers so far that allow for differential timing
of different types of EIAs, while at the same time looking at the margins,
controlling for endogeneity of EIAs and multilateral resistance. Consistent
with this literature, we find that medium term reaction effects are important.
Longer term effects do not seem to play a substantial role in the European
context.
3We do not include Croatia in our sample, as Croatia became a member of the EU
in mid 2013.
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Third, we allow for heterogeneity across EIAs. We start by considering
various types of EIAs by including separate dummies for preferential trade
agreements (PTAs), free trade agreements (FTAs) and customs unions and
common market agreements (CUs). Next, we also look at the trade effect
of each EIA separately. We find that most EIAs increase trade flows, but
the magnitude of effects varies strongly across agreements. This is obscured
when only looking at a general EIA dummy.
Fourth, we look at the different motivations for concluding EIAs and
how these affect trade. Our findings indicate that the EIAs that were
concluded by the EU for economic reasons stimulate trade more than those
concluded for political reasons or a mix of political and economic reasons.
Fifth, we estimate the effects of EIAs on trade flows for each EU country
individually. We find that the effects for most countries have the same
sign. However, there is great variation in the magnitude of the effects, with
such effects not being statistically significant for a substantial number of
countries.
Finally, we allow for directionality of the effects of EIAs on trade flows.
As expected, we find that EIAs do not have symmetric effects on imports
and exports; while FTAs strongly increase import competition in the EU
market, their effect on European exports is much more complex.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses
the gravity model and describes the empirical methodology used while
section 2.3 discusses the data. Section 2.4 presents the main results and
findings and section 2.5 presents robustness checks dealing with endogeneity
and changes over time in pair-specific unobservables. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Methodology
To estimate the effects of trade policy ex post, many different techniques
have been employed, ranging from single equation regressions to large-scale
computable general equilibrium models (Baldwin and Venables, 1995).
Most approaches can be classified into two categories: partial equilibrium
gravity models and computable general equilibrium models. While both
types of methodologies have advantages and drawbacks4, the literature
has “voted with its feet”, and gravity models have been the workhorse
of the international trade literature for the last 50 years when estimating
trade policy effects ex post (Head and Mayer, 2014). Computable general
4While computable general equilibrium models have the advantage of being able to
capture the complicated interplay of effects which may occur after changes in trade
policy, they are very sensitive to changes in the calibration of parameters, and face a
trade-off between transparency and complexity. This in contrast to gravity models,
which use historical data and econometric techniques to estimate partial equilibrium
effects of changes in trade policy. However, the latter do not provide direct estimates
of welfare costs, as do the former. For comprehensive, yet in-depth discussions of these
methodologies, see Baldwin and Venables (1995), Piermartini and Teh (2005) and Ivus
and Strong (2007).
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equilibrium models, on the other hand, are the main tool to predict the
effects of changes in trade policy ex ante.
In this paper, we use a panel gravity model with three sets of fixed
effects, as proposed by Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and subsequently used
by a large number of studies.
The gravity model
Since its introduction by Tinbergen (1962), the gravity model has become
the most applied model for analyzing trade flows. In its most simple form,
the gravity model states that trade flows between a country pair depend
negatively on the distance between the two countries and positively on the
mass of each country. Pioneering studies by Tinbergen (1962), Poyhonen
(1963), and Linneman (1966) provided initial specifications of the gravity
model and estimates of the determinants of trade flows.
During the decades following Tinbergen’s seminal work, many authors
have come up with theoretical foundations for the gravity equation. Once
a theoretical orphan, the gravity model is now a fully-fledged model with
strong theoretical micro-foundations. Though estimating the trade elasticity
is model-specific and different types of quantitative models (like Armington,
Krugman, Ricardian and Melitz models) might yield different structural
interpretations of it, Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clarez (2012)
argue that the gravity equation offers a common way to estimate the trade
elasticity and therefore a common estimator of the gains from trade, despite
the different micro-level predictions of different quantitative trade models.
They adopt a broad definition of the gravity model and suggest that a
trade model satisfies the gravity equation if bilateral trade flows can be
decomposed as follows:
lnXijt = Ait +Bjt + γlnτijt + υijt (2.1)
where i, j = 1, ..., N countries; Xijt denotes bilateral trade flows between
country i and country j at time t; Ait denotes the characteristics of country
i at time t; Bjt denotes the characteristics of country j at time t; γ denotes
the partial elasticity of bilateral imports with respect to variable trade
costs; τijt denotes variable trade costs and υijt denotes parameters that
are country pair-specific but different from variable trade costs.
This general gravity model can easily be extended to accommodate a
range of variables in which the researcher might be interested, explaining
the popularity of the gravity model. One common extension is the inclusion
of a dummy variable when two countries share an EIA, allowing to evaluate
the trade effects of EIAs. The gravity equation then takes the following
form:
lnXijt = Ait +Bjt + γlnτijt + ζEIAijt + υ
′
ijt (2.2)
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with ζ denoting the trade effect of EIAs.
Aitken (1973) was the first to apply the gravity equation to trade
agreements to measure the effect of the former on intra-bloc trade. Many
followed, with for example Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997), Frankel (1997),
and Soloaga and Winters (2001) extending the model to also take trade
diversion effects into account.
Empirical pitfalls of the gravity model
Estimating equation (2) in order to recover ζ might seem fairly simple.
There are, however, several econometric problems that have to be addressed
when estimating the gravity equation empirically.
First, and for this paper most importantly, the EIA dummy suffers
from an endogeneity problem. This potentially biases the gravity model
when standard estimation methods are used. Contrary to what is normally
assumed in empirical papers, the EIA dummy variable is not an exogenous
variable: country pairs that conclude trade agreements are not randomly
selected, but unobserved time-invariant bilateral variables influence simulta-
neously the presence of an EIA and the volume of trade. This endogeneity
problem is extremely troublesome, as there does not exist a consensus
in the literature as to the direction of the bias. Baier and Bergstrand
(2007) find that unobserved heterogeneity biases the coefficients of FTAs
downwards in standard gravity equation estimations, while Magee (2003)
argues that - building on the natural trading partner hypothesis - countries
tend to conclude EIAs if they already have significant bilateral trade. This
argument is consistent with Roy (2012), who finds that most positive and
significant estimates of FTAs can be explained by positive selection of
country pairs in trade agreements. The CUs in Roy’s study, however, seem
to be robust to selection on observables. If any, there is a negative selection
effect of CUs.
Even though this endogeneity problem was already raised in 1993 by
Trefler, Baier and Bergstrand (2002 and 2004) and Magee (2003) were
the first to address it empirically - using instrumental variables with cross
section data. However, due to the lack of reliable instruments, these studies
have not been very successful in solving the endogeneity of EIAs, providing
“at best mixed evidence of isolating the effect of FTAs on trade flows” as
Baier and Bergstrand (2007) put it.
Baier and Bergstrand (2007) provide a more convincing solution to
the endogeneity problem, using panel data. Panel data are extremely
useful in the presence of unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity as it is
possible to control for this unobserved heterogeneity and hence alleviate the
endogeneity bias by using either country pair fixed effects or differencing
the data5. Both solutions have since then been extensively used in empirical
5Baier and Bergstrand use five year intervals to difference their data, instead of
the usual first differences, while Anderson and Yotov (2011) use four year intervals.
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work.
Differencing panel data has one major advantage over using fixed effects:
if the error terms are highly serially correlated, then estimating the model in
differences will be more efficient than fixed effects for large T (Wooldridge,
2010). However, fourth differencing also results in a loss of data as the
fourth-differences estimator uses up the first four years of data. This
becomes especially problematic when adding lags to our baseline model,
as it results in additional loss of data and we only have a time span of 26
years. This is why we will estimate our model using both methods (see
section 2.5 for results using differenced data).
Second, Ait and Bjt include the so-called multilateral price/resistance
(MR) term (see for example Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). There are
different methods to estimate this unobserved MR term (see Feenstra 2004).
A first option is to proxy the multilateral MR term by price index data (like
GDP deflators). However, as not all costs of making transactions across
borders are reflected in aggregate price indices, this estimation method will
yield biased results.
A second option is to directly estimate the MR term. This requires
solving a highly nonlinear system of N equations with a custom nonlinear
least squares program. As this is computationally very burdensome, this is
not feasible for datasets with a large number of country pairs and years
such as ours.
A third alternative is to include country-time fixed effects. Though still
computationally burdensome when working with large panel datasets6, this
has become the preferred method of many authors for solving the MR
problem (including Baier and Bergstrand 2007).
Third, zero trade flows are very common in trade datasets when a global
perspective is adopted. When using a loglinearized gravity equation, these
zero observations are ignored, which can potentially bias the results. Two
methods have been proposed in the literature to cope with this zero-trade-
flow problem: including a selection equation and estimating the model
multiplicatively using for example Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood
(as proposed by Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). However, due to the particular
characteristics and quality of our data set, only 34% of the trade flows in our
sample contain zeroes or missing values. Moreover, it is computationally
impossible to estimate a model with a large number of fixed effects using
PPML because of convergence issues. Finally, Lima˜o (2016) notes that
selection due to zero trade flows is not an issue if one is interested only in
the impact of EIAs on the treated group, as is the case in this paper, and
This is because trade flows typically change very slowly over time, making it very likely
that first differenced data will not display much variation. We will call this fifth and
fourth differences, respectively, from now on.
6Calculation times have luckily shortened tremendously since the introduction
of the high-dimensional fixed effects command reghdfe for Stata by Guimaraes and
Portugal (2010), which was first used in a gravity setting in Kohl, Brakman, and
Garretsen (2016).
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believe non-traders will never form an EIA. Evidence from a meta-analysis
by Cipollina and Salvatici (2010) indicates no significant differences between
estimates that address the zeros issue (Lima˜o, 2016).
This brings us to the following baseline model
lnXijt = β0 +β1PTAijt+β2FTAijt+β3CUijt+δit+ψjt+ηij+ijt (2.3)
with Xijt bilateral import and export flows from country i to country j
at year t, PTAijt (FTAijt) (CUijt) a dummy variable taking the value
1 when countries i and j have an active PTA (FTA) (CU) in year t; δit
importer-time fixed effect; ψjt exporter-time fixed effect; ηij country pair
fixed effect and ijt error term. Note that terms Ait and Bjt of equation
2.2 – which typically include standard gravity variables such as the log of
GDP and a dummy variable for sharing contiguous borders, a common
language or colonial ties – are completely absorbed by our importer-time
and exporter-time fixed effects.
Dissecting the effects of EIAs
Our properly specified baseline model is, however, too simple to capture the
complex trade effects of EIAs. Starting from our simple baseline model, we
will therefore progressively dissect the heterogeneous effects of the European
Union EIAs in a more precise manner. We hence let go of the frequently
used empirical assumption of homogeneous trade effects of EIAs (see for
example Rose 2000; Feenstra, Markusen and Rose 2001 and Frankel and
Rose 2002). In this paper, we dissect the complexity of the effects of EIAs
in six ways.
First of all, we are interested in the exact way trade agreements affect
trade flows: do EIAs affect how much countries trade of a given good (the
intensive margin) or rather how many goods are traded (the extensive mar-
gin)? Following Hummels and Klenow (2005), we will therefore decompose
our trade flows into an intensive and an extensive margin, using highly
disaggregated data.
Hummels and Klenow (2005) define the intensive margin of goods ex-
ported from country i to j in year t as the market share of country i in
country j’s imports from the world within the set of products that i exports
to j:
IMijt =
∑
p∈Pijt X
p
ijt∑
p∈Pijt X
p
Wjt
(2.4)
where Xpijt is the value of exports from i to j for product p in year t, X
p
Wjt
the value of country j’s imports from the world for product p and Pijt the
set of all products exported from i to j in year t.
The extensive margin of goods exported is defined as the fraction of all
products that are exported from i to j, where each product is weighted by
the importance of that product in world exports to j in year t:
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EMijt =
∑
p∈Pijt X
p
Wjt∑
p∈PWjt X
p
Wjt
(2.5)
with PWjt the set of all products exported by the world to j in year t.
A nice property of the Hummels and Klenow (2005) decomposition is
that the product of the margins equals the ratio of exorts from i to j
relative to country j’s total imports. Taking the natural logs and using
some algebra, Hummels and Klenow show that the log of the value of
the trade flow from i to j can be decomposed linearly into the log of the
extensive margin, the log of the intensive margin and the value of imports
from the world into country j:
lnXijt = lnEMijt + lnIMijt + lnXjt (2.6)
Note that the term lnXjt will be absorbed by our importer-time fixed effect
δit in our estimations.
Second, EIAs could also have very different effects depending on how
long they have already been in place. EIAs are typically phased in over
a period of five to ten years7, and terms-of-trade changes take typically a
few years before coming into effect, altering the effect of EIAs over time.
Following Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and Baier, Bergstrand, and Feng
(2014), we estimate a distributed lags model by including five and ten
year lags of our set of EIA variables in our estimation to pick up on these
reaction effects.
Our fixed effects specification then becomes
lnXijt = β0 + β1PTAijt + β2PTAijt−5 + β3PTAijt−10+
β4FTAijt + β5FTAijt−5 + β6FTAijt−10 + β7CUijt + β8CUijt−5+
β9CUijt−10 + δit + ψjt + ηij + ijt (2.7)
Magee (2008) goes a step further, and includes a separate dummy
per year that an EIA has entered into force. This makes it possible to
evaluate how the effects of EIAs change over time. However, including this
many dummy variables in our model results in unstable coefficients due to
multicollinearity. Trade flows typically display some hysterisis over time,
making several of these variables highly correlated.
Third, we take the dissection of the European EIAs even further and
look at the effects of each TWPTA, FTA and CU individually. We do
this by swapping the PTA, FTA and CU dummies with a separate dummy
for each agreement (the agreements included are listed in table 2.7 in the
appendix).
7Du¨r et al. (2014) coded 587 agreements signed between 1945 and 2009 and find
that it takes on average 5.7 years for the tariff cuts of an FTA to be fully implemented
and 4.5 years for a CU. Partial trade agreements have a relatively short so-called
“transition period” of just 1.7 years.
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Fourth, and pushing the dissecting of the EIAs even further, we look
at the impact of different motivations for concluding trade agreements on
trade flows. We do this by re-categorizing our EIA dummies and adding
them into our baseline model.
Fifth, we have a closer look at the effects of the EU EIAs on each EU
country individually. EU EIAs are negotiated by the European Union, but
need not have a similar impact on all Member States. The 27 economies of
the European Union differ considerably and EIAs can have very different
economic effects, depending on the characteristics of the signatories. We
will therefore estimate our baseline model for the EU countries individually.
Following Herderschee and Qiao (2007), we do this by creating three sets
of interaction terms with on the one hand our EIA dummies and on the
other hand a dummy for the country for which we estimate the individual
effect. Our fixed effects specification then becomes
lnXijt = β0 + β1PTAijt ∗ Ij + β2FTAijt ∗ Ij + β3CUijt ∗ Ij+
δit + ψjt + ηij + ijt (2.8)
with Ij an indicator variable for country j.
Finally we look at the directionality of effects. Most papers looking at
the effects of EIAs - including Baier, Bergstrand & Feng (2014) and Kohl
(2014) - assume implicitly that the effects of EIAs on imports and exports
are symmetric. In this paper, we will allow for EIAs to have different
effects on import and export flows. We will do this by interacting our EIA
dummies with a dummy variable indicating whether the 27 EU countries
are trading with other EU countries, importing from non-EU27 countries
or exporting to non-EU27 countries. Note that we use our full sample of
observations in all regressions.
2.3 Data
The data used in this paper cover bilateral export and import flows between
the 27 Member States of the European Union and the rest of the world
(201 countries and territories) from 1988 through 2013. Table 2.1 lists the
countries included in our dataset.
We have two main datasets. Data on bilateral export and import flows
come from the Eurostat database COMEXT. We opted for this database as
it contains the most detailed and complete information on trade between
each European Union country and the rest of the world: both intra- and
extra-EU imports and exports are available on the eight-digit level from
1988 to 2013 for a large number of countries8. Note that data on import
8The COMEXT database considers Belgium and Luxembourg, and Liechtenstein
and Switzerland as one country. So when we refer to Belgium or Switzerland in this
paper, we really mean Belgium and Luxembourg, and Switzerland and Liechtenstein.
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Table 2.1: List of countries in dataset
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, American Samoa, Andorra, Angola, Anguilla, Antarctica,
Antigua Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Aruba, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bermuda, Bhutan, Bolivia,
Bosnia Herzegovina, Botswana, Bouvet Isl., Brazil, British Indian OT, British Virgin Isl.,
Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon,
Canada, Cayman Isl., Central African Rep., Chad, Chile, China, Christmas Isl., Cocos Isl.,
Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cook Isl., Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Rep.,
Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Rep., DR Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,
Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Falkland Isl., Faroe Isl., Fiji, Finland, France,
French Polynesia, French ST, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Green-
land, Grenada, Guam, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Heard and Mc-
Donald Isl., Holy See (Vatican), Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia,
Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Ko-
rea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Macao,
Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Isl., Maurita-
nia, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Montserrat, Morocco,
Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherland Antilles, Netherlands, New
Caledonia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Norfolk Isl., Northern Mariana
Isl., North-Korea, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Papua New Guinea,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Pitcairn, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda,
Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra
Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Isl., Somalia, South Georgia & Sandwich Isl.,
South-Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, St Helena, Ascension & Tristan, St Kitts & Nevis, St Lu-
cia, St Pierre & Miquelon, St Vincent & Grenadines, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden,
Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tokelau,
Tonga, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Turks & Caicos Isl., Tuvalu, UAE,
Uganda, UK, Ukraine, United States Minor OI, Uruguay, US Virgin Isl., USA, Uzbekistan,
Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Wallis & Futuna, Yemen, Zimbabwe, Zambia
flows are typically considered to be more reliable than data on exports, as
the former are often reported in more detail, so to allow customs to apply
duties, taxes or other regulatory controls. WTO (2012) notes that there
are some exceptions to this rule of thumb: export data can be more reliable
when trade takes place within a customs area and when exporters have a
strong incentive to draw-back internal taxes (i.e. to receive a rebate on
taxes or duty paid for imported goods which are subsequently exported in
the same form or a different form). Moreover, Eurostat (2017) notes that
while discrepancies between imports and mirrored exports might arise for
a number of methodological reasons, these disappear at a more aggregate
level.
For our dataset on trade agreements, we constructed a multichotomous
index of EIAs. We used the same EIA classification as Baier and Bergstrand
(based upon Frankel 1997 and Balassa 1987), but since the European Union
did not conclude any economic union agreements and because of the small
number of two-way preferential trade agreements, we compiled the Baier
and Bergstrand index into three categories: (1) one-way and two-way
preferential trade agreement (PTA), (2) free trade agreement (FTA) and
(3) customs union and common market (CU). Data on FTAs and CUs were
collected from McGill (2014), Tuck (2014), WorldTradeLaw.net (2013),
WTO (2014), EFTA (2014) and European European Commission (2014)9.
9When data on entry into force of agreements exceptionally differed between sources,
we used the data provided by the European Commission. Comparing our EIA data to
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Table 2.7 in the appendix lists all the European Union free trade agreements
and customs unions with the rest of the world. For data on PTAs, we used
Regulations of the EU Council concerning GSP schemes (1987; 1988; 1994;
1998; 2001; 2005; 2008; 2012) and European European Commission (2014)
as our main sources. Summary statistics on EIAs are provided in table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Summary statistics on EIAs.
Agreement Frequency Percentage Share of EIAs
No EIA 80 515 44%
OPTA 57 259 31% 56%
TWPTA 6 763 4% 7%
FTA 24 778 14% 24%
CU 12 999 7% 13%
Total 182 314 100%
2.4 Main results
Baseline model
Table 2.3 represents estimates of the partial equilibrium effects of different
types of EIAs on trade flows (i.e. import and export flows), based on
equation (2.3). As the Breusch-Pagan test and the Wooldrigde test indicate
the presence of severe heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the data,
respectively, we employ standard errors that are clustered two-way, namely
by country pair and year.
First of all, note that the European Union has only three customs unions
with the rest of the world (Andorra, Turkey and San Marino) and three
common market agreements (Liechtenstein10, Norway and Iceland). Results
for the CU dummies will therefore mainly be driven by Turkey, Norway
and Iceland, and will have large standard errors due to the small sample
size.
From the first column of table 2.3, we find that deeper integration
agreements have larger effects on trade flows. This is consistent with Baier,
Bergstrand, and Feng (2014), who also find that FTAs and CUs have larger
average effects on trade flows than PTAs, and CUs have larger effects on
trade than FTAs and PTAs.
We find that PTAs do not have a statistically or economically significant
impact on trade flows. This is surprising, as the goal of most EU PTAs is
the EIA data collected by Baier and Bergstrand (and available at www.nd.edu/~jbergstr)
reveals a high intercoder reliability: we obtain 91% agreement between both datasets
and a Krippendorph’s Alpha of .85.
10We ignore the common market agreement between Liechtenstein and the EU, as
Liechtenstein and Switzerland are considered one country in our dataset.
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Table 2.3: GLS estimation of the baseline model using 3 sets of fixed effects.
(1) (2) (3)
X IM EM X IM EM X IM EM
PTA 0.02 -0.18***0.20*** 0.01 -0.18**0.19*** 0.07 -0.15* 0.21***
(0.050) (0.067) (0.056) (0.050) (0.070) (0.058) (0.053) (0.071) (0.070)
Lag5 0.08** -0.03 0.12*** 0.08* -0.04 0.12***
(0.040) (0.044) (0.034) (0.042) (0.045) (0.037)
Lag10 0.06 -0.01 0.07
(0.043) (0.048) (0.041)
FTA 0.20** -0.11 0.31*** 0.20** -0.10 0.30*** 0.23** -0.05 0.28***
(0.079) (0.087) (0.082) (0.075) (0.088) (0.082) (0.089) (0.095) (0.092)
Lag5 0.09 -0.09 0.17*** 0.10* -0.08 0.18***
(0.053) (0.051) (0.045) (0.056) (0.061) (0.050)
Lag10 0.02 -0.02 0.04
(0.043) (0.053) (0.050)
CU 0.49*** -0.10 0.59*** 0.45*** -0.09 0.54*** 0.46*** -0.08 0.54***
(0.119) (0.096) (0.116) (0.112) (0.094) (0.118) (0.121) (0.103) (0.136)
Lag5 0.16* -0.04 0.20** 0.19** -0.03 0.22**
(0.080) (0.068) (0.071) (0.083) (0.082) (0.077)
Lag10 -0.08 -0.07 -0.02
(0.071) (0.078) (0.077)
Total ATE
PTA 0.19** -0.20**0.40***
(0.078) (0.091) (0.090)
FTA 0.35** -0.15 0.50***
(0.132) (0.140) (0.124)
CU 0.57*** -0.17 0.74***
(0.188) (0.154) (0.143)
Observations 182,314 182,314 182,314 162,976162,976162,976 134,031134,031134,031
Estimation includes importer-year, exporter-year and pair fixed effects. Standard errors
clustered on country pair and year in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Total
average treatment effects (ATEs) are computed using a two-tailed joint significance test.
to increase imports from (poor) extra-EU countries to the EU. However,
there is some evidence that exports eligible for preferential treatment do
not always enter the EU market at a preferential rate, due to for example
complex rules of origin procedures (see for example Manchin (2006) for
a discussion of the preference utilisation rate of ACP countries). This
unexploited potential of PTAs might explain why they have not succeeded
in significantly raising imports to the EU.
We find a differential result based on the estimates for FTAs and CUs.
These trade agreements have a statistically significant impact on total trade
flows, increasing them on average with 100 ∗ (e0.20 − 1) = 22% and 63%
respectively.
Key role for the extensive margin
Each set in table 2.3 presents the results of running the same specification
with three alternative dependent variables: bilateral import or export flows
(X or ln Xijt in equation (2.3)), the intensive margin (IM or lnIMijt) and
the extensive margin (EM or lnEMijt).
We find that the extensive margin plays an important role for all three
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types of EIAs. Even though we did not find any effect of PTAs on total
trade flows, we do find that PTAs have a positive and statistically significant
effect on the extensive margin and increase the variety of goods traded.
This trade diversification effect is, however, offset by an equally large but
negative effect on the intensive margin: we find that the volume traded but
per good decreases.
For FTAs and CUs we also find an increase in the extensive margin.
This increase is however not offset by intensive margin effects, resulting
in positive total trade flow effects. We elaborate further on the on the
margins of trade and differential timing of EIAs in the next section.
Differential timing of EIAs
In column (2) and (3) of table 2.3, we added five and ten year lags to the
specifications11. We find that trade agreements continue having effects
on trade flows up to five years after the EIA has entered into force. As
mentioned before, this is because of two reasons. First, it takes time for the
terms of trade to adjust to the new situation. Second, many stipulations
of trade agreements only enter into force after a certain period of time,
since EIAs are typically phased-in over a time period of up to five years or
sometimes even ten or more years12.
In contrast to Baier, Bergstrand, and Feng (2014), we do not find any
effect of EIAs up to ten years. This suggests that the average onset of
effects of EIAs with a European partner is faster than the average EIA.
Taking a closer look, we see that PTAs do not have a contemporaneous
effect on trade flows, but they do have a small positive effect (+8%) in the
medium run. FTAs increase total trade flows on average with 11% after
five years, while CUs increase them on average with 21%.
Looking at the margins, we find that these lagged effects are completely
driven by changes in the relative number of goods traded. In contrast to
Baier, Bergstrand, and Feng (2014), we do not find that intensive margin
effects of EIAs precede extensive margin effects. Our findings also contradict
the theoretical work of Ruhl (2008) and Arkolakis, Eaton and Kortum
(2012) who argue that effects on the extensive margin are delayed due to
fixed export costs and delayed consumer responses respectively. This again
points in the direction of EU EIAs having very fast effects on trade flows.
11Note that when adding five and ten year lags, only agreements enforced by
respectively 2008 and 2003 are considered.
12However, it is not clear yet whether and how these phase-in periods affect trade.
Pioneering work by Besedesˇ, Kohl, and Lake (2015), using data on the phase-in
schedules for all products in the North American FTA (NAFTA), shows that US
imports of products with phased in cuts grew at statistically similar rates as imports
of products which experienced an immediate cut in tariff rates. Evidence for other
trade agreements is not available yet, due to the large data collection required for the
analysis.
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In order to see the cumulative effects of EIAs over time, we calculated
total average treatment effects (ATEs) using a two-tailed joint significance
test13. We find that PTAs have a small, but positive and statistically
significant effect on trade flows over time (+21%), while FTAs and CUs
have moderate (+42%) and large effects (+77%), respectively, in the long
run.
Effects of individual EIAs
We now look at the different European Union EIAs separately. How does
each FTA and CU influence trade flows between the 27 EU countries and
the rest of the world? For this, we swap the FTA and CU dummy in
equation (2.3) for a separate dummy for each agreement14.
Results are summarized in figure 2.1. The full regression output can be
found in table 2.9 in the appendix. Consistent with our baseline results,
we find that most trade agreements have a positive effect on total trade
flows. A majority of trade agreements in our sample (11 or 55%) increase
contemporaneous trade flows, while 8 (40%) do not have any statistically
significant effect and one EIA - namely the FTA with Albania - has decreased
total trade flows.
Looking at the margins, we find again that the extensive margins dom-
inates. For most EIAs we find that the increase in trade flows is driven
by an expansion of the relative amount of goods traded, and not by an
increase in the volume of goods traded. The only exceptions are Tunisia
and Morocco, where we find positive effects on the intensive margin and a
small negative effect on the extensive margin.
Motivation matters
Since the start of the EU, EU trade policy has differentiated between
different groups of countries, granting them different preferences. The
classification of the many different types of EU EIAs into only three
categories is therefore rather crude. Persson and Wilhemsson (2007)15
use the notion of “pyramid of privilege” to study different European PTA
13This in contrast to Baier, Bergstrand, and Feng (2014) who simply take the sum
of the coefficients that are statistically significant.
14Note that we cannot estimate the individual effects of the agreements with Papua,
CARIFORUM, Cameroon, Mauritius, Seychelles, Madagascar, Zimbabwe, Botswana,
Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia Switzer-
land, South Korea, Colombia, Peru, Honduras, Panama, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and El
Salvador because of collinearity. Most of these agreements only entered into force in
the last year(s) of our sample, or are concluded with countries that have poor data
availability. Therefore we group them together in a control variable. This control
variable also absorbs all other EIAs that are not captured by the separate agreement
dummies (namely PTAs and EIAs that were in place between the rest of the world
and EU countries, before they were part of the European Union).
15We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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Figure 2.1: Contemporaneous effects (in %) of individual EIAs using a GLS
estimation with fixed effects.
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Note: The percentage next to each bar indicates the share of each country in total extra-
EU trade for 2013. The stars next to the agreements indicate statistical significance of the
estimate for the total trade flow (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Only estimates for
the margins which are statistically significant at the 10% treshold are shown in the graph.
The full regression output can be found in table 2.9 in the appendix. Note that we use
contemporaneous effects, as computing total ATEs with five and ten year lags would mean
that we could only look at EIAs enforced by 2003.
schemes and the “privileges” or trade benefits they offer. We extend this
framework to EIAs with a deeper level of integration, and also include
FTAs and CUs. Moreover, we not only look at the degree of market access
offered by each EIA subtype, but also look at the motivation for concluding
trade agreements as the EU has many different motives for undertaking
EIAs, some of which are more economically inspired, while others are more
politically inspired (see Woolcocke (2007), for a discussion of the different
EU motivations).
We distinguish between the following subtypes of EIAs (European Com-
mission 2014). The Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) is a one-way
PTA system allowing developing country exporters to pay less or no duties
on their exports to the EU. The goal is to contribute to their economic
growth by granting these countries access to EU markets. From an EU
perspective, these agreements are not concluded to help EU firms gain more
market acces, and hence they are not expected to stimulate EU exports.
We therefore consider the motivation for concluding these agreements from
the perspective of the EU as political. The Everything but Arms (EBA)
arrangement is similar, but only for least developed countries. It is more
encompassing, as it grants duty-free quota-free access on all products except
for arms and ammunition. Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) and
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Cooperation Agreements (CA) are both TWPTAs and grant more or at
least as much privileges as the GSP and EBA schemes.
Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA) were concluded to
establish a progressive partnership with Western Balkan countries aiming
to stabilise the region, establish a free-trade area and eventually EU mem-
bership. The motivation for these agreements is hence mainly political.
Association Agreements (ASS) are agreements setting up an all-embracing
framework to conduct bilateral relations, close political and economic co-
operation as well as human rights and democratic principles. Free trade
agreements are a core component of this. “Free Trade Agreements” (EU-
FTA)16 are economic EIAs, concluded with the purpose of increasing market
access and stimulating trade. Deep and Comprehensive FTAs (DCFTA) or
so-called “new generation” FTAs are more ambitious than EUFTAs in lift-
ing trade barriers. Finally, there are European Economic Area Agreements
and Customs Unions (EUCU), which are formed for economic, as well as
political, reasons and they grant their beneficiaries very extensive market
access.
To sum up, the GSP, EBA, TWPTA and SAA agreements are all
concluded mainly for political reasons, while the main motivation for the
Eureopean Union to conclude EUFTAs, DCFTAs and CUs is economic.
ASS are concluded for both economic and political reasons. GSP, EBA,
TWPTA and SAA enjoy low degrees of privilege, while ASS, EUFTA,
DCFTA and CU enjoy higher degrees of market access.
Table 2.7 in the appendix lists all agreements and their respective
subtype. Plotting these agreements according to their market access and
the motivation of the EU for concluding them - based on Persson and
Wilhelmsson (2007) and the descriptions of the different types of agreements
outlined in the previous paragraphs - results in figure 2.2. Note that -
unsurprisingly - there exists a strong and positive relationship between
motivation and privilege.
In order to check if this distinction also affects the data, we rerun our
baseline model, but now include a dummy for each of these agreements
instead of the PTA, FTA and CU dummies in equation (2.3). We also
include a control variable that absorbs all EIAs that are not captured by
these dummies. Note that most EPAs entered into force after 2009 and
there are only a small number of CAs. This is why we will merge both
of these subtypes into one category called TWPTA. Moreover, the first
DCFTA was concluded with South Korea and entered into force only in
2011. Hence, we will collapse both EUFTAs and DCFTAs into one category.
Our results are outlined in table 2.4. We find that motivation for
concluding EIAs matters. Looking at the contemporaneous effects, we see
16In order to distinguish between what the EU calls “Free trade agreements”, and
the more general class of FTAs, we will call the former EUFTAs from now on.
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Figure 2.2: Classification of EU EIAs according to degree of market access
(privilege) and motivation of the EU for concluding the EIA.
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Note: see text for a description of the different types of agreements. Classification is based
on Persson and Wilhelmsson (2007) and European Commission (2014).
that GSP, EBA, TWPTA and SAA do not have any effect on total trade
flows, while ASS, EUFTA and EUCU increase trade flows on average with
respectively 35%, 105% and 35%. Thus, EIAs adopted for only economic
reasons double trade flows, while EIAs adopted for both political and
economic reasons also increase trade, but to a lesser extent. EIAs made for
political reasons do not seem to have an impact on total trade flows.
This increase is entirely caused by an increase in the intensive margin for
ASS, while for EUFTA and EUCU it is completely driven by the extensive
margin. Regarding GSP and EBA, we find positive effects on the extensive
margin. This is completely offset by negative effects on the intensive margin,
resulting in a zero effect on total trade flows. Thus, GSP and EBA result
in increasing export diversification, but they do not manage to increase
total revenues from trade. We find no effects on the margins for TWPTAs.
In terms of lags, we find positive effects up to ten years for GSP, as
well as EBA, arrangements. This is driven by an increase in the extensive
margin in the medium term. TWPTAs have no lagged effects.
For the ASS, EUFTA and EUCU we find positive and statistically
significant effects up to five years. This is again driven by the extensive
margin. For EUFTAs, we find small negative effects on total trade flows
after ten year (-21%), suggesting overshooting of the initial response to
these trade agreements.
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Table 2.4: GLS estimation of the impact of motivation and degree of
privilege of EIAs using 3 sets of fixed effects.
(1) (2) (3)
X IM EM X IM EM X IM EM
GSP 0.05 -0.19** 0.25*** 0.03 -0.20** 0.23*** 0.08 -0.10 0.18**
(0.052) (0.074) (0.066) (0.055) (0.075) (0.063) (0.060) (0.073) (0.064)
Lag5 0.12** -0.02 0.14*** 0.12** -0.06 0.18***
(0.048) (0.050) (0.032) (0.046) (0.048) (0.036)
Lag10 0.13** 0.13* -0.00
(0.058) (0.067) (0.053)
EBA -0.12 -0.39*** 0.27** -0.14 -0.38** 0.24** -0.01 -0.27** 0.26**
(0.080) (0.130) (0.101) (0.084) (0.133) (0.093) (0.080) (0.122) (0.115)
Lag5 0.13* -0.10 0.23*** 0.13** -0.13 0.26***
(0.064) (0.077) (0.053) (0.060) (0.080) (0.061)
Lag10 0.24** 0.13 0.11
(0.087) (0.084) (0.074)
TWPTA 0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.05 -0.06 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01
(0.137) (0.130) (0.106) (0.131) (0.124) (0.113) (0.146) (0.134) (0.141)
Lag5 0.18 0.11 0.06 0.21 0.11 0.10
(0.108) (0.085) (0.080) (0.126) (0.109) (0.094)
Lag10 0.04 0.04 -0.00
(0.088) (0.097) (0.084)
SAA -0.04 -0.31 0.27*** -0.10 -0.39 0.28** -0.08 -0.38 0.30**
(0.327) (0.327) (0.098) (0.332) (0.334) (0.112) (0.324) (0.327) (0.122)
Lag5 -0.19 -0.36** 0.17 -0.22 -0.40** 0.18
(0.180) (0.147) (0.114) (0.193) (0.159) (0.109)
ASS 0.30*** 0.32*** -0.02 0.32*** 0.33*** -0.01 0.27** 0.22** 0.05
(0.100) (0.094) (0.071) (0.103) (0.096) (0.076) (0.120) (0.092) (0.073)
Lag5 0.18** 0.02 0.16*** 0.17* -0.01 0.18***
(0.078) (0.079) (0.055) (0.091) (0.088) (0.061)
Lag10 -0.01 -0.11 0.09
(0.112) (0.115) (0.082)
EUFTA 0.72*** -0.29 1.01*** 0.71*** -0.29 1.01*** 0.73*** -0.13 0.87***
(0.210) (0.193) (0.280) (0.204) (0.190) (0.262) (0.212) (0.145) (0.194)
Lag5 0.17* -0.20** 0.37*** 0.24** -0.19 0.43***
(0.090) (0.086) (0.111) (0.102) (0.110) (0.129)
Lag10 -0.23** -0.06 -0.17
(0.094) (0.119) (0.131)
EUCU 0.30*** -0.14 0.44*** 0.24** -0.12 0.37*** 0.28** -0.06 0.33**
(0.101) (0.107) (0.118) (0.101) (0.110) (0.126) (0.125) (0.115) (0.149)
Lag5 0.22*** -0.04 0.26*** 0.22** -0.01 0.24***
(0.072) (0.072) (0.077) (0.078) (0.080) (0.079)
Lag10 -0.12 0.05 -0.17
(0.118) (0.130) (0.148)
control 0.02 -0.15* 0.17** 0.01 -0.15* 0.16** 0.06 -0.12 0.18**
(0.063) (0.080) (0.062) (0.062) (0.081) (0.066) (0.074) (0.094) (0.083)
Lag5 0.07* -0.07 0.15*** 0.06 -0.06 0.13***
(0.042) (0.043) (0.034) (0.045) (0.049) (0.037)
Lag10 0.07* -0.03 0.10**
(0.037) (0.031) (0.038)
Observations 182,314 182,314 182,314 162,976 162,976 162,976 134,031 134,031 134,031
Estimation includes importer-year, exporter-year and pair fixed effects. Standard errors
clustered on country pair and year in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Because most SAAs only entered into force recently, lag 10 is omitted. Other captures all
EIAs not captured by the GSP, EBA, TWPTA, SAA, ASS, EUFTA and EUCU dummies.
For a list of agreements per category, see table 2.7 in the appendix.
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Effects of EIAs on individual countries
Now we relax the assumption that trade agreements have a homogeneous
impact on the countries that sign them and estimate the effects of PTAs,
FTAs and CUs on each EU27 country separately. EIAs with EU countries
are negotiated by the European Union, but will most likely not have a
similar impact on all Member States. The 27 economies of the European
Union differ considerably in terms of GDP, distance to extra-EU countries,
sharing a common language with extra-EU countries, trade openness17,
and so on. EIAs can have very different economic effects, depending on the
characteristics of the signatories (see for example Vicard (2011) for a study
showing empirically that the effectiveness of an EIA in enhancing bilateral
trade flows depends on both the economic characteristics of the country
pair and the characteristics of all other members of the EIA).
Results are presented in figure 2.3. First of all, note that our results
are consistent with the results from our baseline model. Deeper EIAs have
larger effects effects on trade flows on average, and the effects of PTAs,
FTAs and CUs are mainly driven by the extensive margin.
Furthermore, we find that the effects of EIAs on trade are qualitatively
similar for most countries: most countries experience a decrease of their
intensive margin, while at the same time experiencing an increase in their
extensive margin. The only exceptions are Cyprus and Romania. These
two countries experience a statistically significant increase in their intensive
margin due to CUs, which might be explained by their proximity to Turkey.
However, not all effects are statistically significant and there is great
heterogeneity in the magnitude of the effects. For example, FTAs increase
Ireland’s extensive margin with nearly 150%, while this is only 26% for Spain
and the EM effects for Poland are not statistically significant. Moreover,
while we find many statistically significant effects on the margins, effects
on total trade flows are less pronounced, with a majority of countries not
seeing any effects of PTAs and FTAs on trade flows.
Directionality of effects
Finally, we relax the assumption that EIAs have symmetric effects on
imports and exports. As most EIAs have different stipulations for imports
and exports, we expect to find different effects for extra-EU imports, extra-
EU exports and intra-EU trade.
Results for the baseline model are presented in table 2.5. Note that
there are no intra-EU PTAs and that PTAs mainly consist of TWPTAs for
17Arribas, Pe´rez and Tortosa-Ausina (2011) for example show that there are very
large differences in trade openness across the members of the European Union, with
Belgium, Luxembourg, Czech Republic, Hungary, The Netherlands and Slovakia the
most open countries, and Spain, the UK and especially Greece the least open.
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Figure 2.3: Contemporaneous effects of different types of EIAs on trade
flows of individual EU countries (in %) using a GLS estimation with 3 sets
of fixed effects.
(a) Effects of PTAs.
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(b) Effects of FTAs.
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(c) Effects of CUs.
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Note: The stars next to the agreements indicate statistical significance of the estimate for
the total trade flow (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Only estimates for the margins which
are statistically significant at the 10% threshold are shown in the graph. The full regression
output can be retrieved upon request to the authors.
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extra-EU exports, while for extra-EU imports both OPTAs and TWPTAs
are present. Consistent with the baseline model, we find that PTAs do
not have any effect on total trade flows. Looking at the margins however,
we now see that PTAs increase the intensive margin with 34% for exports,
while PTAs increase the extensive margin with 30% for imports. PTAs
also increase the extensive margin after five years for imports, but not for
exports.
Second, and most surprisingly, the effect of FTAs on trade flows is
completely driven by the effect of FTAs on imports. FTAs do not have an
effect on extra-EU exports. Looking at the margins, we see that FTAs have
a moderately positive effect on the extensive margin for extra-EU exports,
while they have a big impact for imports. After five years, FTAs have a
moderately positive impact on exports, while they have a small impact on
imports. Hence, the accumulated impact of FTAs on the EM is similar for
imports and exports, with the impact on imports materializing faster than
for exports.
Finally, looking at the estimates for CU, we find large effects for both
exports and imports. Extra-EU exports increase with 75%. This is com-
pletely driven by the extensive margin. This strong effect continues up to
five years after entry into force (+33%). On the import-side, we see that
the effect of CUs is almost identical to the effect of FTAs on extra-EU
imports.
Results for each agreement separately are presented in figure 2.4. We
find that the majority of trade agreements does not have symmetric effects
on imports and exports: for 12 agreements (60%) we find a positive effect
on imports while no or negative effect on exports or vice versa. For the
other 8 agreements, we find that effects have the same sign for both imports
and exports, but the magnitude of the effects differs. Moreover, we find
that EIAs have similar effects on imports and exports on average (i.e. a
moderate increase), but this does not hold for each agreement separately.
Results for the different EU agreements are presented in table 2.8 in the
appendix. We find that the lack of effects of TWPTAs on total trade is
caused by opposing effects on imports and exports: TWPTAs decrease the
intensive margin of EU imports while they increase the intensive margin of
EU exports. This contraction of trade volumes is however only temporary,
and is offset after five years by an expansion of the extensive margin of
trade.
SAAs increase the number of products traded for both imports and
exports. However, this is counteracted by a decrease in the volume traded
per good for imports but not for exports, resulting in negative total trade
flow effects for imports but not for exports. For ASS, we find symmetric
effects on both imports and exports.
Furthermore, we find that EUFTAs have a large impact on EU imports
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Table 2.5: GLS estimation of the directional effects of EIAs using 3 sets of
fixed effects.
(1) (2) (3)
X IM EM X IM EM X IM EM
Extra-EU imports
PTA 0.03 -0.23*** 0.26*** 0.02 -0.22*** 0.24*** 0.08 -0.21** 0.29***
(0.060) (0.076) (0.063) (0.061) (0.077) (0.066) (0.065) (0.080) (0.075)
Lag5 0.08* -0.05 0.14*** 0.06 -0.06 0.12**
(0.046) (0.049) (0.042) (0.051) (0.048) (0.046)
Lag10 0.07 0.00 0.07
(0.051) (0.054) (0.046)
FTA 0.34*** -0.08 0.42*** 0.32*** -0.08 0.40*** 0.40*** -0.01 0.41***
(0.087) (0.080) (0.075) (0.084) (0.084) (0.077) (0.111) (0.091) (0.099)
Lag5 0.12 -0.05 0.17** 0.10 -0.04 0.14*
(0.074) (0.061) (0.060) (0.082) (0.075) (0.071)
Lag10 0.05 -0.02 0.07
(0.080) (0.069) (0.074)
CU 0.32** 0.02 0.30** 0.32** 0.04 0.28** 0.30** 0.04 0.26*
(0.123) (0.105) (0.121) (0.125) (0.104) (0.121) (0.122) (0.116) (0.135)
Lag5 0.03 -0.13 0.16** 0.02 -0.12 0.13
(0.091) (0.089) (0.073) (0.099) (0.107) (0.083)
Lag10 -0.12 0.04 -0.16
(0.096) (0.101) (0.111)
Extra-EU exports
PTA 0.10 0.29*** -0.19** 0.08 0.25** -0.17 0.15 0.29*** -0.14
(0.124) (0.102) (0.089) (0.119) (0.100) (0.101) (0.126) (0.096) (0.121)
Lag5 0.05 0.08 -0.04 0.07 0.08 -0.02
(0.116) (0.086) (0.090) (0.126) (0.104) (0.097)
Lag10 0.04 -0.03 0.07
(0.115) (0.132) (0.111)
FTA 0.08 -0.17 0.24* 0.08 -0.16 0.24* 0.06 -0.19 0.25*
(0.116) (0.117) (0.122) (0.112) (0.116) (0.118) (0.123) (0.138) (0.136)
Lag5 0.11 -0.14 0.25** 0.15 -0.12 0.27**
(0.097) (0.088) (0.092) (0.105) (0.090) (0.092)
Lag10 -0.08 -0.20** 0.12
(0.092) (0.090) (0.096)
CU 0.56*** -0.25 0.81*** 0.49*** -0.25 0.75*** 0.54** -0.15 0.69**
(0.163) (0.156) (0.177) (0.146) (0.154) (0.176) (0.208) (0.176) (0.242)
Lag5 0.35*** 0.06 0.29** 0.33** 0.07 0.27**
(0.112) (0.112) (0.118) (0.121) (0.118) (0.120)
Lag10 -0.04 0.03 -0.06
(0.159) (0.165) (0.160)
Intra-EU trade
FTA 0.14 -0.09 0.24* 0.14 -0.09 0.23* 0.20* 0.05 0.15
(0.092) (0.118) (0.117) (0.093) (0.117) (0.115) (0.114) (0.131) (0.131)
Lag5 0.03 -0.08 0.11* 0.03 -0.13 0.16*
(0.060) (0.081) (0.062) (0.056) (0.096) (0.084)
Lag10 0.05 0.08 -0.04
(0.042) (0.062) (0.053)
CU 0.50*** -0.15 0.65*** 0.47*** -0.13 0.61*** 0.46*** -0.13 0.60***
(0.135) (0.103) (0.122) (0.127) (0.100) (0.124) (0.132) (0.112) (0.134)
Lag5 0.14 -0.05 0.19** 0.19** -0.03 0.23**
(0.088) (0.083) (0.077) (0.090) (0.097) (0.084)
Lag10 -0.12 -0.14* 0.02
(0.072) (0.077) (0.076)
Observations 182,314 182,314 182,314 162,976 162,976 162,976 134,031 134,031 134,031
Estimation includes importer-year, exporter-year and pair fixed effects. Standard errors
clustered on country pair and year in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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(+63%), but this is unimportant compared to their impact on exports
(+153%). This increase in trade continues up to five years after entry into
force, while we find no lagged effects for imports. However, this effect is
for exports again partly offset after ten years, indicating overshooting of
the initial response.
We find a similar pattern for EUCUs, which do not increase EU imports
on average, but do increase exports by 54%. This positive effect on exports
becomes amplified after five years, but not for imports.
Results for the impact on the individual EU countries are presented
in figure 2.5. In contrast to before, we now do find negative effects on
the extensive margin for PTAs and CUs for exports. We also find that
FTAs and CUs have no or positive effects on extra-EU imports. This is
mainly driven by the extensive margin. On the export-side, we find mixed
effects of FTAs and CUs: CUs have negative effects on exports of EU15
countries (both IM and EM), but large positive effects on exports of newer
EU members (completely driven by the EM, except for Hungary).
Figure 2.4: Directional contemporaneous effects◦ (in %) of individual EIAs
using a GLS estimation with 3 sets of fixed effects.
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Note: The percentage next to each bar indicates the share of each country in total extra-EU
imports or exports, respectively, for 2013. The stars next to the agreements indicate statistical
significance of the estimate for the total trade flow (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Only
estimates for the margins which are statistically significant at the 10% threshold are shown
in the graph. The full regression output can be retrieved upon request to the authors.
◦ Computing total ATEs with five and ten year lags would mean that we could only look at
EIAs enforced by 2003.
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Figure 2.5: Directional contemporaneous effects of different types of EIAs on trade flows
of individual EU countries (in %) using a GLS estimation with 3 sets of fixed effects.
(a) Effects of PTAs.
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(b) Effects of FTAs.
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(c) Effects of CUs.
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Note: The stars next to the countries indicate statistical significance of the estimate for the total trade flow
(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Only estimates for the margins which are statistically significant at the 10%
threshold are shown in the graph. The full regression output can be retrieved upon request to the authors.
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2.5 Robustness checks
Strict exogeneity
Generalised least squares (GLS) assumes strict exogeneity. If this assump-
tion fails, the estimation will be biased. To test for strict exogeneity,
Wooldridge (2010) suggests including leads of the EIA variables in levels
in the fixed effects and differences estimation. If the EIA variables are
endogenous, then the leads will be significant and results for the fixed
effects specification and differences specification will be different, since a
violation of the strict exogeneity assumption will bias both estimators in a
different way.
Results for the exogeneity test are presented in table 2.6. We computed
the test with five year leads as well as with one year leads. We find that
all EIAs are strictly exogenous when using our fixed effects specification.
However, the assumption of strict exogeneity is violated for PTAs when
using differences.
In order to assess how much our results are biased due to these violations
of the strict exogeneity assumption, and also as a robustness check, we
compute our extended baseline model using differences. Taking the fourth
difference18 of equation (2.3) eliminates the country pair fixed effects
∆4lnXijt = β0 + β1∆4PTAijt + β2∆4FTAijt + β3∆4CUijt+
∆4δit + ∆4ψjt + ∆4ijt (2.9)
with ∆4 fourth difference.
Comparing the coefficients for the baseline model obtained using the
fixed effects specification in table 2.3 with the baseline model obtained
using the differences specification in table 2.10 in appendix, we see that
the results are very similar. This similarity also holds up for the PTA
coefficient. This suggests that there is no endogeneity bias.
Changes over time of pair-specific unobservables
Neither our fixed effects specification nor differencing the data controls for
changes over time in pair-specific unobservables. This could for example
be the case when fixed or variable export costs fall due to technological
improvement. To alleviate this problem partially, Trefler (2004) and Baier,
Bergstrand, and Feng (2014) use a random growth first-difference model.
18Following Anderson and Yotov (2011), we use fourth differences instead of first
differences as trade flows typically change very slowly over time, making it very likely
that first differenced data will not display much of variation. We obtain very similar
results using fifth differences instead of fourth differences. As the latter makes us loose
one year less of data, we choose to report our results using fourth differences. Results
using fifth differences can be retrieved upon request.
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Table 2.6: Exogeneity test using both a GLS estimation with fixed effects
and differences.
Fixed effects Differences
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
PTA 0.07 0.02
FTA 0.23** 0.13*
CU 0.46***0.37***
∆4PTA 0.04 0.02
∆4FTA 0.09 0.05***
∆4CU 0.30**0.27***
F.PTA -0.06 0.22*
(0.038) (0.121)
F.FTA -0.07 0.11
(0.087) (0.145)
F.CU 0.00 0.16
(0.091) (0.173)
F5.PTA -0.18 0.13
(0.122) (0.539)
F5.FTA -0.21 0.14
(0.176) (0.617)
F5.CU -0.17 0.23
(0.179) (0.515)
Estimations in columns (1a) and (1b) include importer-year, exporter-
year and pair fixed effects, while estimations in columns (2a) and (2b)
use differenced data and include importer-year and exporter-year fixed
effects only. Standard errors clustered on country pair and year in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
By including country pair-specific fixed effects in our differenced model, we
can account for changes in pair specific unobservables that evolve smoothly
over time.
This transforms our difference model in the following way:
∆4lnXijt = β0 + β1∆4PTAijt + β2∆4FTAijt + β3∆4CUijt+
∆4δit + ∆4ψjt + ηij + ∆4ijt (2.10)
Another option is to use our fixed effects specification and include
country pair fixed effects interacted with a time trend. Our fixed effects
specification then becomes
lnXijt = β0 +β1PTAijt+β2FTAijt+β3CUijt+δit+ψjt+ηij +ηij .t+ijt
(2.11)
with t time trend.
Results are presented in table 2.11 and 2.12 in the appendix. First of
all, note that the results for both the fixed effects specification and the
differences specification are very similar. This again strengthens our belief
that the possible bias stemming from endogeneity of the EIA dummies is
very small.
Second, we see that most estimates fail to reach statistical significance.
FTAs and CUs do no longer have a statistically significant contemporaneous
impact on total trade flows. This is because standard errors are larger for
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most estimates as well as because the magnitude of most coefficients is
smaller. We do however find positive and statistically significant contem-
poraneous effect of PTAs and CUs on the extensive margin. This effect is
partially offset for CUs by a negative effect after ten years.
Zero trade flows
Our baseline model is estimated using the log transformation of trade flows.
As the log transformation of zero is not defined, this implies that zero trade
flows will be ignored when estimating our model. To alleviate this problem,
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) suggest to estimate the gravity model
multiplicatively using the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood estimator.
While it is so far computationally impossible to estimate a model with
three large sets of fixed effects, it is possible to estimate a model with two
large sets of fixed effects since the introduction of the poi2hdfe command
for Stata (Guimaraes and Portugal, 2010). As the command only works
with positive observations, demeaning the data or taking first differences
to absorb the pair-dimension is not an option. We therefore estimate our
model twice, once only including importer-year and exporter-year fixed
effects, and once only including pair and year dummies. To minimize
ommitted variable bias, we include typical gravity covariates that vary
along the ij-dimension in the former, while we include typical gravity
covariates that vary along the it- and jt-dimension in the latter.
We thus estimate the two following specifications:
Xijt = β0 + β1PTAijt + β2FTAijt + β3CUijt
+ γcovariates1 + δit + ψjt + ijt (2.12)
Xijt = β0 + β1PTAijt + β2FTAijt + β3CUijt+
γcovariates2 + δij + ψt + ijt (2.13)
with covariates1 a vector consisting of the distance between the capitals of
a country pair, a dummy taking value 1 if a country pair shares a common
language, a dummy taking value 1 if a country pair shares a common border
and a dummy taking value 1 if a country pair has shared colonial ties at
some point in time, and covariates2 a vector consisting of the log of GDP
for country i at time t and the log of GDP for country j at time t. All
covariates come from the CEPII BACI dataset.
Results are presented in table 2.13 in the appendix. We find very
different results for the trade agreement coefficients in set 1 compared to
set 2. While PTAs, FTAs and CUs have large trade creating effects in
set 1, they have negative effects on trade flows in set 2. This suggests
that our results are biased due to ommitted variables. This because we
2.6. Conclusion 49
do not account properly for the multilateral resistance term in set 1 and
self-selection of country pairs into trade agreements in set 2. As has been
shown by Baier and Bergstrand (2007), this can severely bias the results.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper sheds new light on the impact of trade agreements on inter-
national trade patterns. It puts the traditional trade-creation effects of
EIAs into a new perspective by pointing to various heterogeneous effects
underpinning the general macro impact. New evidence is provided for the
trade impact of EIAs negotiated by the EU with various trading partners
in the period 1988 2013. Our findings have important implications for
future trade policy, as well as for the international competitiveness of open
economies.
First of all, we confirm the trade-creation effect of EIAs, but the size of
the effect depends on the degree of integration implied by the agreement.
FTAs and CUs clearly generate stronger cumulative trade effects than PTAs.
Hence, effective trade integration requires deep integration. Moreover,
the impact may follow the implementation of the agreement with a time
lag. Hence, evaluating new agreements may lead to the wrong conclusion
that trade is not affected. The actual impact may require some time to
materialize.
A second striking finding is the crucial role of the extensive margin of
trade. Trade is boosted by EIAs through increased product differentiation
in exports and imports. This effect may also materialize later on, especially
for exports under FTAs. Hence, EIAs open the door to trade in additional
products rather than intensifying trade in previously exported products.
Thus, on the one hand, companies can benefit from EIAs by launching new
products for the destination markets covered by EU trade agreements. On
the other hand, the value of traded products may decline.
Our results also indicate that the findings for one particular agreement or
EU Member State cannot be generalized for all agreements or EU Member
States. Although the impact across EU Member States differs, EIAs
positively affect the extensive margin and negatively affect the intensive
margin for almost all trade by the EU Member States. Hence, the positive
role of the extensive margin can be confirmed at the level of the individual
Member States. Moreover, EIAs with a clear economic rationale appear to
boost trade the most. Hence, EIAs signed for merely political reasons do
not make much economic sense.
In sum, EIAs are an excellent tool to increase product differentiation
and, through such differentiation, international trade. As many trading
firms are confronted with significant barriers to entry into new markets or
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for new products, this specific effect of EIAs is very important in improving
international competitiveness and boosting international trade.
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Table 2.7: EIAs in force between the EU and third countries for the period
1988-2013.
Date Agreement EIA Type Date Agreement EIA Type
1964 EU-Turkey PTA TWPTA 2004 EU-Egypt FTA ASS
1971 EU-OCT FTA other 2004 EU-Montenegro FTA SAA
1973 EU-Liechtenstein FTA EUFTA 2005 EU-Algeria FTA ASS
1973 EU-Switzerland FTA EUFTA 2006 EU-Albania FTA SAA
1973 EU-Iceland FTA EUFTA 2008 EU-Bosnia-Herz. FTA SAA
1973 EU-Norway FTA EUFTA 2009 EU-Swaziland PTA TWPTA
1978 EU-Algeria PTA TWPTA 2009 EU-CARIFORUM PTA TWPTA
1978 EU-Egypt PTA TWPTA 2009 EU-Mozambique PTA TWPTA
1991 EU-Andorra CU EUCU 2009 EU-Namibia PTA TWPTA
1992 EU-Albania PTA TWPTA 2009 EU-Madagascar PTA TWPTA
1994 EU-Liechtenstein CM EUCU 2009 EU-Lesotho PTA TWPTA
1994 EU-Iceland CM EUCU 2009 EU-Botswana PTA TWPTA
1994 EU-Norway CM EUCU 2009 EU-Cameroon PTA TWPTA
1995 EU-Israel FTA ASS 2009 EU-Zimbabwe PTA TWPTA
1996 EU-Turkey CU EUCU 2009 EU-Mauritius PTA TWPTA
1997 EU-Faeroe Islands FTA EUFTA 2009 EU-Seychelles PTA TWPTA
1997 EU-Palestine FTA ASS 2010 EU-Serbia FTA SAA
1998 EU-Tunisia FTA ASS 2011 EU-Papua N. Guinea PTA TWPTA
2000 EU-South Africa FTA other 2011 EU-South Korea FTA EUFTA
2000 EU-Morocco FTA ASS 2012 EU-Iraq PTA TWPTA
2000 EU-Mexico FTA EUFTA 2013 EU-Nicaragua FTA ASS
2001 EU-Macedonia FTA SAA 2013 EU-Honduras FTA ASS
2002 EU-Jordan FTA ASS 2013 EU-Peru FTA EUFTA
2002 EU-San Marino CU EUCU 2013 EU-Panama FTA ASS
2003 EU-Lebanon FTA ASS 2013 EU-Colombia FTA EUFTA
2003 EU-Chile FTA EUFTA
Date refers to the (provisional) entry into force of an agreement. TWPTA: two-way
PTA, ASS: Association Agreement, SAA: Stabilisation and Association Agreement,
EUFTA: EU FTA. Generalised scheme of Preferences, GSP+ and Everything but
Arms have been ommitted from the list due to space constraints. These schemes
contains OPTAs with virtually all developing countries since the 1970s. EIAs with
European countries before they were part of the EU have also been ommitted from
this list due to space constraints.
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Table 2.8: GLS estimation of the directional effects of motivation and
degree of privelege of EIAs using 3 sets of fixed effects.
(1) (2) (3)
X IM EM X IM EM X IM EM
Extra-EU imports
TWPTA -0.15 -0.37** 0.22 -0.20 -0.37** 0.18 -0.15 -0.31 0.16
(0.161) (0.159) (0.128) (0.149) (0.154) (0.126) (0.149) (0.205) (0.164)
Lag5 0.16 -0.02 0.18** 0.15 -0.08 0.23**
(0.124) (0.111) (0.069) (0.150) (0.126) (0.090)
Lag10 0.05 0.07 -0.02
(0.165) (0.114) (0.106)
SAA -0.67** -0.81*** 0.14*** -0.73*** -0.88*** 0.16 -0.66*** -0.83** 0.17
(0.282) (0.272) (0.071) (0.350) (0.291) (0.093) (0.352) (0.298) (0.109)
Lag5 -0.10 -0.38** 0.27** -0.11 -0.40** 0.30***
(0.228) (0.159) (0.124) (0.257) (0.173) (0.139)
ASS 0.27** 0.31** -0.04 0.27** 0.32** -0.04 0.29*** 0.27*** 0.01
(0.110) (0.120) (0.082) (0.108) (0.125) (0.085) (0.134) (0.155) (0.088)
Lag5 0.15 -0.04 0.19*** 0.19*** -0.04 0.23***
(0.089) (0.098) (0.042) (0.094) (0.105) (0.055)
Lag10 0.17 0.06 0.11
(0.121) (0.132) (0.077)
EUFTA 0.49** 0.01 0.48** 0.47*** 0.00 0.47** 0.52*** 0.12 0.40***
(0.228) (0.213) (0.206) (0.229) (0.216) (0.205) (0.276) (0.258) (0.218)
Lag5 0.03 -0.13 0.16 0.07 -0.14 0.20
(0.089) (0.103) (0.096) (0.100) (0.142) (0.126)
Lag10 -0.05 0.00 -0.05
(0.105) (0.106) (0.075)
EUCU 0.14 -0.02 0.16 0.14 0.00 0.13 0.14 0.04 0.11
(0.105) (0.106) (0.102) (0.108) (0.107) (0.107) (0.098) (0.118) (0.113)
Lag5 0.04 -0.13 0.17** 0.03 -0.13 0.16***
(0.086) (0.086) (0.066) (0.097) (0.102) (0.079)
Lag10 -0.08 0.10 -0.18
(0.111) (0.112) (0.113)
Extra-EU exports
TWPTA 0.14 0.37*** -0.23 0.08 0.27 -0.19 0.19 0.34 -0.16
(0.250) (0.215) (0.169) (0.244) (0.202) (0.179) (0.261) (0.197) (0.218)
Lag5 0.18 0.24*** -0.06 0.26 0.28 -0.02
(0.197) (0.136) (0.144) (0.239) (0.186) (0.176)
Lag10 0.03 0.01 0.02
(0.177) (0.166) (0.165)
SAA 0.56 0.18 0.38*** 0.49 0.10 0.39** 0.46 0.05 0.41**
(0.345) (0.411) (0.115) (0.310) (0.415) (0.162) (0.335) (0.431) (0.162)
Lag5 -0.28 -0.35*** 0.07 -0.35 -0.43** 0.08
(0.234) (0.185) (0.162) (0.232) (0.195) (0.151)
ASS 0.30*** 0.32** -0.02 0.35** 0.35** -0.00 0.24 0.16 0.07
(0.149) (0.146) (0.114) (0.159) (0.149) (0.117) (0.180) (0.126) (0.117)
Lag5 0.19 0.06 0.13 0.13 -0.00 0.14
(0.122) (0.111) (0.091) (0.148) (0.129) (0.094)
Lag10 -0.18 -0.27 0.08
(0.177) (0.161) (0.127)
EUFTA 0.93** -0.58** 1.51*** 0.93** -0.59** 1.52*** 0.91*** -0.38** 1.29***
(0.361) (0.269) (0.476) (0.351) (0.260) (0.442) (0.299) (0.136) (0.277)
Lag5 0.30*** -0.29** 0.59*** 0.41** -0.26 0.67***
(0.154) (0.134) (0.165) (0.179) (0.168) (0.174)
Lag10 -0.39** -0.12 -0.27
(0.166) (0.185) (0.234)
EUCU 0.43*** -0.26*** 0.69*** 0.32** -0.25 0.56*** 0.37*** -0.15 0.53**
(0.151) (0.154) (0.164) (0.143) (0.158) (0.173) (0.201) (0.180) (0.226)
Lag5 0.39*** 0.05 0.34*** 0.39*** 0.08 0.32**
(0.108) (0.112) (0.111) (0.115) (0.118) (0.114)
Lag10 -0.15 0.01 -0.15
(0.190) (0.200) (0.225)
Observations 182,314 182,314 182,314 162,976 162,976 162,976 134,031 134,031 134,031
Estimation includes importer-year, exporter-year and pair fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered on country pair and year but are ommitted due to space constraints. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients for EBA, GSP and intra-EU EIAs are ommit-
ted due to space constraints. Full results can be retrieved upon request. For a list of
agreements per category, see table 2.7 in the appendix.
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Table 2.9: GLS estimation of the effects per agreement using 3 sets of fixed
effects.
X IM EM
OCT -0.06 -0.50*** 0.44**
(0.142) (0.152) (0.170)
Egypt -0.09 -0.27 0.18**
(0.192) (0.163) (0.086)
Iceland 0.63*** 0.20 0.42**
(0.195) (0.182) (0.175)
Norway -0.01 -0.18 0.17
(0.134) (0.128) (0.103)
Algeria 0.71 0.10 0.61
(0.964) (0.564) (0.444)
Andorra -0.05 -0.26 0.20
(0.312) (0.369) (0.434)
Turkey 0.40** 0.10 0.30***
(0.169) (0.167) (0.083)
Faroe 1.53*** -0.62* 2.15***
(0.385) (0.341) (0.531)
Palestine 1.56*** 1.03 0.53
(0.382) (0.650) (0.637)
Macedonia 0.45** 0.38 0.07
(0.204) (0.245) (0.138)
Jordan 0.37* -0.04 0.41***
(0.200) (0.162) (0.079)
San Marino 0.84*** -0.21 1.05***
(0.272) (0.264) (0.250)
Chile -0.03 -0.07 0.04
(0.195) (0.150) (0.083)
Lebanon 0.47** -0.06 0.53***
(0.222) (0.190) (0.092)
Albania -0.89*** -0.42*** -0.47**
(0.123) (0.136) (0.198)
Israel 0.40*** 0.05 0.35***
(0.118) (0.109) (0.074)
Morocco 0.24 0.72*** -0.48***
(0.182) (0.194) (0.147)
Tunisia 0.37* 0.87*** -0.49***
(0.208) (0.186) (0.132)
Mexico 0.14 0.02 0.12
(0.177) (0.177) (0.077)
South Africa 0.28* 0.10 0.18***
(0.159) (0.140) (0.051)
Control -0.00 -0.14** 0.14***
(0.045) (0.064) (0.047)
Observations 182,314 182,314 182,314
Estimation includes importer-year, exporter-
year and pair fixed effects. Standard errors
clustered on country pair and year in paren-
theses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.10: Estimation of the baseline model using fourth differences.
(1) (2) (3)
X IM EM X IM EM X IM EM
∆4PTA 0.04 -0.12 0.16*** 0.06 -0.12* 0.18*** 0.11* -0.08 0.19***
(0.059) (0.070) (0.040) (0.057) (0.068) (0.040) (0.060)(0.065)(0.038)
Lag5 0.05 -0.02 0.08* 0.05 -0.02 0.08
(0.039) (0.045) (0.039) (0.046)(0.054)(0.044)
Lag10 0.02 0.00 0.02
(0.034)(0.051)(0.036)
∆4FTA 0.09 -0.01 0.10 0.11 -0.01 0.12 0.20** 0.02 0.18**
(0.070) (0.059) (0.066) (0.071) (0.063) (0.073) (0.073)(0.071)(0.062)
Lag5 0.07* -0.02 0.09* 0.11** -0.03 0.13**
(0.039) (0.066) (0.053) (0.044)(0.075)(0.058)
Lag10 0.02 0.02 -0.01
(0.037)(0.044)(0.035)
∆4CU 0.30** -0.11 0.41*** 0.32** -0.10 0.42*** 0.41*** -0.04 0.46***
(0.117) (0.067) (0.132) (0.118) (0.066) (0.136) (0.103)(0.075)(0.111)
Lag5 0.10** 0.04 0.05 0.12** 0.04 0.08
(0.042) (0.064) (0.057) (0.050)(0.079)(0.072)
Lag10 -0.09 -0.04 -0.05
(0.066)(0.100)(0.094)
Total ATE
∆4PTA 0.18** -0.10 0.28***
(0.071)(0.074)(0.050)
∆4FTA 0.32*** 0.02 0.30**
(0.096)(0.135)(0.120)
∆4CU 0.44** -0.05 0.49**
(0.161)(0.179)(0.214)
Observations 138,266138,266138,266 119,478119,478119,478 91,759 91,759 91,759
Table 2.11: Estimation of the baseline model using a random growth model.
(1) (2) (3)
X IM EM X IM EM X IM EM
∆4PTA 0.04 -0.10 0.14*** 0.06 -0.11 0.17*** 0.10 -0.08 0.17**
(0.073) (0.086) (0.051) (0.075) (0.087) (0.055) (0.086)(0.089) (0.064)
Lag5 0.03 -0.02 0.06 -0.02 -0.06 0.04
(0.042) (0.058) (0.051) (0.050)(0.070) (0.053)
Lag150 -0.07 -0.05 -0.02
(0.050)(0.066) (0.057)
∆4FTA 0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.11 0.03 0.08
(0.093) (0.084) (0.069) (0.099) (0.084) (0.075) (0.113)(0.095) (0.075)
Lag5 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.02
(0.035) (0.042) (0.042) (0.046)(0.056) (0.053)
Lag10 0.00 0.06 -0.06
(0.047)(0.038) (0.036)
∆4CU 0.20 -0.18* 0.38** 0.21 -0.16 0.37** 0.29* -0.08 0.37**
(0.134) (0.096) (0.152) (0.144) (0.097) (0.168) (0.148)(0.113) (0.146)
Lag5 0.02 0.05 -0.03 0.00 0.06 -0.06
(0.062) (0.060) (0.080) (0.066)(0.080) (0.091)
Lag10 -0.12 -0.02 -0.10
(0.080)(0.100) (0.088)
Total ATE
∆4PTA 0.01 -0.18 0.19*
(0.109)(0.132) (0.105)
∆4FTA 0.17 0.13 0.05
(0.163)(0.135)(0.118))
∆4CU 0.17 -0.04 0.21
(0.239)(0.215) (0.208)
Observations 137,907137,907137,907 119 108119 10811,9108 91,371 91,371 91,371
Standard errors clustered on country pair and year in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Total average treatment effects (ATEs) are computed using
a two-tailed joint significance test.
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Table 2.12: GLS estimation of the baseline model using fixed effects and a
time trend.
(1) (2) (3)
X IM EM X IM EM X IM EM
PTA 0.01 -0.11 0.12** 0.01 -0.11 0.12** 0.03 -0.07 0.11*
(0.072) (0.073) (0.047) (0.077) (0.075) (0.048) (0.074) (0.074) (0.054)
Lag5 0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.06 -0.06 -0.00
(0.051) (0.055) (0.044) (0.061) (0.069) (0.050)
Lag10 -0.08* -0.06 -0.02
(0.043) (0.055) (0.042)
FTA 0.07 -0.01 0.08 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.11 0.03 0.07
(0.094) (0.086) (0.071) (0.097) (0.085) (0.071) (0.103) (0.091) (0.075)
Lag5 0.02 0.05 -0.03 0.00 0.03 -0.02
(0.041) (0.039) (0.040) (0.053) (0.047) (0.045)
Lag10 0.00 0.05 -0.05
(0.042) (0.036) (0.035)
CU 0.22 -0.14 0.36* 0.22 -0.13 0.35* 0.26 -0.09 0.35*
(0.155) (0.107) (0.185) (0.162) (0.104) (0.191) (0.168) (0.104) (0.183)
Lag5 0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.03
(0.058) (0.062) (0.064) (0.071) (0.069) (0.069)
Lag10 -0.12* -0.00 -0.12
(0.067) (0.075) (0.070)
Total ATE
PTA -0.10 -0.18 0.09
(0.110) (0.119) (0.087)
FTA 0.11 0.11 0.0
(0.150) (0.131) (0.114)
CU 0.13 -0.07 0.20
(0.238) (0.166) (0.252)
Observations182,314182,314182,314 162,976162,976162,976 134,031134,031134,031
Standard errors clustered on country pair and year in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Total average treatment effects (ATEs) are computed using a two-
tailed joint significance test.
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Table 2.13: PPML estimation of the baseline model in multiplicative form.
(1) (2) (3)
X IM EM X IM EM X IM EM
Set 1
PTA 0.22*** 1.17*** -0.37*** 0.22*** 1.09*** -0.37*** 0.21*** 0.84*** -0.37***
(0.016) (0.409) (0.070) (0.016) (0.371) (0.070) (0.016) (0.281) (0.071)
Lag 5 0.04*** -0.02 -0.03 0.03** 0.01 -0.02
(0.012) (0.213) (0.055) (0.012) (0.206) (0.057)
Lag 10 0.03** 0.53** 0.03
(0.015) (0.248) (0.061)
FTA 0.40*** 0.64* -0.33*** 0.41*** 0.46 -0.31*** 0.40*** 0.38 -0.36***
(0.020) (0.355) (0.052) (0.020) (0.418) (0.067) (0.020) (0.325) (0.067)
Lag 5 -0.03** 0.26 -0.07 -0.04*** 0.15 -0.17
(0.016) (0.313) (0.092) (0.016) (0.379) (0.106)
Lag 10 0.09*** 0.38 0.33***
(0.020) (0.330) (0.120)
CU 0.81*** 0.70 -0.52*** 0.83*** 0.46 -0.48*** 0.80*** 0.14 -0.51***
(0.025) (0.433) (0.057) (0.026) (0.445) (0.063) (0.026) (0.311) (0.069)
Lag 5 -0.07*** 0.99 -0.14* -0.09*** 0.90 -0.06
(0.025) (0.759) (0.079) (0.025) (0.767) (0.080)
Lag 10 0.18*** 1.69 -0.20**
(0.025) (1.157) (0.097)
Ln(GDPi) 0.82*** -0.96*** 0.57*** 0.82*** -0.89** 0.57*** 0.81*** -0.91** 0.57***
(0.013) (0.355) (0.070) (0.013) (0.395) (0.071) (0.013) (0.386) (0.070)
Ln(GDPj) 0.72*** -0.09 -0.39*** 0.71*** -0.11 -0.39*** 0.70*** -0.08 -0.39***
(0.013) (0.232) (0.042) (0.014) (0.228) (0.042) (0.014) (0.170) (0.043)
Set 2
PTA -0.21*** 0.21 -0.05 -0.21*** 0.19 -0.05 -0.20** 0.17 -0.06
(0.036) (0.221) (0.142) (0.079) (0.280) (0.161) (0.079) (0.263) (0.161)
Lag 5 -0.15*** -0.01 0.07 -0.14** -0.02 0.08
(0.058) (0.099) (0.106) (0.056) (0.100) (0.108)
Lag 10 -0.01 0.29*** -0.06
(0.057) (0.093) (0.096)
FTA -0.12*** -0.15 0.65*** -0.10 -0.16 0.65*** -0.09 -0.18 0.65***
(0.042) (0.171) (0.135) (0.082) (0.213) (0.200) (0.083) (0.203) (0.201)
Lag 5 -0.05 0.16 0.30* -0.04 0.18* 0.29*
(0.074) (0.108) (0.160) (0.074) (0.106) (0.162)
Lag 10 0.08 0.13 -0.02
(0.078) (0.085) (0.130)
CU -0.82*** -0.35 -0.88*** -0.76*** -0.36 -0.87*** -0.74*** -0.36 -0.89***
(0.058) (0.254) (0.142) (0.121) (0.336) (0.206) (0.121) (0.320) (0.211)
Lag 5 -0.02 -0.12 0.30 -0.03 -0.16 0.36
(0.117) (0.155) (0.219) (0.116) (0.159) (0.247)
Lag 10 0.14 0.39*** -0.19
(0.115) (0.152) (0.221)
Contig 0.48*** 0.78*** -1.01*** 0.47*** 0.78*** -1.07*** 0.47*** 0.78*** -1.07***
(0.017) (0.086) (0.110) (0.073) (0.151) (0.387) (0.073) (0.149) (0.389)
Comlang 0.21*** -0.08 0.39*** 0.21*** -0.07 0.39*** 0.22*** -0.05 0.38***
(0.020) (0.085) (0.064) (0.080) (0.115) (0.103) (0.082) (0.111) (0.103)
Colony 0.39*** 0.45*** 0.44*** 0.40*** 0.45*** 0.44*** 0.40*** 0.44*** 0.44***
(0.019) (0.051) (0.064) (0.077) (0.080) (0.098) (0.077) (0.078) (0.098)
Ln(dist) -0.57***-0.64***-0.76*** -0.58***-0.65***-0.78*** -0.59***-0.64***-0.77***
(0.011) (0.058) (0.060) (0.047) (0.080) (0.103) (0.047) (0.080) (0.103)
FE set 1 it, jt it, jt it, jt it, jt it, jt it, jt it, jt it, jt it, jt
FE set 2 ij, t ij, t ij, t ij, t ij, t ij, t ij, t ij, t ij, t
Obs. set 1 205,362 205,343 206,226 204,534 204,515 205,394 204,017 203,998 204,877
Obs. set 2 226,105 226,105 226,105 224,775 224,775 224,775 223,596 223,596 223,596
Standard errors clustered on country pair and year in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. Total average treatment effects (ATEs) are computed using a two-tailed joint signifi-
cance test.
Chapter 3
Anticipation effects of trade
agreements
3.1 Introduction
This chapter picks up where the previous chapter left off. As discussed,
economic integration agreements keep on attracting unremitting attention.
Therefore, it is important to determine the exact impact these agreements
have, from an academic point of view as well as a policy point of view. A lot
is already known about the static effects of trade agreements: from trade
diversion and trade creation (see for example Frankel, Stein, and Wei, 1995;
Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1997; Soloaga and Winters, 2001; Carrere, 2006;
Lee and Shin, 2006; Magee, 2008), over welfare effects and price effects (see
for example Freund, 2000b or Breinlich, Dhingra, and Ottaviano, 2016) and
differences in design of trade agreements (Kohl, Brakman, and Garretsen,
2016; Du¨r, Baccini, and Elsig, 2014) to studies comparing the impact of
trade agreements on different sectors (see for example Soete and Van Hove,
2016; Ma´rquez-Ramos, Florensa, and Recalde, 2015).
Recently, empirical papers also started paying attention to the long-term
effects of trade agreements and the timing of trade policy effects: Baier and
Bergstrand (2007) and Baier, Bergstrand, and Feng (2014), for example,
estimate the partial equilibrium impact of trade agreements on trade flows
up to 15 years after entry into force, while Magee (2008) estimates how the
effects of different types of trade agreements on trade flows changes over
time and Iacovone and Javorcik (2010) examine product-level dynamics
within firms following NAFTA.
However, a lot less is known about what happens before entry into
force: most empirical and theoretical studies assume (implicitly) that trade
agreements only have effects after their enter into force. If firms are forward-
looking, though, we should observe some effect of EIAs before their entry
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into force. This because of first-mover advantages. In a seminal literature
review, Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) define a first-mover advantage
as “the ability of pioneering firms to earn positive economic profits (i.e.
profits in excess of the cost of capital).” With first-mover we refer to the first
firm to enter a market supported by sizeable investments in the production
and distribution of the product, where the elapsed time between its entry
and that of later entrants is of sufficient magnitude allowing the first-mover
to achieve advantageous resource positions. The term early entrants is used
when there are multiple firms entering a market in short succession that
are all able to achieve advantegeous resource positions (Mart´ınez-Lo´pez,
2014).
First-movers or early entrants have been found to achieve higher market
shares and profitability than non-innovative late entrants in many industries
and product-markets (see for example Lambkin, 1988; Shankar, 1998;
Kerin, Varadarajan, and Peterson, 1992; Lilien and Yoon, 1990). The
literature has identified three main mechanisms through which these first-
mover advantages arise: technological leadership, preemption of scarce
assets, and switching costs/buyer choice under uncertainty (Lieberman
and Montgomery, 1988). Moreover, late entry into foreign markets after
many other foreign firms have entered and established strong positions, has
also been found to raise the cost of operations and intensify retaliation by
established first-movers (Mitchell, Shaver, and Yeung, 1994; Sapienza et al.,
2006).
The first-mover advantage literature builds on the central insight of
non-cooperative game theory that a commitment to a course of action
confers a strategic advantage, with Von Stackelberg (1934) illustrating the
advantage of moving first in a duopoly context (Bagwell, 1992).
Evidence of the existence of first-mover advantages in relation to trade
agreements, can be found in Freund (2000a). Constructing a three-country
two-period model with quantity competition and sunk costs, she finds that
a regional agreement in the first period, followed by free trade in the second
period, leads to permanently greater trade among the member nations.
Permanent effects arise because firms undertake irreversible investment
before free trade is achieved. Moreover, using the European Union integra-
tion process as a natural experiment, she finds evidence that supports the
predictions from her model, namely that founding members of the EU were
able to establish trade links that persist after other countries entered the
union. By 1990, the original six members still traded over 75 percent more
with each other than with the later entrants of the EU (see also Abraham
et al., 2002).
There are only a handful studies that estimate anticipation effects of
trade agreements empirically (namely Freund and McLaren, 1999; Magee,
2008; Florensa, Ma´rquez-Ramos, and Recalde, 2015; Coulibaly, 2009; Elliott
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and Ikemoto, 2004; Bergin and Lin, 2012 Kose, Towe, and Meredith, 2004
and Lakatos and Nilsson, 2015). Typically, these studies look at anticipation
effects by estimating what happens t years before an EIA enters into force.
This is a valid strategy for what Kohl (2014) calls “specialist” studies (such
as Bergin and Lin, 2012 studying EMU, Kose, Towe, and Meredith, 2004
studying NAFTA and Lakatos and Nilsson, 2015 studying the EU-Korea
FTA). However, for so-called “generalist” papers studying a multitude of
EIAs, this strategy has some severe shortcomings. First of all, as this
strategy only looks at EIAs that have entered into force, it ignores possible
anticipation effects of EIAs that were negotiated but did not enter into force
yet or will never enter into force due to a suspension of the talks or failure
to ratify the agreement. This introduces bias in the results. Second, the
stages of the lifetime of an EIA have very different durations across EIAs:
some trade agreements go through the whole pre-implementation process
in less than three years, while for other EIAs the negotiation process drags
on eternally. By looking at an average effect five or four years prior to the
entry into force, it becomes impossible to link the results to any particular
pre-implementation stage.
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one study so far that estimates
the effects of the different stages of EIAs on trade flows directly. Mo¨lders
and Volz (2011) estimate the anticipation effects of EIAs for 14 East Asian
countries by augmenting the gravity model with dummies reflecting the 5
different stages in the lifetime of an EIA. However, they limit their results
to the impact on total trade flows only and they do not distinguish between
different types of EIAs. As Baier, Bergstrand, and Feng (2014) and Soete
and Van Hove (2017) amongst others have shown, deeper EIAs such as
FTAs and CUs have a larger impact on trade flows than the more shallow
PTAs. Moreover, they only include countries in their dataset that have at
least one connection to an East Asian country via an FTA.
Our study wants to fill this gap. We contribute to the literature by
looking more closely at the different stages of the lifetime of an EIA and
estimating the impact each stage has on trade. As such, this chapter
complements the previous chapter of this dissertation, which looked solely
at the effects of trade agreements after entry into force. We do this by
augmenting the gravity model with a dummy for each stage in the lifetime
of an EIA. We use a panel on aggregate trade flows between 27 EU countries
and 201 third countries and territories for the period of 1988-2013, and
control for endogeneity of EIAs and multilateral resistance.
Our results clearly indicate the existence of anticipation effects. These
anticipation effects are non-negligible in size. For some EU Member States,
they are even more important than the impact of trade agreements on trade
flows after they enter into force. It is therefore important to take anticipation
effects into account when estimating the total partial equilibrium impact
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of trade agreements on trade flows.
On average, trade between parties starts increasing from the moment
official negotiations have started. Then, trade flows get another boost when
the EIA enters into force. Moreover, we find heterogeneous anticipation
effects of EIAs on the different Member States of the EU and according to
the depth of integration of the EIA, but not according to the pace of the
negotiations.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2
describes the different stages in the lifetime of an EIA, while section 3.3
provides an overview of the relevant literature. Section 3.4 discusses the
gravity model and describes the empirical methodology used, while section
3.5 discusses the data. Section 3.6 presents the main findings and three
extensions, and section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 The lifetime of an EU EIA
EU legislative processes are unique, given the extra supra-national level
that has to be taken into account. This is also the case when negotiating
trade agreements. Trade policy has been an exclusive power of the EU since
the Treaty of Rome, meaning that the EU negotiates trade agreements
rather than individual Member States (Putte, De Ville, and Orbie, 2015).
Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, trade policy is set
down in Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU). Under this article, the Commission negotiates on behalf of Member
States with third countries. The EU Council - comprising of the heads
of state or government of the Member States - authorises the European
Commission to start negotiations and sets out general objectives in a so-
called “negotiating directive”. Subsequently, the Commission negotiates on
behalf of the EU and regularly informs the Council and the Parliament of
how the negotiations are going. After each negotiation round and at other
key points in the negotiations, the Council and the European Parliament
are simultaneously informed about the state of play. The negotiating teams
are lead by the Chief Negotiator of DG Trade, and the duration of the
negotiations can range between two to three years to much longer, depending
of how quickly the negotiations rounds follow one another (Bollen, De Ville,
and Orbie, 2016; European Commission, 2015a).
When negotiations reach the stage of technical finalisation, the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council are informed immediately and finalised
texts are sent to the Member States and the European Parliament. After
completion of the so-called legal “scrubbing” - which can take up to nine
months, the chief negotiators of both parties initial the English text of
the proposed agreements. At this point, the agreement is not yet legally
binding (European Commission, 2015a; European Commission, 2015b).
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Table 3.1: Definition of the different stages in the life of an EU EIA
Stage Event Description
Stage 1 Announcement First mention of the potential agreement by
a credible source
Stage 1 Mandate EU Council gives the EU Commission a
‘negotiation mandate’
Stage 2 Negotiation Official start of negotiations
Stage 3 Conclusion Official conclusion of negotiations
Stage 3 Initialling Both parties initial the text of the proposed
agreement
Stage 4 Signature Agreement is formally/officially signed
Stage 5 Provisional Provisional application of the agreement while
awaiting ratification by all MS (if needed)
Stage 5 Publication Publication of the agreement in the
Official Journal of the EU
Stage 6 Implementation Official entry into force of the agreement
Stage 7 End Agreement is terminated or superseded by
another agreement
Next, the agreement is translated into all official languages of the EU and
the national language(s) of the partner country. Then, the Council gives the
authorisation to sign the agreement, after an internal debate. Once both
parties have signed, the Council transmits the agreement together with the
draft decision to conclude to the European Parliament for consent. After
consent of the Parliament, the Council adopts the final decision to conclude
the agreement and the agreement is published in the Official Journal, after
which it can enter into force (European Commission, 2015a).
Where the agreement contains provisions that fall under Member State
responsibility, individual Member States also have to ratify the agreement
according to their national ratification procedures. From the moment
the EU has ratified these so-called “mixed agreements”, they can be ap-
plied provisionally awaiting ratification by all Member States (European
Commission, 2015a).
Based on this negotiation process, we can distinguish seven main events
in the life of an EIA: (1) announcement, (2) start negotiations, (3) conclusion
of negotiations, (4) signature of the agreement, (5) provisional application,
(6) entry into force and (7) end of agreement.
3.3 Literature review
Though small, the body of evidence indicating potential anticipation effects
of trade agreements is growing. We distinguish two strands in the literature.
First, we give an overview of the empirical evidence that exists on (the
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lack of) anticipation effects of EIAs. Then, we discuss theoretical models
of trade that include forward-looking firms and study firm dynamics.
Empirical studies
Freund and McLaren (1999) were the first to find evidence of pre-implementation
responses to trade liberalizations. Looking at countries joining regional
trade blocs such as the EU and Mercosur, they find that the joining
country's trade orientation toward bloc countries typically rises along an
‘S’-shaped path, with the adjustment beginning four years before the date
of accession. They attribute their findings to anticipatory sunk invest-
ments made to prepare for accession. In the case of NAFTA, Kose, Towe,
and Meredith (2004) show that there were trade and financial flow effects
of NAFTA before it entered into force. Krueger (1999) also finds that
trade relations between Canada, the US and Mexico were affected before
NAFTA entered into force. However, according to Krueger, this was not
entirely attributable to the anticipation of NAFTA but also to the Mexican
liberalisation process prior to NAFTA.
Magee (2008) studies yearly dynamics of different types of EIAs for a
panel data set of 133 countries between 1980 and 1998. By augmenting a
gravity model with yearly leads and lags, he finds that EIAs increase trade
flows on average with 26% in the four years before entry into force. This is
mainly driven by FTAs (which increase trade flows with a little more than
40% prior to entry into force) and to a lesser extent by CUs (almost 20%).
He does not find any anticipation effects of PTAs. Using a similar strategy
as Magee (2008), Bergin and Lin (2012) study the dynamics of trade before
and after the implementation of the European Monetary Union (EMU).
Using data for the period 1973-2004, they find that the extensive margin of
trade rises seven years before the actual EMU adoption, while total trade
flows start rising four years prior to the event.
Coulibaly (2009) studies trade effects of seven regional trade blocs in
Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin-America between 1960 and 1999. Using
a gravity model combined with kernel estimation techniques to capture
non-monotic trade effects while imposing minimal structure on the data,
he estimates the year-by-year impact of each trade bloc on trade flows.
He finds anticipation effects of various strength five years prior to entry
into force for ASEAN, ECOWAS and SADC, but not for AFTA, SAPTA,
CACM, CAN and Mercosur.
Florensa, Ma´rquez-Ramos, and Recalde (2015) study the effect of the
institutional quality of EIAs on Latin America’s total trade flows and the
margins of trade. They use data on the bilateral exports of goods from 11
member countries of the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA)
over the period 1962-2009. They find that LAIA countries anticipate trade
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agreements 5 years before their entry into force. This is especially the case
for the extensive margin of “deeper” trade agreements such as FTAs and
CUs.
Lakatos and Nilsson (2015) study the trade effects of the EU-South
Korea FTA. They use monthly trade data between the EU and South Korea
for the period January 2005-June 2014 and find clear anticipation effects
for EU exporters. Compared to the pre-negotiation period, the probability
for EU countries to export to South Korea increases with 8% during the
negotiation period. South Korean exporters tend to be more hesitant,
with an anticipation effect of 6% only occurring after the initialling of
the agreement. They find a similar picture when looking at the intensive
margin.
Mo¨lders and Volz (2011) is the only study looking at a multitude of
EIAs that links trade data to the different stages in the lifetime of an EIA.
Using data for 14 East Asian countries and 78 countries in the rest of the
world for the period 1995-2007, they estimate a gravity model augmented
with dummies reflecting five different stages of EIAs. Their results indicate
that there are indeed anticipation effects of Asian FTAs. Particularly the
stage in which bilateral trade agreements are (close to) being negotiated
exposes significant positive trade effects. However, their results also clearly
show that the magnitude and sign of the estimates depend very strongly on
the econometric specification used. This indicates the need for follow-up
research to confirm the robustness of their results.
Peterson and Rudloff (2015) study the link between trade and peace.
Using data for 180 PTAs for the period 1957-2000, they find evidence
of anticipation effects of PTAs on peace: while in-force PTAs have no
statistically significant impact on peace when controlling for other factors
linked to peace, signed but not-yet-in-force PTAs are pacifying. They argue
that “a signed PTA indicates that all members to the agreement fully
expect ratification and entry into force to follow. (...) The high likelihood
of signed PTAs to enter into force is further strengthened by the fact that
many PTAs have been ratified despite significant changes in leadership.”
Theoretical framework
Most theoretical papers modeling the effects of trade agreements have fo-
cused on capturing how changes in the extent of globalization (such as trade
agreements) influence various firm-level responses (i.e. export decisions,
quality and organization of production). In order to highlight composition
effects, the majority of these models examine cases in which the firms’
responses do not change over time, assuming a stable environment without
firm dynamics (see for example Krugman, 1980; Melitz, 2003; Chaney,
2008). Boosted by recent empirical evidence exploiting the availability of
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firm-level data allowing researchers to explore the intertemporal dimension
of firms’ exports (e.g. Bernard, Redding, and Schott, 2010; Eaton et al.,
2009; Iacovone and Javorcik, 2010), theoretical models allowing for the
inclusion and study of firm dynamics have emerged.
For example, Arkolakis (2011) and Impullitti, Irarrazabal, and Opromolla
(2013) extend the Melitz (2003) model to a dynamic setting, while Eaton et
al. (2009) develop a model capturing the search and learning processes firms
go through when (potentially) entering foreign markets. Arkolakis (2008)
introduces trade dynamics into a static model of international trade with
product differentiation, heterogeneous productivity firms, and increasing
marginal market penetration costs.
With respect to changes in the trade policy environment, Alessandria
and Choi (2014) and Ruhl (2008) examine transition dynamics of firms
following a temporary or permanent trade liberalization, focusing on the
role of entry into domestic and export markets. Three papers look at the
dynamic effects of expected trade liberalization before they have happened,
namely Burstein and Melitz (2011), Bergin and Lin (2012), and Costantini
and Melitz (2008). We look at each more in detail in the following sections.
Burstein and Melitz (2011) model how the interaction between firm-
level dynamics and endogenous innovation leads to transition dynamics
at the aggregate level in response to a trade liberalization. They analyze
the transition dynamics of aggregate productivity, consumption and trade
volumes under different liberalization scenarios. Their model is a 2-country
model under monopolistic competition with a single factor of production
(labour) and common CES product differentiation across all products. Firms
are heterogeneous with respect to their export and innovation decisions,
and productivity is a function of innovation. Firms pay a sunk cost to start
exporting, in addition to per-unit iceberg costs and per-period fixed costs
of trading. They are forward looking and there is a feedback loop between
all the decisions the firm takes.
They then analyze the effects of a reduction in international per-unit
trade costs of 3.5%. First, they consider the importance of interaction
effects between firm-level dynamics and endogenous innovation in gen-
erating transition dynamics by juxtaposing the effects of a permanent
unanticipated trade liberalization in the full model, with the effects of the
same liberalization on either a model where productivity remains constant
post-entry (i.e. no innovation) or a model where there is no endogeneous
market selection and all firms export regardless of their productivity (i.e.
no fixed cost of exporting). In the latter two cases, trade liberalization
does not induce any endogenous transition dynamics, whereas it does in
the full model. This because of the response of firm entry to the change in
trade cost and consequently the differences in current and future export-
market profitability relative to the profitability of domestic sales. Second,
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they analyze the effects of different trade liberalization scenarios: (1) an
unanticipated permanent reduction of trade costs, (2) an unanticipated
temporary reduction, (3) a permanent reduction of trade costs that was
announced two years prior to the reduction, (4) an unanticipated temporary
reduction when part of the fixed costs exporters face are sunk1, (5) an
unanticipated permanent reduction with sunk-export costs, and (6) an
anticipated permanent reduction with sunk-export costs.
The results under the two scenarios in which the trade liberalization
was announced two years ahead of time provide a useful framework for
our paper. Burstein and Melitz (2011) find that firms anticipate trade
liberalizations and change their behavior before the trade liberalization
enters into force. Without sunk-export costs, exporters increase their
innovation intensity the day the trade liberalization is announced. This
is driven by the firms’ desire to smooth their innovation activities over
time in response to the higher benefits to innovate. Because the cost of
innovation is convex, firms do not want to cluster their innovation activities
immediately before the drop in the trade cost and prefer instead to spread
them out ahead of the anticipated liberalization. The increase in innovation
is then reflected in a higher growth rate for exporters, which results in an
increasing share of exporters in domestic revenues and hence an increase in
exports. Adding sunk-export costs to the model generates an option value
associated with the export-entry decision and an associated hysterisis band.
This induces firms to enter the export market before trade costs decrease,
as the announcement of a future trade liberalization substantially reduces
the option value of waiting to export for firms that are just below the
export-cost cutoff in the pre-liberalization steady state. The increase in the
share of exporters in domestic revenues, and hence trade volumes, before
entry into force is substantially larger in the model with the sunk-export
costs compared to the model without. While the relationship between time
and trade volumes is S-shaped for both scenarios, with an acceleration
in the growth of trade in the first two years after entry into force of the
liberalization, the relationship is much smoother and gradual in the model
with sunk-export costs compared to the model without.
The model of Bergin and Lin (2012) is closely related. They construct
a trade model to understand the role of news and shifts in expectations
about a future trade liberalization on firms responses. By allowing for
heterogeneity in the sunk-export costs across firms, they make firms’ entry
decisions forward looking and responsive to the announcement of a trade
liberalization. The mechanisms of early entry differ between both papers:
1The assumption Burstein and Melitz (2011) make is that in addition to the per-
period fixed cost firms pay to export, non-exporters that become exporters must also
hire a certain amount of units of labor during the first period as an exporter. An
exporter that stops exporting must incur these sunk-export costs to restart exporting.
Hence the export decision becomes (partly) irreversible.
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while Burstein and Melitz (2011) results are based on the uncertainty of
shocks leading to an option value of waiting to enter, Bergin and Lin (2012)
mechanism of firm entry ahead of the actual liberalization is rooted in a
congestion externality (i.e. the sunk cost of entry rises with the number of
other firms entering). This captures the idea of the first-mover advantage
as outlined in the International Business literature theoretically. The
liberalization scenarios considered also differ: Bergin and Lin (2012) model
their scenario to resemble the effect of the signing of the Maastricht Treaty
in 1992, formalizing plans to adopt a common currency (the euro) seven
years later in 1999, which lowered trade costs and frictions associated with
currency conversion. They consider three changes in trade costs: a drop
in iceberg costs from 0.2 to 0.1, a cut in the average level of sunk cost of
exporting of 5% and a reduction of the fixed cost of trade by 5%. The
trade liberalization is expected to be permanent under all three scenarios,
and announced seven years ahead of time.
They find that the first scenario matches the actual transition dynamics
they observed in the data the best, namely a 12% rise in exports between
1992 and 1999. Under the first scenario, the model predicts significant
entry investment immediately in the period where the shock is announced,
leading to a larger number of firms starting to export already in the second
period. The response in overall exports differs from that of the number
of firms exporting in that it does not rise significantly prior to the actual
shock. This coincides with the empirical evidence reported earlier that the
extensive margin responded to EMU several years ahead of overall exports.
The reason is that while the extensive margin is driven mainly by sunk costs
and forward looking behavior, the demand for imports is driven primarily
by the relative price and hence by iceberg trade costs in that period.
What is interesting, is that they extend their model to allow for uncer-
tainty. While Burstein and Melitz (2011) assume that agents have perfect
foresight and that there is no aggregate policy uncertainty, Bergin and Lin
(2012) relax this assumption and include uncertainty about the entry into
force of the currency union into their model. They do this by making the
model stochastic and including shocks that are independently normally
distributed with zero mean. While the expected value of the reduction in
trade costs remains the same, there is now uncertainty about the realized
value of trade costs, as shocks make trade costs fluctuate around the mean.
They find that the level of exports is not affected by uncertainty. This
because firms make the decision of price setting and exports after trade
costs are actually realized for that period, thereby eliminating uncertainty
for this decision. In contrast, the number of firms entering the export
market is impacted by the uncertainty. As firms make the decision to enter
prior to the realization of the trade costs, uncertainty about future trade
costs implies risk associated with a new export entry decision. Nonetheless,
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the effect of uncertainty on the extensive margin remains fairly small for
moderate levels of uncertainty, and there is only a big effect of uncertainty
on the export decision if the probability of trade costs actually falling at
entry into force drops below 60%.
Finally, Costantini and Melitz (2008) build a dynamic model of firm-level
adjustment to trade liberalization that captures the joint entry, exit, export
and innovation decisions of heterogeneous firms. They model the sunk
nature of market entry costs for both the domestic and export market as
well as the per-unit and additional fixed costs of exporting incurred in every
period. Again, they analyze different trade liberalization scenarios. Focus-
ing on changes in firm productivity and innovation decisions, they show how
the relative timing and magnitude of firm-level productivity improvements
and export market entry decisions are also determined by non-technological
factors such as the timing of trade liberalization announcements and the
speed of liberalization. They find that announcing the trade liberalization
before its implementation, induces firms to anticipate the liberalization and
innovate ahead of the export market entry. They also show that a more
abrupt pace of liberalization amplifies these effects.
Based on the predictions of these three models, we expect to find positive
anticipation effects of EU trade agreements on trade flows between the EU
and partner countries. We also expect the anticipation effects to be smaller
than the effect of the EIA on trade flows once it enters into force. Yet, it
is difficult to predict at which stage anticipation effects will occur based
on these models, as these theoretical models do not distinguish between
different stages in the lifetime of an EIA before it enters into force. Rather,
they assume one stage between announcement of the EIA and its entry
into force and model the anticipation effect as one event.
3.4 Methodology
The main point of this paper is to link the anticipation and reaction effects
of EIAs to the different stages in the life of an EIA. To do so, we augment
a gravity model with a dummy for each stage.
Based on the negotiation process of European EIAs described in section
3.2, we distinguish seven stages in the life of an EIA: (1) announcement,
(2) negotiations, (3) conclusion of negotiations, (4) agreement signed, (5)
provisional application, (6) entry into force and (7) end of agreement.
As has been shown extensively in the literature, it is necessary to account
for the multilateral resistance term when using the gravity model, as well
as the endogeneity of EIAs. We use the same methodological strategy as
in chapter 2 to deal with these potential sources of bias, that is we include
three sets of fixed effects in our model (importer-year, exporter-year and
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pair), and alternatively we take first differences using four year intervals
and estimating the model without country pair fixed effects.
Moreover, we have shown in the previous chapter that deeper trade
agreements have different effects on trade flows than more shallow agree-
ments. We therefore also allow for a heterogeneous impact of different types
of EIAs in this chapter. We do this by interacting our STAGE variable
with a variable indicating whether the EIA is a TWPTA, FTA or CU/EM.
This results in the following baseline model:
lnXijt = β0 + I
EIA
ijt ∗
7∑
s=1
βsSTAGE
s
ijt + δit + ψjt + ηij + εijt (3.1)
with Xijt bilateral import and export flows, STAGE
s
ijt a dummy variable
taking the value 1 when countries i and j have an EIA in stage s in year t,
IEIAijt indicating whether the EIA is a TWPTA, FTA or CU/EM, δit and
ψjt country-year fixed effects, ηij country pair fixed effect, εijt error term.
In a second part, we extend our baseline model. First, we exploit
our ex post knowledge that some trade agreements and negotiations have
been suspended. We explore whether trade agreements that were actually
implemented have differential anticipation effects than trade negotiations
for agreements that were never finalized. We do this by interacting our
main independent variables with a dummy for suspended negotiation and
suspended trade agreement, respectively. We also add a dummy for EIAs
that have not been finalized yet and for which we hence don’t know if they
will be suspended at some point or not.
We estimate the following model:
lnXijt = β0 + I
susp
ij ∗
7∑
s=1
βsSTAGE
s
ijt + δit + ψjt + ηij + εijt (3.2)
with Isuspij indicating whether the negotiations of an EIA have been sus-
pended at some point, the EIA itself (after ratification) has been suspended
or if the EIA has not been through all stages yet.
Second, we investigate whether the degree of certainty that the trade
agreement will eventually be implemented has an impact on anticipation
effects. We proxy the degree of certainty by the duration of the different
stages. As the speed of negotiations will likely be different when there is
one or more partner countries, we also add a dummy variable indicating
whether an EIA is being negotiated bilaterally or multilaterally 2.
We estimate the following model:
lnXijt = β0+
7∑
s=1
βsSTAGE
s
ijt+speedijt+I
multi
ij +δit+ψjt+ηij+εijt (3.3)
2As the EU negotiates trade policy as a whole, we treat it as one entity and consider
EIAs between the EU and one partner country as bilateral.
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with Imultiij a dummy variable taking the value 1 when there is more than one
partner country and speedijt a variable indicating how long the negotiation
process took.
Third, we explore whether trade agreements have heterogeneous effects
on the Member States. We follow a similar method as outlined in Soete
and Van Hove (2017) and estimate a Member State-specific coefficient for
each stage by interacting our STAGE variable with a dummy for each
Member State. Our specification takes the following form:
lnXijt = β0 + I
MS ∗
7∑
s=1
βsSTAGE
s
ijt + δit + ψjt + ηij + εijt (3.4)
with IMS a dummy for each Member State of the European Union. As Soete
and Van Hove (2017) have shown that EIAs have heterogeneous effects on
the different EU Member States once the EIA enters into force, we also
expect these Member States to anticipate trade agreements differently.
3.5 Data
The data used in this paper is based on the dataset of the previous chapter,
described in section 2.3. Hence, it covers bilateral import and export flows
between the 27 Member States of the European Union and the rest of the
world (201 countries and territories) from 1988 through 20133. We focus on
the European Union, as the EU has been a driver of the recent explosion
of EIAs (see chapter 1).
As this dataset only provides data on provisional application and entry
into force of EIAs (stage 5 and 6), we complemented this dataset with
data on the other stages in the lifetime of an EIA. For stages (1) through
(4), we used European Commission (2014). In the few cases where we
could not find the data using official EU or partner country sources, we
used historical data from quality newspapers through LexisNexis Academic
(2014). We include all stages of all EIAs in our dataset that we could find,
so not only EIAs that eventually enter into force. Hence our dataset also
contains information on trade agreements that were never implemented or
EIAs for which the negotiation talks were suspended.
Summary statistics on the different stages of the lifetime of European
EIAs are provided in tables 3.2 and 3.3. The majority of EIAs in our
dataset are OPTAs, TWPTAs and FTAs. The frequency of customs unions
3As noted in the previous chapter, the dataset considers Belgium and Luxembourg,
and Liechtenstein and Switzerland as one country. So when we refer to Belgium or
Switzerland in this paper, we really mean Belgium and Luxembourg, and Switzerland
and Liechtenstein. Moreover, we do not include Croatia in our sample, as Croatia
became a member of the EU in mid 2013.
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics on stages of EIAs.
EIA / TWPTA FTA CU Subtotal
Stage Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq %
Stage 1 5 012 6.6% 5 915 7.8% 242 0.3% 11 169 15%
Stage 2 16 213 21.4% 12 319 16.2% 0 0.0% 28 532 38%
Stage 3 1 631 2.2% 1 897 2.5% 0 0.0% 3 528 5%
Stage 4 710 0.9% 1 275 1.7% 175 0.2% 2 160 3%
Stage 5 2 630 3.5% 2 105 2.8% 0 0.0% 4 735 6%
Stage 6 3 658 4.8% 16 190 21.3% 4 391 5.8% 24 239 32%
Stage 7 132 0.2% 1 351 1.8% 0 0.0% 1 483 2%
Subtotal 29 986 40% 41 052 54% 4 808 6% 75 846 100%
Note: The dataset consists of 169 782 observations in total, of which 43 587
observations have no EIAs, and 50 349 have an active OPTA.
Table 3.3: Summary statistics on the duration (in years) of the stages of
EIAs.
All TWPTA FTA
Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev
Stage 1 1.7 1.5 3.1 1.3 0.9 0.9
Stage 2 4.0 3.6 7.1 1.3 2.2 4.1
Stage 3 0.6 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.5 1.1
Stage 4 1.0 0.9 2.2 0.7 0.8 1.3
Stage 5 3.0 2.4 6.7 1.5 2.0 0.8
Stage 4 and 5 1.2 1.4 0.6 1.3 1.3 1.6
Note: there are not enough observations for CUs to compute sensible summary
statistics.
in our dataset is very low, as the European Union has only concluded
CUs with a handful of countries. Moreover, most of these CUs already
entered into force before 1988, explaining the very low percentage of stage
1 through 5 CUs in our dataset. There are no agreements that come to an
end in our dataset. But there are, however, some trade agreements that
are superseded by an agreement with deeper integration.
We assume that OPTAs have no anticipation effects, as the implementa-
tion of these trade agreements is a unilateral decision, and it is often not
very certain on forehand for which countries they will be implemented or
how cumbersome it will be for companies to comply with all the rules to
get preferential treatment.
Looking at the duration of the different stages of EIAs, we find that the
negotiation stage (stage 2-3) has the longest duration, with an average du-
ration of four years and a standard deviation of 3.6 years. Agreements that
are applied provisionally (stage 5-6), are on average applied provisionally
for 3 years, with a standard deviation of 2.4 years. All other stages in the
lifetime of an EIA (with the exception of the entry into force of course) have
an average duration of less than two years. When we split up these numbers
3.6. Estimation strategy and results 71
according to EIA type, we find that the whole pre-implementation process
of TWPTAs takes in general more than double the time of that of FTAs.
Standard deviations are also much higher for this type of agreements.
3.6 Estimation strategy and results
This section presents our results. We start by presenting results for the
baseline model. Then we present two robustness checks and finally we extend
our baseline model in three different ways. In a first extension, we investigate
whether trade agreements/negotiations that have been suspended, have
a differential impact on trade flows than trade agreements that had a
smooth negotiation process. In a second extension, we evaluate whether
the speed of negotiations influences the impact on trade flows. Finally, we
explore whether the Member States of the European Union anticipate trade
agreements differently.
Baseline model
Results using the same estimation methods as in the previous chapter are
presented in table 3.9 in appendix. However, looking at the residual versus
fitted value plots of the fixed effects and fourth differences specification
in figure 3.6 in the appendix, we see that using robust standard errors
clustered on country pair do not control sufficiently for the serial correlation
present in the data. The residuals are not randomly distributed around
the 0 line, and there is a clear pattern in the variance of the residuals. We
confirm this finding using the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel
data, which strongly rejects the null hypothesis of no AR(1) processes in
the data (F=589.9, p<0.000).
To control better for the severe serial correlation and heteroskedasticity
present in the data, we use feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) using
an AR(1) autocorrelation structure. GLS was first described in Aitken
(1934) and can be used to perform linear regression when there is a cer-
tain degree of correlation between the residuals in a regression model. In
these cases, ordinary least squares is no longer the best linear unbiased
estimator (BLUE), as it can be statistically inefficient or even give mislead-
ing inferences. For large samples FGLS is consistent and efficient under
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, and should hence be preferred over
OLS. This because FGLS is estimated in two stages, with the residuals
of the first stage being used to build a consistent estimator of the errors
covariance matrix by re-weighting the data (Baltagi, 2008, Greene (2003)).
To reduce the number of parameters we need to estimate, we demean
our data and then estimate our baseline model without country pair fixed
effects using FGLS.
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Hence, this is the exact model we are estimating:
(xijt − xij) =
7∑
s=1
βs
(
STAGEsijt − STAGEsij
)
+
(
δit − δi
)
+(
ψjt − ψj
)
+ (εijt − εijt) (3.5)
with x denoting ln X or the log of bilateral export flows and import flows.
Results are presented in figure 3.1. Note that due to the small number
or even lack of observations for certain stages of customs unions and
deeper integration agreements, we cannot estimate the anticipation effects
for all stages of these agreements. We do not find any evidence that
TWPTAs or CUs create trade before they enter into force. For CUs, none of
coefficients for the different stages before implementation reaches statistical
significance for CUs, while for TWPTAs we find a small decrease in trade
flows during the negotiation, signature and implementation stage. Negative
and significant effects of the entry into force of shallow agreements on trade
flows are also found in Baier, Bergstrand, and Feng (2014), Florensa et al.
(2013), Florensa et al. (2014), and Ma´rquez-Ramos, Florensa, and Recalde
(2015). Both Baier, Bergstrand, and Feng (2014) and Ma´rquez-Ramos,
Florensa, and Recalde (2015) explain this finding by the occurrence of
a differential trend over time, biasing the results for shallow agreements
downwards.
For FTAs, on the other hand, we find large anticipation effects. We find
that trade between parties starts increasing from the moment official FTA
negotiations have started. We find that trade increases with 21% during
the negotiations. Trade flows get another boost when the FTA enters into
force (+36% compared to country pairs without EIA). When FTAs are
officially announced, we also find a statistically significant effect on trade
flows, however the effect is very small in economic terms (+10%).
Results grouping FTAs and CUs together into one dummy variable yield
very similar results and are presented in table 3.6 in the appendix.
Comparing these results to the results of Baier and Bergstrand (2007),
who find that EIAs increase trade flows up to 100% between the time they
enter into force and 10 years after the entry into force, we can conclude
that these effects are rather modest, but not negligible.
The results are also consistent with the theoretical predictions of Burstein
and Melitz (2011). In their model, they include two stages of trade liber-
alization: announcement and entry into force. Allowing for productivity
dynamics, Burstein and Melitz find that when a trade liberalization is
announced on forehand, some exporters enter the market ahead of time at
the moment of the announcement. This is a sudden and one-time increase.
However, between the announcement and the entry into force of the trade
liberalization, the volume of exports (measured as the share of exporters in
domestic revenues) increases steadily.
To get a full picture of the effects of trade agreements over time, before
and after entry into force, we follow a similar strategy as in chapter two
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Figure 3.1: Anticipation effects of EIAs according to type of EIA.
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Figure 3.2: Anticipation and lagged effects of EIAs according to type of
EIA.
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and add five-year lags into our baseline model4. Results are presented in
figure 3.25. We find that trade keeps increasing (at least) up to five years
after the implementation of the agreement. After five years, trade flows
are on average 43% higher for FTAs and 65% for CUs.
4It would be interesting to see the results over a longer period of time. However,
adding ten-year lags into our model makes us loose 10 years of data. This big loss of
data results in unstable results.
5Note that the interpretation of lagged effects is slightly different than for the
stage-dummies: while the dummies for every stage represent the total effect on the
trade flows at that point in time, the lagged effect is the additional effect after five
years. To make the figure easily interpretable, we therefore compute the total effects
of trade agreements on trade flows after five years by adding up the coefficient of the
lagged effect with the coefficient for the implementation stage. To obtain standard
errors of this total average treatment effect we compute a two-tailed joint significance
test.
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Robustness
Endogeneity. Generalised least squares (GLS) assumes strict exogeneity.
If this assumption fails, the estimation will be biased. To test for strict
exogeneity, Wooldridge (2010) suggests including leads of the EIA variables
in levels in the estimation. If the EIA variables are exogenous, the coeffi-
cients for these leads should not be statistically significant. Results for the
equation test are presented in table 3.7. We find that the 5 year lead is not
statistically significant, hence indicating our estimation strategy controls
effectively for the potential endogeneity of EIAs.
EU integration. To rule out any effects of EU integration on our findings,
we estimate our model using only EU12 countries as a robustness check.
These countries were part of the European Union for the whole period of
our study, and there should hence not be any EU integration effects.
Results are presented in figure 3.3 and in table 3.6 in the appendix. We
find that TWPTAs have no or slightly negative effects on trade flows of
the EU12 countries during every stage of their lifetime. CUs have no effect
on trade flows during the announcement and negotiation stage, while they
boost trade flows strongly after they are signed and even more once they
are implemented. FTAs increase trade flows from the moment they are
announced. Once the negotiation starts, trade flows increase even more
and this effect lasts until after the implementation of the trade agreement.
Comparing these results to the results using our full sample, we find that
the results are very similar qualitatively. Quantitatively, the magnitude
of the results is larger, with FTAs increasing trade flows with 55% during
the negotiation phase, 57% during the conclusion phase, 52% during the
signature phase, and 65% after (provisional) entry into force.
Figure 3.3: Anticipation effects of EIAs according to type of EIA for EU12
countries only
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Extensions
Suspended. In this first extension, we exploit our ex post knowledge
that some trade negotiations have been suspended. Trade negotiations
that will eventually be suspended, might proceed differently - maybe less
smoothly, or the press might be more critical - than trade negotiations
that will not. By interacting our dummies for the different stages with a
dummy for suspension, we can compare the effects of both. As the baseline
model revealed that TWPTAs do not have any anticipation effects, we
only include FTAs and CUs in our model. For the rest, we use the same
estimation strategy as for the baseline model.
Results are presented in figure 3.4. The full regression output can be
found in table 3.10 in the appendix. Note that in our dataset, there are six
trade agreements that were suspended while they were in stage 1 of the
pre-implementation process, twelve in stage 2 and three in stage 3. None
of the trade agreements that were already signed have been suspended.
Hence stages 4 through 6 are omitted from the estimation for the trade
agreements that were suspended at some point. All trade agreements that
were suspended are FTAs, no CUs were suspended.
We find that FTAs that were suspended, have no statistically significant
effect on trade flows at any point in their lifetime. The coefficients for the
first and second stage (announcement and negotiation) are close to zero,
while the coefficient for the conclusion stage amounts to 0.26, but is not
statistically significant at 10%. Moreover, when adding a dummy capturing
the three years after the suspension of an agreement, we find that trade
flows are as we expect them to be based on the variables in our model
(see column (2) of table 3.10 in appendix). We thus find no effect of trade
agreements that are suspended at some point on trade flows.
This suggests that firms seem to be able to distinguish a priori between
trade agreements that will enter into force eventually and those that will not,
or that the announcement or the start of negotiations of some agreements
Figure 3.4: Anticipation effects of FTAs and CUs.
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is not a credible signal that the agreement will eventually enter into force,
while of others it is. Looking more in detail at the proposed EIAs that have
been suspended, we find that the majority of suspended trade deals were
with members of four trade blocs, namely the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN, with member states Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia),
the Andean Community (with member states Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador
and Peru), Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) and the
Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia
and the UAE). Woolcocke (2007) sees some similarities between the EU
FTA negotiations with Mercosur, on the one hand, and ASEAN, on the
other hand. Namely, both regions include countries at different levels of
development and are experiencing difficulties with their regional integration
process. This makes it difficult for the EU to pursue a region-to-region
approach. Similar comments can also be made for the Gulf Cooperation
Council and the Andean Community, which were not at all advanced in
their own integration process at the time of the EU FTA negotiations.
Speed. In a second part, we investigate whether the speed of negotiations
influences the anticipation effects of trade agreements. Croce, Juan-Ramo`n,
and Zhu (2004) argue that anticipation depends strongly on the belief
that the agreement will be implemented. Hence smooth or fast-paced
negotiations might increase the probability of an EIA being concluded.
We explore this by including a variable with the speed (duration in years)
of the negotiation process in our baseline model. We again use the same
estimation strategy for this extension as for the baseline model, except for
only including FTAs and CUs.
Results are presented in table 3.4. Column (1) presents the baseline
model, augmented with the duration of stages 1 to 6 for each FTA and
CU. In column (2) we use the duration of stages 1 to 4, while in column
(3) we include an interaction term. Finally, column (4) includes the speed
of each stage separately. All specifications also include a dummy variable
indicating whether an EIA is being negotiated bilaterally or multilaterally.
We find that the pace of the negotiations does not influence whether or
not trade agreements are anticipated. None of the coefficients for speed in
the different specifications are statistically nor economically significant.
Member States. In this final extension, we explore whether there is
heterogeneity between Member States of the European Union in anticipating
trade agreements. We do this by estimating a Member State-specific effect of
EIAs on each stage in the lifetime of an EIA. We expect to find heterogeneity,
as Soete and Van Hove (2017) have shown that there is heterogeneity in the
reaction of Member States to trade agreements after their entry into force.
It is reasonable to assume that the determinants influencing heterogeneity
in the reaction of Member States to the entry into force of EIAs will also
induce heterogeneity in how Member States anticipate trade agreements.
Results are presented in figure 3.5. The full regression output can be
retrieved upon request. We find clear evidence of heterogeneity between
3.6. Estimation strategy and results 77
Table 3.4: Anticipation effects of FTAs and CUs and the pace of negotia-
tions.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trade Trade Trade Trade
Stage 1 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09
(0.093) (0.059) (0.093) (0.093)
Stage 2 0.30*** 0.09 0.30*** 0.32***
(0.091) (0.059) (0.091) (0.091)
Stage 3 0.28** 0.18** 0.28** 0.30***
(0.116) (0.073) (0.116) (0.116)
Stage 4 0.30*** 0.24*** 0.30*** 0.32***
(0.109) (0.078) (0.109) (0.108)
Stage 5 0.27*** 0.29*** 0.27***
(0.101) (0.073) (0.101)
Stage 5 and 6 0.46***
(0.067)
Stage 6 0.46*** 0.44*** 0.46***
(0.067) (0.064) (0.067)
Multi 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020)
Multi*speed 1-6 -0.00
(0.019)
Speed 1-6 -0.01 -0.00
(0.004) (0.004)
Speed 1-4 -0.00
(0.004)
Speed 1-2 0.01
(0.023)
Speed 2-3 0.00
(0.019)
Speed 3-4 -0.02
(0.038)
Speed 4-6 -0.02
(0.016)
Observations 71,651 77,737 71,651 71,651
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and
*** p<0.01.
Member States. While in some Member States trade flows double during
the negotiations phase, this is not the case in others. Some Member
States even experience a decrease in their trade. We find strong positive
anticipation effects for Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
Latvia, Romania and Bulgaria. With the exception of Bulgaria, anticipation
effects of trade agreements are more important for all these countries than
the impact of trade agreements after their entry into force. This finding
demonstrates how important it is to take anticipation effects into account
when one wants to estimate the total partial equilibrium impact of trade
agreements on trade flows.
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Export promotion policies have been shown to stimulate exports (Go¨rg,
Henry, and Strobl, 2008; Volpe Martincus and Carballo, 2008) and increase
the propensity to export (Schminke and Van Biesebroeck, 2013). Moreover,
for the case of Belgium, it has been shown that trade export promotion is
especially important and effective in reaching destinations outside of the
Single Market (Schminke and Van Biesebroeck, 2013). To test whether
trade openness or export promotion policies are related to the diverging
anticipation effects in the different Member States, we calculate the cor-
relation between the anticipation effects and trade openness, on the one
hand, and two measures of trade promotion, on the other hand. Results
are presented in table 3.5. Trade openness was calculated as the sum of
exports and imports of a country divided by its GDP and was retrieved
from the World Bank. Using either trade openness from 1995 or 2013, we
find that there is no relationship between trade openness and anticipation
of trade agreements. The correlation coefficients amount to -0.05 and -0.07,
respectively. There is a weak negative correlation, however, between trade
openness and anticipation effects during the first two stages of an EIA, with
coefficients ranging between -0.20 and -0.26. Being less open to trade is
associated with more positive (or less negative) anticipation effects during
the announcement and negotiation phase of a trade agreement.
Trade promotion was measured as the number of staff employed by a
country to promote trade or the number of clients trade promotion agencies
have. This data comes from INTRACEN (2015). We find a modest
correlation between the number of clients and anticipation of a trade
agreement (0.34 on average for all stages), while we find a weak correlation
between the number of clients and the effect of a trade agreement once
it has been implemented (0.18). Moreover, looking at the correlation
coefficients for all pre-implementation stages separately, we find that the
correlation coefficients are the largest in the two first stages: stage 1 has
a correlation coefficient of 0.36 while for stage 2 it amounts to 0.43. This
could suggest that trade promotion agencies are important in signaling to
firms the existence of trade agreements and their potential opportunities
in the early stages of development of trade agreements, when they might
not have received much attention or media coverage. We also find a weak
association between the number of staff employed by trade promotion
agencies and the anticipation effects during the announcement stage of an
EIA (the correlation coefficient is 0.19).
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Table 3.5: Explanations for the heterogeneity of anticipation effect by
member state
Trade Openness Trade Promotion
1995 2013 Nr of staff Nr of clients
Stage 1 -0.23 -0.26 0.19 0.36
Stage 2 -0.20 -0.20 0.11 0.43
Stage 3 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.23
Stage 4 0.14 0.13 -0.12 0.20
Mean stages 1-4 -0.05 -0.07 0.06 0.34
Stage 5 and 6 0.08 0.11 -0.19 0.18
3.7 Conclusion
This paper looks more closely at the different stages of the lifetime of an
EIA and estimates the impact each stage has on trade. We do this by
augmenting the gravity model with a dummy for each stage in the lifetime
of an EIA. We use a panel on aggregate trade flows between 27 EU countries
and 201 third countries and territories for the period of 1988-2013, and
control for endogeneity of EIAs and multilateral resistance.
Our results clearly indicate the existence of anticipation effects, but
the presence and strength of anticipation effects depend on the depth of
integration. We find that TWPTAs and CUs have no anticipation effects,
while FTAs have large anticipation effects: trade between parties starts
increasing from the moment official FTA negotiations have started and
keeps increasing up to five years after the entry into force of the trade
agreement.
The anticipation effects of FTAs are sizeable and much more important
than the literature has assumed them to be so far: FTAs increase trade
flows on average with 21% during the pre-implementation period. Once
the FTA enters into force, trade flows get another boost of 15 percentage
points and are on average 36% higher than trade flows between country
pairs without an FTA. Five years after the entry into force of the agreement
trade flows are on average 43% higher. Half of the increase in trade flows
ascribed to trade agreements thus takes place before said trade agreements
have officially entered into force.
Moreover, comparing our results to chapter 16, we find that not including
all the stages of the lifetime of an EIA into the model underestimates the
effects trade agreements have: while FTAs are estimated to increase trade
flows with 36% when including all stages, this is only 22% when only
including a dummy for entry force. We obtain similar findings when looking
at the effects up to five years after entry force. To obtain correct estimates
of the effects of trade agreements on trade flows it is therefore important to
6The findings of chapter 1 and 2 were obtained using the same datasets and using
similar methods, making the results comparable.
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look at the whole lifetime of the trade agreement, instead of only looking
at the effect of trade agreements after they enter into force.
One possible channel through which governments could stimulate antici-
pation effects are trade promotion agencies. We find that the heterogeneity
in anticipation effects of trade agreements between EU Member States
can be explained (partially) by the presence of trade promotion agencies:
countries with active trade promotion agencies experience a higher increase
in trade flows before trade agreements enter into force. This suggests that
these agencies might be important in signaling the existence of trade agree-
ments and their potential opportunities to firms. Moreover, the correlation
between the presence of trade promotion agencies and the trade stimulating
effects of trade agreements decreases over time. The correlation is much
stronger in the early stages in the life of an EIA compared to the later stages.
This might be because of the first-mover advantage providing early entrants
with a competitive edge over later entrants. Trade promotion agencies
should therefore focus their efforts on the announcement and negotiation
stages of EIAs for the biggest results.
However, trade negotiations have to be credible for anticipation effects
to occur. Trade negotiations with trade blocs that encounter difficulties
with their own integration process did not result in elevated trade flows.
While this paper allows for heterogeneous effects of trade agreements on
the different EU Member States, we do not allow for many other sources of
heterogeneity, leaving many questions unanswered. Are the anticipation
effects driven by the intensive or the extensive margin of trade? How is firm
entry affected? Which characteristics of trade agreements drive anticipation
effects? And how does media coverage and political uncertainty affect the
anticipation of trade agreements? In the next chapter, we will complement
this study of anticipation effects on the aggregate level with an analysis
using the firm as the observation unit, while the other questions provide
exciting research questions for future work.
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3.8 Appendix
Figure 3.6: Plot of residuals vs fitted values for the fixed effects specification
and the fourth differences specification.
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Table 3.6: Anticipation effects of FTAs and CUs using feasible GLS
Full sample EU12 only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Stage 1 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10** 0.09** 0.28***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.039) (0.039) (0.048)
Stage 2 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.28*** 0.27*** 0.47***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.040) (0.040) (0.054)
Stage 3 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.50***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.059) (0.059) (0.076)
Stage 4 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.27*** 0.25*** 0.50***
(0.041) (0.042) (0.063) (0.064) (0.079)
Stage 5 and 6 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.61***
(0.029) (0.042) (0.067)
Stage 5 0.29*** 0.28***
(0.041) (0.062)
Stage 6 0.34*** 0.38***
(0.032) (0.045)
EU accession 0.15*** 0.15***
(0.027) (0.027)
OPTA 0.25*** 0.24*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.31***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.046) (0.046) (0.070)
TWPTA -0.01 -0.01 -0.48*** -0.11*** -0.65***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.055) (0.042) (0.079)
Observations 169,519 169,519 106,387 106,387 63,687
Standard errors clustered on country pair in parentheses. * p<0.1,
** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. Demeaned country-year fixed effects are
included.
Table 3.7: Exogeneity test
Trade
F5.Stage 1 0.02
Stage 1 0.04
Stage 2 0.14***
Stage 3 0.14**
Stage 4 0.13**
Stage 5 0.26***
Stage 6 0.32***
Observations 126,589
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and ***
p<0.01.
84 Chapter 3. Anticipation effects
T
a
b
le
3
.8
:
S
ta
g
es
a
n
d
ch
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
o
f
a
ll
E
IA
s
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
E
U
a
n
d
th
ir
d
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
d
u
ri
n
g
th
e
p
er
io
d
1
9
8
8
-2
0
1
3
.
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
1
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
2
S
t
a
g
e
1
S
t
a
g
e
2
S
t
a
g
e
3
S
t
a
g
e
4
S
t
a
g
e
5
S
t
a
g
e
6
S
t
a
g
e
7
T
y
p
e
B
il
a
t
e
r
a
l
F
o
ll
o
w
-
u
p
E
I
A
s
u
s
p
e
n
d
e
d
E
C
A
lb
a
n
ia
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
6
n
o
2
0
0
9
n
o
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
E
C
A
lg
e
r
ia
1
9
9
6
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
n
o
2
0
0
5
n
o
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
E
C
A
n
d
o
r
r
a
1
9
8
9
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
0
n
o
1
9
9
1
n
o
C
U
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
E
C
A
n
g
o
la
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
A
r
m
e
n
ia
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
3
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
E
IA
E
C
B
o
li
v
ia
2
0
0
6
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
e
g
o
t
ia
t
io
n
s
E
C
B
o
s
n
ia
H
e
r
z
e
g
o
v
in
a
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
8
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
E
C
B
r
u
n
e
i
2
0
0
7
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
e
g
o
t
ia
t
io
n
s
E
C
B
u
r
m
a
2
0
0
3
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
e
g
o
t
ia
t
io
n
s
E
C
C
a
m
b
o
d
ia
2
0
0
4
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
e
g
o
t
ia
t
io
n
s
E
C
C
a
n
a
d
a
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
E
C
C
h
il
e
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
5
n
o
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
E
C
C
o
lo
m
b
ia
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
E
C
C
o
t
e
d
’I
v
o
ir
e
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
8
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
y
e
s
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
E
c
u
a
d
o
r
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
4
n
o
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
e
g
o
t
ia
t
io
n
s
E
C
E
g
y
p
t
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
4
n
o
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
E
C
F
a
r
o
e
Is
la
n
d
s
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
1
n
o
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
7
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
E
C
F
ij
i
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
4
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
y
e
s
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
G
e
o
r
g
ia
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
4
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
E
C
G
h
a
n
a
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
7
2
0
1
4
n
o
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
Ic
e
la
n
d
1
9
7
3
n
o
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
E
C
In
d
ia
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
7
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
E
C
In
d
o
n
e
s
ia
2
0
0
7
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
e
g
o
t
ia
t
io
n
s
E
C
Is
r
a
e
l
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
5
2
0
0
0
n
o
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
E
C
J
a
p
a
n
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
E
C
J
o
r
d
a
n
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
7
2
0
0
2
n
o
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
E
C
L
a
o
s
2
0
0
5
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
e
g
o
t
ia
t
io
n
s
E
C
L
e
b
a
n
o
n
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
6
n
o
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
E
C
L
ib
y
a
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
8
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
e
g
o
t
ia
t
io
n
s
E
C
L
ie
c
h
t
e
n
s
t
e
in
1
9
7
3
n
o
C
U
n
o
n
o
n
o
E
C
M
a
c
e
d
o
n
ia
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
4
n
o
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
E
C
M
a
la
y
s
ia
2
0
0
7
2
0
1
0
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
E
C
M
e
x
ic
o
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
n
o
2
0
0
0
n
o
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
E
C
M
o
ld
o
v
a
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
4
n
o
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
E
C
M
o
n
t
e
n
e
g
r
o
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
n
o
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
E
C
M
o
r
o
c
c
o
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
n
o
2
0
0
0
n
o
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
E
C
N
a
m
ib
ia
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
4
n
o
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
N
o
r
w
a
y
1
9
7
3
n
o
C
U
n
o
n
o
n
o
E
C
O
C
T
1
9
7
1
n
o
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
E
C
P
a
le
s
t
in
e
.
.
.
.
1
9
9
5
2
0
0
0
n
o
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
E
C
P
a
p
u
a
N
e
w
G
u
in
e
a
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
1
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
y
e
s
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
P
e
r
u
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
E
C
P
h
il
ip
p
in
e
s
2
0
0
7
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
E
C
S
a
n
M
a
r
in
o
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
3
n
o
C
U
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
E
C
S
e
r
b
ia
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
3
n
o
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
3.8. Appendix 85
T
a
b
le
3
.8
:
S
ta
g
es
a
n
d
ch
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
o
f
a
ll
E
IA
s
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
E
U
a
n
d
th
ir
d
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
-
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
.
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
1
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
2
S
t
a
g
e
1
S
t
a
g
e
2
S
t
a
g
e
3
S
t
a
g
e
4
S
t
a
g
e
5
S
t
a
g
e
6
S
t
a
g
e
7
T
y
p
e
B
il
a
t
e
r
a
l
F
o
ll
o
w
-
u
p
E
I
A
s
u
s
p
e
n
d
e
d
E
C
S
in
g
a
p
o
r
e
2
0
0
7
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
3
n
o
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
E
C
S
o
u
t
h
A
fr
ic
a
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
4
n
o
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
E
C
S
o
u
t
h
K
o
r
e
a
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
1
n
o
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
E
C
S
w
it
z
e
r
la
n
d
1
9
7
3
n
o
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
E
C
S
y
r
ia
1
9
7
7
2
0
0
4
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
E
IA
E
C
T
h
a
il
a
n
d
2
0
0
7
2
0
1
3
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
E
C
T
u
n
is
ia
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
5
n
o
1
9
9
8
n
o
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
E
C
T
u
r
k
e
y
1
9
6
3
.
.
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
n
o
C
U
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
E
C
U
k
r
a
in
e
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
4
n
o
2
0
1
6
n
o
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
E
C
U
S
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
E
C
V
ie
t
n
a
m
2
0
0
7
2
0
1
2
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
E
C
A
n
t
ig
u
a
a
n
d
B
a
r
b
u
d
a
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
8
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
B
a
h
a
m
a
s
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
8
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
B
a
r
b
a
d
o
s
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
8
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
B
e
li
z
e
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
8
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
D
o
m
in
ic
a
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
8
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
G
r
e
n
a
d
a
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
8
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
G
u
y
a
n
a
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
8
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
H
a
it
i
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
8
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
J
a
m
a
ic
a
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
8
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
S
a
in
t
K
it
t
s
a
n
d
N
e
v
is
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
8
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
S
a
in
t
L
u
c
ia
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
8
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
S
a
in
t
V
in
c
e
n
t
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
8
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
S
u
r
in
a
m
e
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
8
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
T
r
in
id
a
d
a
n
d
T
o
b
a
g
o
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
8
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
D
o
m
in
ic
a
n
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
8
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
C
a
m
e
r
o
o
n
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
4
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
A
fr
ic
a
n
R
e
p
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
C
h
a
d
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
C
o
n
g
o
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
C
o
n
g
o
B
r
a
z
z
a
v
il
le
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
E
q
u
a
t
o
r
ia
l
G
u
in
e
a
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
G
a
b
o
n
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
S
a
o
T
o
m
e
&
P
r
in
c
ip
e
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
C
o
s
t
a
R
ic
a
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
E
C
E
l
S
a
lv
a
d
o
r
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
E
C
G
u
a
t
e
m
a
la
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
E
C
H
o
n
d
u
r
a
s
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
E
C
N
ic
a
r
a
g
u
a
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
E
C
P
a
n
a
m
a
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
E
C
B
u
r
u
n
d
i
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
5
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
K
e
n
y
a
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
5
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
R
w
a
n
d
a
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
5
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
T
a
n
z
a
n
ia
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
5
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
U
g
a
n
d
a
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
5
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
86 Chapter 3. Anticipation effects
T
a
b
le
3
.8
:
S
ta
g
es
a
n
d
ch
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
o
f
a
ll
E
IA
s
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
E
U
a
n
d
th
ir
d
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
-
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
.
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
1
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
2
S
t
a
g
e
1
S
t
a
g
e
2
S
t
a
g
e
3
S
t
a
g
e
4
S
t
a
g
e
5
S
t
a
g
e
6
S
t
a
g
e
7
T
y
p
e
B
il
a
t
e
r
a
l
F
o
ll
o
w
-
u
p
E
I
A
s
u
s
p
e
n
d
e
d
E
C
M
a
d
a
g
a
s
c
a
r
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
2
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
M
a
u
r
it
iu
s
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
2
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
S
e
y
c
h
e
ll
e
s
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
2
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
Z
im
b
a
b
w
e
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
2
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
C
o
m
o
r
o
s
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
7
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
Z
a
m
b
ia
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
7
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
D
ji
b
o
u
t
i
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
4
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
E
r
it
r
e
a
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
4
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
E
t
h
io
p
ia
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
4
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
M
a
la
w
i
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
4
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
S
u
d
a
n
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
4
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
B
a
h
r
a
in
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
e
g
o
t
ia
t
io
n
s
E
C
K
u
w
a
it
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
e
g
o
t
ia
t
io
n
s
E
C
O
m
a
n
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
e
g
o
t
ia
t
io
n
s
E
C
Q
a
t
a
r
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
e
g
o
t
ia
t
io
n
s
E
C
S
a
u
d
i
A
r
a
b
ia
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
e
g
o
t
ia
t
io
n
s
E
C
U
A
E
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
e
g
o
t
ia
t
io
n
s
E
C
A
r
g
e
n
t
in
a
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
e
g
o
t
ia
t
io
n
s
E
C
B
r
a
z
il
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
e
g
o
t
ia
t
io
n
s
E
C
P
a
r
a
g
u
a
y
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
e
g
o
t
ia
t
io
n
s
E
C
U
r
u
g
u
a
y
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
e
g
o
t
ia
t
io
n
s
E
C
V
e
n
e
z
u
e
la
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
e
g
o
t
ia
t
io
n
s
E
C
B
o
t
s
w
a
n
a
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
4
2
0
0
9
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
L
e
s
o
t
h
o
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
4
2
0
0
9
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
M
o
z
a
m
b
iq
u
e
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
4
2
0
0
9
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
S
w
a
z
il
a
n
d
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
4
2
0
0
9
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
B
e
n
in
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
4
n
o
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
B
u
r
k
in
a
F
a
s
o
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
4
n
o
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
C
a
p
e
V
e
r
d
e
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
4
n
o
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
G
a
m
b
ia
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
4
n
o
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
G
u
in
e
a
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
4
n
o
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
G
u
in
e
a
-B
is
s
a
u
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
4
n
o
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
L
ib
e
r
ia
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
4
n
o
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
M
a
li
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
4
n
o
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
M
a
u
r
it
a
n
ia
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
4
n
o
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
N
ig
e
r
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
4
n
o
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
N
ig
e
r
ia
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
4
n
o
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
S
e
n
e
g
a
l
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
4
n
o
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
S
ie
r
r
a
L
e
o
n
e
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
4
n
o
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
T
o
g
o
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
4
n
o
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
E
g
y
p
t
2
0
1
1
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
y
e
s
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
F
a
r
o
e
Is
la
n
d
s
.
.
.
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
n
o
F
T
A
y
e
s
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
J
o
r
d
a
n
2
0
1
1
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
y
e
s
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
M
o
r
o
c
c
o
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
3
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
y
e
s
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
S
o
u
t
h
A
fr
ic
a
2
0
0
7
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
4
n
o
n
o
n
o
T
W
P
T
A
y
e
s
y
e
s
n
o
3.8. Appendix 87
T
a
b
le
3
.8
:
S
ta
g
es
a
n
d
ch
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
o
f
a
ll
E
IA
s
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
E
U
a
n
d
th
ir
d
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
-
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
.
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
1
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
2
S
t
a
g
e
1
S
t
a
g
e
2
S
t
a
g
e
3
S
t
a
g
e
4
S
t
a
g
e
5
S
t
a
g
e
6
S
t
a
g
e
7
T
y
p
e
B
il
a
t
e
r
a
l
F
o
ll
o
w
-
u
p
E
I
A
s
u
s
p
e
n
d
e
d
E
C
M
e
x
ic
o
2
0
1
3
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
y
e
s
y
e
s
n
o
E
C
T
u
n
is
ia
2
0
1
1
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
F
T
A
y
e
s
y
e
s
n
o
A
u
s
t
r
ia
Ic
e
la
n
d
1
9
6
1
1
9
9
4
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
A
u
s
t
r
ia
Is
r
a
e
l
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
2
n
o
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
A
u
s
t
r
ia
L
ie
c
h
t
e
n
s
t
e
in
1
9
6
1
1
9
9
4
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
A
u
s
t
r
ia
N
o
r
w
a
y
1
9
6
1
1
9
9
4
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
A
u
s
t
r
ia
S
w
it
z
e
r
la
n
d
1
9
6
1
1
9
9
4
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
A
u
s
t
r
ia
T
u
r
k
e
y
.
.
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
1
n
o
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
B
u
lg
a
r
ia
A
lb
a
n
ia
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
3
n
o
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
6
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
B
u
lg
a
r
ia
B
o
s
n
ia
H
e
r
z
e
g
o
v
in
a
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
1
n
o
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
6
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
B
u
lg
a
r
ia
Ic
e
la
n
d
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
n
o
1
9
9
4
2
0
0
6
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
B
u
lg
a
r
ia
Is
r
a
e
l
.
.
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
1
n
o
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
6
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
B
u
lg
a
r
ia
L
ie
c
h
t
e
n
s
t
e
in
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
n
o
1
9
9
4
2
0
0
6
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
B
u
lg
a
r
ia
M
a
c
e
d
o
n
ia
1
9
9
9
1
9
9
9
1
9
9
9
1
9
9
9
n
o
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
6
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
B
u
lg
a
r
ia
M
o
ld
o
v
a
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
2
n
o
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
6
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
B
u
lg
a
r
ia
M
o
n
t
e
n
e
g
r
o
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
1
n
o
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
6
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
B
u
lg
a
r
ia
N
o
r
w
a
y
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
n
o
1
9
9
4
2
0
0
6
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
B
u
lg
a
r
ia
S
e
r
b
ia
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
2
n
o
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
6
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
B
u
lg
a
r
ia
S
w
it
z
e
r
la
n
d
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
n
o
1
9
9
4
2
0
0
6
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
B
u
lg
a
r
ia
T
u
r
k
e
y
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
8
n
o
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
6
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
C
y
p
r
u
s
A
r
m
e
n
ia
.
.
.
1
9
9
5
n
o
1
9
9
5
2
0
0
6
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
C
z
e
c
h
R
e
p
.
Ic
e
la
n
d
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
2
n
o
1
9
9
2
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
C
z
e
c
h
R
e
p
.
Is
r
a
e
l
.
.
.
1
9
9
6
n
o
1
9
9
6
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
C
z
e
c
h
R
e
p
.
L
ie
c
h
t
e
n
s
t
e
in
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
2
n
o
1
9
9
2
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
C
z
e
c
h
R
e
p
.
N
o
r
w
a
y
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
2
n
o
1
9
9
2
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
C
z
e
c
h
R
e
p
.
S
w
it
z
e
r
la
n
d
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
2
n
o
1
9
9
2
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
C
z
e
c
h
R
e
p
.
T
u
r
k
e
y
.
.
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
n
o
1
9
9
7
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
E
s
t
o
n
ia
A
r
m
e
n
ia
.
.
.
.
.
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
E
s
t
o
n
ia
F
a
r
o
e
Is
la
n
d
s
.
.
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
7
n
o
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
E
s
t
o
n
ia
Ic
e
la
n
d
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
E
s
t
o
n
ia
L
ie
c
h
t
e
n
s
t
e
in
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
E
s
t
o
n
ia
N
o
r
w
a
y
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
E
s
t
o
n
ia
S
w
it
z
e
r
la
n
d
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
E
s
t
o
n
ia
T
u
r
k
e
y
.
.
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
7
n
o
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
E
s
t
o
n
ia
U
k
r
a
in
e
.
.
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
5
n
o
1
9
9
6
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
F
in
la
n
d
Ic
e
la
n
d
1
9
6
1
1
9
9
4
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
F
in
la
n
d
Is
r
a
e
l
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
2
n
o
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
F
in
la
n
d
L
ie
c
h
t
e
n
s
t
e
in
1
9
6
1
1
9
9
4
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
F
in
la
n
d
N
o
r
w
a
y
1
9
6
1
1
9
9
4
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
F
in
la
n
d
S
w
it
z
e
r
la
n
d
1
9
6
1
1
9
9
4
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
F
in
la
n
d
T
u
r
k
e
y
.
.
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
1
n
o
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
H
u
n
g
a
r
y
Ic
e
la
n
d
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
n
o
1
9
9
3
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
H
u
n
g
a
r
y
Is
r
a
e
l
.
.
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
n
o
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
H
u
n
g
a
r
y
L
ie
c
h
t
e
n
s
t
e
in
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
n
o
1
9
9
3
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
H
u
n
g
a
r
y
N
o
r
w
a
y
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
n
o
1
9
9
3
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
88 Chapter 3. Anticipation effects
T
a
b
le
3
.8
:
S
ta
g
es
a
n
d
ch
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
o
f
a
ll
E
IA
s
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
E
U
a
n
d
th
ir
d
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
-
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
.
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
1
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
2
S
t
a
g
e
1
S
t
a
g
e
2
S
t
a
g
e
3
S
t
a
g
e
4
S
t
a
g
e
5
S
t
a
g
e
6
S
t
a
g
e
7
T
y
p
e
B
il
a
t
e
r
a
l
F
o
ll
o
w
-
u
p
E
I
A
s
u
s
p
e
n
d
e
d
H
u
n
g
a
r
y
S
w
it
z
e
r
la
n
d
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
n
o
1
9
9
3
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
H
u
n
g
a
r
y
T
u
r
k
e
y
.
.
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
n
o
1
9
9
7
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
L
a
t
v
ia
Ic
e
la
n
d
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
5
n
o
1
9
9
6
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
L
a
t
v
ia
L
ie
c
h
t
e
n
s
t
e
in
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
5
n
o
1
9
9
6
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
L
a
t
v
ia
N
o
r
w
a
y
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
5
n
o
1
9
9
6
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
L
a
t
v
ia
S
w
it
z
e
r
la
n
d
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
5
n
o
1
9
9
6
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
L
a
t
v
ia
T
u
r
k
e
y
.
.
.
1
9
9
8
n
o
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
L
it
h
u
a
n
ia
Ic
e
la
n
d
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
5
n
o
1
9
9
7
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
L
it
h
u
a
n
ia
L
ie
c
h
t
e
n
s
t
e
in
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
5
n
o
1
9
9
7
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
L
it
h
u
a
n
ia
N
o
r
w
a
y
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
5
n
o
1
9
9
7
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
L
it
h
u
a
n
ia
S
w
it
z
e
r
la
n
d
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
5
n
o
1
9
9
7
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
L
it
h
u
a
n
ia
T
u
r
k
e
y
.
.
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
7
n
o
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
P
o
la
n
d
F
a
r
o
e
Is
la
n
d
s
.
.
.
1
9
9
8
n
o
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
P
o
la
n
d
Ic
e
la
n
d
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
P
o
la
n
d
Is
r
a
e
l
.
.
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
7
n
o
1
9
9
7
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
P
o
la
n
d
L
ie
c
h
t
e
n
s
t
e
in
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
P
o
la
n
d
N
o
r
w
a
y
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
P
o
la
n
d
S
w
it
z
e
r
la
n
d
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
P
o
la
n
d
T
u
r
k
e
y
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
9
1
9
9
9
n
o
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
R
o
m
a
n
ia
A
lb
a
n
ia
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
3
n
o
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
R
o
m
a
n
ia
B
o
s
n
ia
H
e
r
z
e
g
o
v
in
a
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
1
n
o
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
6
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
R
o
m
a
n
ia
Ic
e
la
n
d
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
2
n
o
1
9
9
3
2
0
0
6
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
R
o
m
a
n
ia
Is
r
a
e
l
.
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
n
o
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
6
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
R
o
m
a
n
ia
L
ie
c
h
t
e
n
s
t
e
in
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
2
n
o
1
9
9
3
2
0
0
6
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
R
o
m
a
n
ia
M
a
c
e
d
o
n
ia
1
9
9
9
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
1
n
o
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
R
o
m
a
n
ia
M
o
ld
o
v
a
.
.
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
4
n
o
1
9
9
4
2
0
0
6
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
R
o
m
a
n
ia
M
o
n
t
e
n
e
g
r
o
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
1
n
o
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
6
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
R
o
m
a
n
ia
N
o
r
w
a
y
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
2
n
o
1
9
9
3
2
0
0
6
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
R
o
m
a
n
ia
S
e
r
b
ia
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
n
o
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
6
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
R
o
m
a
n
ia
S
w
it
z
e
r
la
n
d
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
2
n
o
1
9
9
3
2
0
0
6
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
R
o
m
a
n
ia
T
u
r
k
e
y
.
.
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
n
o
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
6
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
S
lo
v
a
k
ia
Ic
e
la
n
d
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
2
n
o
1
9
9
2
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
S
lo
v
a
k
ia
L
ie
c
h
t
e
n
s
t
e
in
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
2
n
o
1
9
9
2
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
S
lo
v
a
k
ia
N
o
r
w
a
y
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
2
n
o
1
9
9
2
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
S
lo
v
a
k
ia
S
w
it
z
e
r
la
n
d
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
2
n
o
1
9
9
2
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
S
lo
v
e
n
ia
B
o
s
n
ia
H
e
r
z
e
g
o
v
in
a
.
.
.
2
0
0
1
n
o
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
S
lo
v
e
n
ia
Ic
e
la
n
d
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
S
lo
v
e
n
ia
L
ie
c
h
t
e
n
s
t
e
in
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
S
lo
v
e
n
ia
M
a
c
e
d
o
n
ia
.
.
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
6
n
o
1
9
9
6
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
S
lo
v
e
n
ia
N
o
r
w
a
y
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
S
lo
v
e
n
ia
S
w
it
z
e
r
la
n
d
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
S
lo
v
e
n
ia
T
u
r
k
e
y
.
.
.
1
9
9
8
n
o
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
S
lo
v
a
k
ia
Is
r
a
e
l
.
.
.
1
9
9
6
n
o
1
9
9
6
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
S
lo
v
a
k
ia
T
u
r
k
e
y
.
.
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
n
o
1
9
9
7
2
0
0
3
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
S
w
e
d
e
n
Ic
e
la
n
d
1
9
6
1
1
9
9
4
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
3.8. Appendix 89
T
a
b
le
3
.8
:
S
ta
g
es
a
n
d
ch
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
o
f
a
ll
E
IA
s
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
E
U
a
n
d
th
ir
d
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
-
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
.
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
1
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
2
S
t
a
g
e
1
S
t
a
g
e
2
S
t
a
g
e
3
S
t
a
g
e
4
S
t
a
g
e
5
S
t
a
g
e
6
S
t
a
g
e
7
T
y
p
e
B
il
a
t
e
r
a
l
F
o
ll
o
w
-
u
p
E
I
A
s
u
s
p
e
n
d
e
d
S
w
e
d
e
n
Is
r
a
e
l
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
2
n
o
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
F
T
A
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
S
w
e
d
e
n
L
ie
c
h
t
e
n
s
t
e
in
1
9
6
1
1
9
9
4
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
S
w
e
d
e
n
N
o
r
w
a
y
1
9
6
1
1
9
9
4
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
S
w
e
d
e
n
S
w
it
z
e
r
la
n
d
1
9
6
1
1
9
9
4
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
S
w
e
d
e
n
T
u
r
k
e
y
.
.
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
1
n
o
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
F
T
A
n
o
n
o
n
o
N
o
te
:
.
in
d
ic
a
t
e
s
m
is
s
in
g
v
a
lu
e
s
.
90 Chapter 3. Anticipation effects
T
a
b
le
3
.9
:
B
a
se
li
n
e
m
o
d
el
u
si
n
g
st
a
n
d
a
rd
es
ti
m
a
ti
o
n
te
ch
n
iq
u
es
.
F
ix
e
d
e
ff
e
c
ts
F
o
u
rt
h
d
iff
e
re
n
c
e
s
R
G
D
F
T
ra
d
e
IM
E
M
T
ra
d
e
IM
E
M
T
ra
d
e
IM
E
M
S
ta
g
e
1
0
.2
2
*
0
.3
3
*
*
-0
.1
1
(0
.1
2
1
)
(0
.1
4
0
)
(0
.1
4
8
)
S
ta
g
e
2
0
.3
2
*
*
*
-0
.1
7
*
0
.4
9
*
*
*
(0
.0
9
6
)
(0
.0
9
3
)
(0
.0
9
0
)
S
ta
g
e
3
0
.1
4
-0
.0
0
0
.1
4
*
(0
.1
3
1
)
(0
.1
1
4
)
(0
.0
7
1
)
S
ta
g
e
4
0
.2
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
3
0
.2
7
*
*
*
(0
.0
8
5
)
(0
.0
9
4
)
(0
.0
8
1
)
S
ta
g
e
5
a
n
d
6
0
.2
5
*
*
*
-0
.1
3
0
.3
8
*
*
*
(0
.0
8
7
)
(0
.0
9
2
)
(0
.0
9
1
)
∆
4
st
a
g
e
1
0
.0
2
0
.3
1
*
-0
.3
0
*
*
-0
.1
8
0
.3
1
*
-0
.4
9
*
*
*
(0
.1
0
3
)
(0
.1
6
0
)
(0
.1
3
8
)
(0
.1
2
6
)
(0
.1
7
2
)
(0
.1
5
1
)
∆
4
st
a
g
e
2
0
.1
2
-0
.0
8
0
.2
0
*
*
-0
.1
2
-0
.1
2
0
.0
0
(0
.1
2
1
)
(0
.1
0
6
)
(0
.0
9
5
)
(0
.1
5
9
)
(0
.1
7
3
)
(0
.1
1
1
)
∆
4
st
a
g
e
3
-0
.0
9
-0
.2
1
0
.1
2
-0
.3
0
-0
.2
6
*
-0
.0
4
(0
.1
2
9
)
(0
.1
4
2
)
(0
.0
7
6
)
(0
.2
0
7
)
(0
.1
5
2
)
(0
.1
0
4
)
∆
4
st
a
g
e
4
0
.1
8
*
*
-0
.0
0
0
.1
8
*
*
0
.0
6
0
.1
1
-0
.0
5
(0
.0
8
5
)
(0
.1
1
5
)
(0
.0
7
4
)
(0
.1
8
5
)
(0
.1
8
2
)
(0
.1
1
9
)
∆
4
st
a
g
e
5
a
n
d
6
0
.1
0
-0
.0
7
0
.1
6
*
*
0
.0
2
-0
.1
1
0
.1
3
(0
.0
7
6
)
(0
.0
6
1
)
(0
.0
7
7
)
(0
.1
1
5
)
(0
.0
8
7
)
(0
.1
0
5
)
O
P
T
A
st
a
g
e
6
-0
.1
0
-0
.2
0
*
*
0
.1
0
*
(0
.0
5
7
)
(0
.0
7
3
)
(0
.0
5
4
)
∆
4
O
P
T
A
st
a
g
e
6
-0
.0
5
-0
.1
5
*
*
0
.1
0
*
*
0
.0
4
-0
.1
4
0
.1
8
*
*
*
(0
.0
6
8
)
(0
.0
7
2
)
(0
.0
4
2
)
(0
.0
8
9
)
(0
.1
0
6
)
(0
.0
5
5
)
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
1
6
9
,5
1
0
1
6
9
,5
1
0
1
6
9
,5
1
0
1
2
8
,0
6
2
1
2
8
,0
6
2
1
2
8
,0
6
2
8
2
,6
7
0
8
2
,6
7
0
8
2
,6
7
0
A
ll
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
in
c
lu
d
e
im
p
o
rt
e
r-
y
e
a
r
a
n
d
e
x
p
o
rt
e
r-
y
e
a
r
fi
x
e
d
e
ff
e
c
ts
.
T
h
e
fi
rs
t
a
n
d
la
st
se
ts
o
f
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
(i
.e
.
th
e
fi
x
e
d
e
ff
e
c
ts
sp
e
c
ifi
c
a
ti
o
n
a
n
d
th
e
ra
n
d
o
m
g
ro
w
th
m
o
d
e
l
(R
G
D
F
)
sp
e
c
ifi
c
a
ti
o
n
)
a
ls
o
in
c
lu
d
e
c
o
u
n
tr
y
p
a
ir
fi
x
e
d
e
ff
e
c
ts
.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
e
rr
o
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
e
se
s.
*
p
<
0
.1
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
5
a
n
d
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
.
3.8. Appendix 91
Table 3.10: Anticipation effects of FTAs and CUs that were suspended at
some point versus FTAs and CUs that were never suspended.
Trade Trade
Not suspended
Stage 1 0.04 0.04
(0.047) (0.047)
Stage 2 0.09* 0.09*
(0.050) (0.050)
Stage 3 0.14** 0.14**
(0.063) (0.063)
Stage 4 0.18*** 0.18***
(0.064) (0.064)
Stage 5 0.22*** 0.22***
(0.062) (0.062)
Stage 6 0.29*** 0.29***
(0.044) (0.044)
Suspended at some point
Stage 1 -0.07 -0.07
(0.061) (0.061)
Stage 2 -0.04 -0.04
(0.057) (0.061)
Stage 3 0.26 0.26
(0.175) (0.175)
Stage 4-6 omitted omitted
omitted omitted
After suspended 0.01
(0.059)
Observations 166,387 166,387
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01.

Chapter 4
Firm-level impact of trade
agreements
4.1 Introduction
With firm-level data becoming more widely available in the last couple
of years, firm-level analysis has become an invaluable tool for scholars in
international trade. Many of the advances in the theoretical and empirical
literature in international trade in recent years have been driven by firm-
level analysis. Empirical analysis using information on firm-level export
transactions and firm characteristics has unlocked a wealth of information,
testing existing models in international trade as well as driving new theo-
retical models (see for example Bernard and Jensen, 1995; Pavcnik (2002);
Bernard et al. (2003); Melitz (2003); Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007);
Bernard et al. (2007); Verhoogen (2008); Kugler and Verhoogen (2012);
Chor, Manova, and Yu (2014); Magerman et al. (2015), and many more).
Many papers research the impact of globalization and trade policy on
firm behavior using firm heterogeneity as a conceptual framework. For
example, Amiti and Konings (2007) study the impact of trade liberalization
in Indonesia, Konings and Vandenbussche (2008) look at the heteroge-
neous responses of firms to trade protection and Abraham, Konings, and
Vanormelingen (2009) study the effect of globalization on the price-cost
margin of firms union bargaining power. While there is a rich empirical
literature on the impact of WTO accessions on firms, this is not the case
for bilateral trade liberalizations (see for example Brandt, Van Biesebroeck,
and Zhang, 2012; Yu, 2015; Ng and Tuan, 2003 for papers on the effect of
China’s WTO accession). There are some papers exploring the impact of a
specific trade agreement on firm-level exports - especially NAFTA seems
to be a popular subject of study (see for example Lo´pez-Co´rdova (2002),
Alvarez and Robertson (2004), Iacovone and Javorcik (2010) and De Hoyos
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and Iacovone (2013) for the impact of NAFTA on Mexican firms). However,
it is difficult to extrapolate these findings to other settings. To the best of
our knowledge, there are no papers estimating a more general effect of a
multitude of trade agreements on firm-level exports.
There are, nevertheless, two major advantages to studying the impact of
free trade agreements on trade flows on the firm-level compared to on the
country-level. First, a well-established result of the theoretical literature
on trade liberalization is the heterogeneous impact on firms. So far, the
empirical EIA literature has failed to support this with empirical evidence.
Second, studying the impact of EIAs on firms using firm-level data is an
ideal robustness check to the extensive country-level literature estimating
the effects of EIAs. While the trade creating effects of trade agreements on
the macro-level are quite robust, this needn’t be on the micro-level due to
firm heterogeneity.
This paper makes a first attempt at determining the impact of trade
agreements on firms. More specifically, we want to estimate the effect
trade agreements have on heterogeneous firms. We do this by using a rich
panel dataset for Belgium on the firm-level for the period 2002-2014. Next
to standard gravity variables and data on trade agreements, our dataset
comprises of two main sources: the National Bank of Belgium’s Trade
Database consisting of all Belgian manufacturing exporters and a dataset
with firm characteristics such as firm size, age and productivity obtained
from the Belgian Business Registry of firms. We can link both datasets
together through a common firm identifier, resulting in a very rich panel.
This allows us not only to estimate the impact of EIAs on firms, but also to
look at the interaction between the impact of EIAs and firm characteristics.
Our analysis proceeds in several steps. We start by estimating a general
partial equilibrium effect of trade agreements on firm-level exports, by
translating the gravity equation to firm-level exports. We augment the
gravity equation with firm characteristics to control for firm heterogeneity,
and try different fixed effects structures. We find a positive effect of trade
agreements on firm-level trade flows.
We continue our analysis by zooming in on the timing of trade policy ef-
fects. We do this by exploring whether trade agreements have effects before
they enter into force officially and for how long they keep on stimulating
trade after entry into force. We find clear indications that firms anticipate
trade agreements: the average firm starts exporting more once FTA ne-
gotiations start. Whether or not trade agreements keep stimulating trade
up to five years after their official implementation is less clear. Moreover,
firms anticipate trade agreements by entering FTA markets ahead of entry
into force.
Next, we look at the heterogeneous impact of EIAs on different types of
firms. We first include interaction effects of our trade agreement dummy
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and firm characteristics in our model, and then allow for a non-linear
relation between firm characteristics and the effects of a trade agreement
by estimating quantile regressions. We find that trade agreements have a
homogeneous impact on firm-level exports in terms of firm productivity and
profitability, but a heterogeneous impact in terms of age and firm size. We
find that especially firms with 50 to 99 employees tend to take advantage
of the opportunities presented by trade agreements, as well as old firms.
Finally, we look at the impact of trade agreements on different margins of
trade. We find that the probability of firms starting to export new products
to a market is higher when there is a trade agreement with market. This
regardless of whether the firm is already active on that market (product
diversification) or not (product-market diversification). This is consistent
with Eckel and Neary (2010), who find that firms expand their range of
products in markets with trade agreements.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 sharpens intuition
about the impact of trade agreements on firm level exports by discussing a
theoretical framework, while 4.3 describes the data used in detail. In section
4.4, we take a first look at the data using extensive summary statistics,
while in section 4.5 we provide a general estimation of the impact of trade
agreements on firm level exports. Section 4.6 looks at the timing of trade
policy effects and section 4.7 investigates if we can identify sources of
heterogeneity of FTA effects. Section 4.8 takes a closer look at exporter
dynamics and several margins of trade and section 4.9 concludes.
4.2 Theoretical framework
Since the seminal work by Melitz (2003), heterogeneity has been on the
forefront of the international trade literature. Firm heterogeneity has been
found to be important in explaining differences between exporters and
non-exporters1, as well as differences across exporting firms2. Recently,
papers have started incorporating this heterogeneity into more detail in
theoretical models of multi-product multi-destination firms (see for example
Mayer, Melitz, and Ottaviano (2014), Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2011),
Eckel and Neary (2010), and Arkolakis, Ganapati, and Muendler (2016)).
Arkolakis, Ganapati, and Muendler (2016) extend Melitz (2003) to a
multi-product setting and generalize the multi-product models of Eckel and
Neary (2010), Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011), Chaney (2008), and
1Exporters have consistently been found to be more productive, larger, profitable
and pay higher wages than non-exporters (Mayer and Ottaviano, 2008). The discussion
whether these differences are caused by self-selection or learning-by-exporting is still
ongoing (Wagner, 2007; Wagner, 2012; De Loecker, 2013).
2Soete and Viegelahn (2017), for example, show that heavy exporters behave
differently than light exporters with respect to five productivity and labour market
indicators.
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Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2011)). Heterogeneity is modeled on the
firm-level, as well as on the firm-product-destination-level. This is similar
to Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011) who include local product appeal
shocks and Eckel and Neary (2010) who assume that firms face declining
efficiency in supplying additional products that are farther from its core
competency.
Crucial in the model are the three types of costs firms face. First, as is
standard in the literature, firms face iceberg trade costs for shipping goods.
Second, firms incur a product-specific cost to cover production costs. This
cost is constant for a given product, but higher for products farther away
from a firm’s core competency. This will be important when firms choose
how many products to export. Third, firms have to pay a fixed cost of
exporting. In contrast to two-country models (e.g. Bergin and Lin, 2012;
Burstein and Melitz, 2011; Costantini and Melitz, 2008), this fixed cost
varies by firm, product and destination market. The introduction of this
market access cost allows to capture the specificities of many trade policy
instruments such as non-tariff barriers. The market access cost affects a
firm’s decision to enter a destination with the first product and its decision
on how many products to export to that destination. It does not affect how
much of a given product firms will export to a given destination (intensive
margin).
Firms hence have to make two decisions. After drawing a productivity
parameter and a destination specific market access cost shock, firms choose
how many products to export to a given destination and what price to charge
for each product at each destination. Firms with the same productivity
and the same access cost shock for a given destination will make identical
product entry decisions in equilibrium, while more productive firms will
introduce more products in a given destination.
While Arkolakis, Ganapati, and Muendler (2016) do not analyze the
impact of a trade liberalization, predictions can be derived using key
equations of the model. In the model, a given firm with productivity
parameter φ and access cost shock cj will export goods from country i to
country j if and only if it will make non-negative profits, i.e. piij(φ, cj) ≥ 0.
Arkolakis, Ganapati, and Muendler (2016) show that this translates into
the following productivity threshold φ∗ij(cj) for exporting at all from i to j
φ∗ij(cj)
σ−1 ≡ cjfij(1)
(
σ˜τijωi
PPj
)σ−1
σ
Tj
(4.1)
with σ a parameter representing CES consumer preferences, ωi wage of the
representative consumer, τij representing standard iceberg shipping costs
(with τij > 1 and τii = 1), σ˜ product mark-up, Tj the total expenditure
of consumers in country j, PPj the corresponding ideal price index and
cjfij(p) the so-called incremental market access cost for product p. This
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cost is product-destination specific and consists of the idiosyncratic market
access cost cj ∈ (0,∞) and the fixed costs of production fij(p), with fij(p)
a continuous function in [1,+∞) and 0 < fii(p) < fij(p). The firm’s
market access cost is zero when a firm produces no products and strictly
positive otherwise, i.e. fij(0) = 0 and fij(p) > 0 for all p = 1, 2, ..., Pij .
The incremental market access cost captures the barriers to access that
may be different for various exporters depending on the number of products
sold, while the idiosyncratic access cost shock implies that there is no strict
hierarchy of destinations across exporters: some exporters may sell to less
popular destinations but not to the most popular ones.
The firm’s total sales in equilibrium at a destination j is
xij(φ, cj , ξ) = σcjfij(1)
(
φ
φ∗sd(cj)
)σ−1( Pij(φ,cj)∑
p=1
h(p)−(σ−1)ξpij
)
(4.2)
with Pij(φ, cj) the number of products a firm chooses to export to a certain
destination, h(p) the marginal-cost schedule of a product and ξ a vector of
product specific i.i.d. taste shocks ξpij for every firm-product.
This determines the average sales per product (intensive margin) ex-
ported from i to j
x¯ij(φ, cj , ξ) ≡ xij(φ, cj , ξ)
Pij(φ, cj)
(4.3)
A trade liberalization such as the entry into force of a trade agreement
will result in a reduction of trade costs. Specifically, in this model, this
would result in lower iceberg shipping costs τij because of tariff reductions
as well as a lower market access cost cj because of reductions of NTBs such
as technical standards. Product-specific production costs are not affected.
Using the key equations, it is easy to see how a reduction of τij and cj
will affect firm behavior. First of all, a drop in τij will result in a reduction
of the productivity threshold φ∗ij(cj), meaning that more firms will enter
and start exporting from i to j. This reduction in the productivity threshold
also implies an increase in firm’s total sales at destination j because of an
increase in the average sales per product at that destination. The number of
products exported by destination is not affected by a change in iceberg costs.
Second, a drop in cj will increase the number of products a firm exports
to a destination Pij(φ, cj) and decrease the threshold productivity φ
∗
ij(cj)
needed to overcome for firms to enter. This in turn will increase firm’s
total sales at a destination and the number of products exported there.
The effect on average sales per product exported to a given destination
is ambiguous, as in the model new products are exported less intensively
than older products.
To summarize, following a trade agreement, we expect to see an increase
in the number of firms entering that market, as well as an increase in total
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sales of firms that were already active in that market. The number of
products exported to that destination will also increase, while the effect on
average sales per exported product is not clear.
4.3 Data
The empirical analysis draws from four main datasets for the years 2002-
2014: (i) firm characteristics collected by the Central Balance Sheet Office,
administered by the National Bank of Belgium (NBB), (ii) firm-level export
data from the Foreign Trade Statistics at the NBB, (iii) data on trade
agreements and (iv) standard gravity covariates. Firms are identified by
their value-added tax (VAT) number, which is unique and common across
these databases. Our final dataset has four dimensions: firm, year, product
and destination. In contrast to the previous two chapters, we focus solely
on exports in this chapter.
Firm characteristics. Virtually all enterprises registered in Belgium
have to file annual accounts at the end of their fiscal year.3 We extract
enterprise-level information from the annualized annual accounts at the
NBB. The annualized annual accounts transform all information in the
annual accounts from fiscal years to calendar years. This transformation
makes sure that all firm-level information in our database is consistent
with observations in the VAT transaction data. We extract information
on added value per worker, number of employees, firmsize, profits/losses,
and age of the company. Firmsize is defined as total firm exports, and
the number of employees is recorded as full time equivalent (FTE). We
calculate value added of the enterprise as turnover minus intermediate
inputs. Turnover is defined as total sales of the enterprise in a given year,
while intermediate inputs are defined as the sum of material and service
inputs to the enterprise.
We drop enterprises that have less than one FTE or that do not report
employment data to account for very small enterprises (including manage-
ment enterprises). Although dropping these companies means losing almost
half of all firms in our sample in 2002 and 2014, this does not result in an
equally large loss of information. Very small firms do not have to report
turnover, inputs or employment. Moreover, these firms are likely to behave
in a different way and could exist only for fiscal reasons. The firms that we
withhold account for most of the economic activity in Belgium. We also
3These also include foreign companies with a branch in Belgium or whose securities
are officially listed in Belgium. The following corporations do not have to report annual
accounts: public institutions, insurance companies, investment and mutual funds,
self-employed workers, companies with unlimited liability, agricultural partnerships,
hospitals, health insurance funds, professional associations, and schools and higher
education institutions.
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drop enterprises that generate negative value added or that have missing
values for any of the firm characteristics. Table 4.14 in the appendix reports
for each firm characteristic how many observations we retain by year when
applying these selection criteria.
Firm-level exports. Data on exports from manufacturing firms comes
from the Foreign Trade Statistics database administered by the NBB. We
only use extra-European Union export flows (Extrastat). For extra-EU
destinations, all transactions with a minimum value of 1000 euros or a
weight of more than 1000 kg have to be reported.4 The export data are
recorded at the firm-year-product-country level; i.e. we observe all export
flows of firm f in year t for product p to destination j. Products are defined
as eight-digit Combined Nomenclature (CN8) products.
We exclude transactions that do not involve a “change in ownership”.
Hence, we omit transaction flows such as the return or replacement of
goods, movements of stock and transactions without compensation (e.g.
goods sent for further processing or for repair after the repair has been
executed).
Finally, the CN8 classification changes over time. To construct a con-
sistent panel and avoid misinterpreting a change in the CN8 codes as a
change in the number of products, we concord the annual changes in the
CN8 classification over time. To do so, we use the algorithm provided by
Van Beveren, Bernard, and Vandenbussche (2012).5
Trade agreement data. Data on trade agreements between Belgium and
the rest of the extra-EU world is based on chapter 2, but has been updated
to also include the year 2014. In this paper, we will focus on FTAs, CUs
and CMs. This because there are no economic union agreements between
Belgium and third countries, on the one hand, and because it has been
shown by Soete and Van Hove (2017) that preferential trade agreements
between the European Union and third countries do not impact trade,
on the other hand. The data vary at the year-destination level and are
summarized in table 4.1.
Gravity covariates. Standard covariates used in the gravity literature
come from the CEPII BACI database. We use nominal GDP of the partner
country, weighted distance between Belgium and the partner country,
common language spoken in both countries by at least 20% of the population
4This is not the case for intra-EU trade, for which the tresholds are a lot higher,
and not constant over time. The cut-off for reporting intra-EU trade was 250,000 euros
in 1998, but has increased since then.
5This methodology is very similar to Pierce and Schott’s (2009) concordance of the
US 10-digit Harmonized System classification.
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and colonial ties. All covariates vary at the destination level, except for
GDP, which varies at the destination-year level.
Table 4.1: EIAs in force between Belgium and the rest of the world for the
period 2002-2014.
Date Agreement EIA Date Agreement EIA
1971 EU-OCT FTA 2001 EU-Macedonia FTA
1973 EU-Liechtenstein FTA 2002 EU-Jordan FTA
1973 EU-Switzerland FTA 2002 EU-San Marino CU
1973 EU-Iceland FTA 2003 EU-Lebanon FTA
1973 EU-Norway FTA 2003 EU-Chile FTA
1991 EU-Andorra CU 2004 EU-Montenegro FTA
1994 EU-Liechtenstein CM 2004 EU-Egypt FTA
1994 EU-Iceland CM 2005 EU-Algeria FTA
1994 EU-Norway CM 2006 EU-Albania FTA
1995 EU-Israel FTA 2008 EU-Bosnia-Herzegovina FTA
1996 EU-Turkey CU 2010 EU-Serbia FTA
1997 EU-Faeroe Islands FTA 2011 EU-South-Korea FTA
1997 EU-Palestine FTA 2013 EU-Honduras FTA
1998 EU-Tunisia FTA 2013 EU-Peru FTA
2000 EU-South Africa FTA 2013 EU-Panama FTA
2000 EU-Morocco FTA 2013 EU-Colombia FTA
2000 EU-Mexico FTA 2013 EU-Nicaragua FTA
Date refers to the (provisional) entry into force of an agreement. Only
trade agreements with extra-EU countries are shown.
4.4 Setting the stage of Belgium’s exporting firms
In this section, we want to outline a general picture of Belgian exports. As
there are already papers characterizing Belgium’s firm-level exports (see for
example Muuˆls and Pisu (2009), Bernard, Van Beveren, and Vandenbussche
(2014), Dhyne et al. (2014), di Comite, Thisse, and Vandenbussche (2014),
Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2014), Magerman et al. (2015) and Muuˆls
(2015)), we will focus our attention here on comparing key indicators
of Belgian exports to all destinations with trade agreement destinations.
Different summary statistics on Belgian extra-EU exports for 2014 are
presented in table 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4.
Being a small, open economy, Belgium consists of many small exporting
firms, exporting a small number of products to a small number of countries.
Most firms export to only one extra-EU destination (namely 8,088 firms in
2014, or 47% of all exporting firms). Only one quarter of the Belgian firms
exports to five or more destinations, and less than 10% exports to twelve or
more destinations. While few in number, these firms account for a majority
of exports, with the average firm serving five or more destinations exporting
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more than 1000 times what a single-destination firm exports. Counting
the number of destinations with a trade agreement firms exports to, we
find that a lion’s share of Belgian companies that exports to extra-EU
destinations exports to at least one destination with a trade agreement
(59% of all firms in 2014). Of these firms, the majority (56%) exports
to only one destination with a trade agreement. Only 20% of the firms
exporting to destinations with trade agreements, exports to four or more
destinations with a trade agreement. 7081 firms, or 41% of all firms in 2014
never export to a destination with a trade agreement.
Figure 4.1: Firms exporting to destinations with or without an FTA or
CU.
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During our sample period, the number of Belgian firms exporting to
Table 4.2: Summary statistics for 2014 by number of export destinations
per firm.
Destinations
Firms Products
All destinations With TA All dest. With TA
Freq. % Value Freq. % Number Number
0 - - - 7081 41 - -
1 8088 47 73,501 5748 33 2.1 2.1
2 2668 15 240,302 1628 9 4.5 3.4
3 1370 8 568,167 1815 5 7.5 4.2
4 891 5 544,623 472 3 11.3 5.9
5-166 4309 26 87,042,734 1582 9 98.5 36.9
Total 17,326 100 2,491,822 17,326 100 28.0 16.3
Value is export value per firm, averaged over all firms serving the
same number of export destinations.
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Table 4.3: Firm characteristics for 2014.
Added value Employees
Profits Age
per worker (FTE)
Mean 254,040 206 1.69e+07 26
Standard deviation 465,480 565 1.67e+08 19
Minimum 31.6 1 -9.12e+08 0
Maximum 3.51e+07 36,468 1.85e+10 195
All destinations 7,679,282 54 1,884,840 24
Single destination 206,597 33 348,099 21
Single destination with FTA 207,032 31 560,666 21
Age denotes the number of years since the foundation of the company
(and hence not the number of years since the company started
exporting).
Table 4.4: Summary statistics by firm by destination for 2014.
All destinations
Destinations with
an FTA or CU
Average number of products 2.6 3.1
Average export 158,786 199,484
Average export per product 78,072 100,406
Average number of years a
1.28 1.26firm exports to a destination
(not necessarily consecutive)
extra-EU destinations has been decreasing. While there was a small peak
in exporting firms in 2007 and 2008, we see a clear negative effect of the
financial crisis and the Great Trade Collapse, and the number of Belgian
exporting firms does not recover to pre-crisis levels in the sample period.
While the total number of firms has steadily been decreasing over time, the
importance of trade agreements has been increasing. Figure 4.1 presents
the evolution of number of firms exporting to destinations with a trade
agreement only, to destinations without a trade agreement only, and mixed.
We confirm that a majority of Belgian firms never exports to a destination
with which the EU has a trade agreement. This share has declined over
the sample period, from 51% in 2002 to 41% in 2014. This decline can of
course be explained by an increase in the number of trade agreements in
this time period. A small number of firms exports only to destinations with
a trade agreement. These are mainly single-destination firms.
Relating the number of export destinations a firm exports to, with firm
characteristics, we find that older and more successful firms tend to serve
more destinations: firms exporting to more destinations, tend to be more
productive (higher added value per worker), have more employees, make
more profit, and be older than firms serving less destinations. We can also
compute these summary statistics only for firms that export to at least one
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export destination with a trade agreement. However, as firm characteristics
are firm-time specific, and not firm-destination-time specific, comparing
these statistics to table 4.3 only makes sense for single destination firms.
Comparing the firm characteristics for firms exporting to one destination
with a trade agreement to all single destination firms, we find that firms
that export to an FTA destination have less employees: they employ on
average 31 employees, or 93% of the employees employed on average by
the full sample of single destination firms. Moreover, we find that these
firms are a lot more profitable: they report on average profits of 560,666
euros, this is 161% of the profits reported by the full sample of single
destination firms. Finally, comparing added value per worker and age of
the company, we do not find notable differences between single destination
firms exporting to FTA countries and all single destination firms. As these
descriptive statistics do not control for any confounding factors, they should
be interpreted cautiously. However, this is not what we expect to find
based on the literature, which predicts that the larger and more productive
firms will take (more) advantage of trade liberalization opportunities.
Comparing destinations with trade agreements to destinations without
trade agreements, we find that the average firm tends to export more
on average to destinations with a trade agreement than without, both in
number of products (3.1 products per firm versus 2.6) as in export value.
This is consistent with the theoretical model of Eckel and Neary (2010),
which predicts that firms will sell a larger range of products in FTA markets
compared to non-FTA markets. Export spells tend to be of similar length
to both kinds of destinations.
4.5 Baseline model
Comparing key indicators for Belgian exports to destinations with and
without a trade agreement, already sheds some light on the impact of trade
agreements on Belgian exporting firms. However, it is important to control
for confounding factors. Destinations with and without trade agreements
are not necessarily similar in terms of country size, distance and shared
history, all factors that are known to influence how much countries will
trade with each other. While there is already an extensive literature on how
to estimate the impact of trade agreements on the country-level (see for
example Head and Mayer (2014) for a comprehensive overview of the latest
literature on the gravity equation), this is not the case for estimating it on
the firm-level. Therefore, we will use the country-level gravity literature as
a guideline, and try to translate it to the firm-level.
We start by estimating a standard baseline gravity model, describing
the average partial equilibrium impact of trade agreements on firm exports.
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We augment the gravity equation with firm characteristics to control for
firm-specific variation.
We estimate the following equation:
lnXfpjt = β0+β1TAjt+βslnfirmcharft+βmcovariatesj/jt+εfpjt (4.4)
with f indexing firms, p products, j export destinations and t years. X
denotes exports flows, TA a dummy taking value 1 if Belgium has an active
FTA or CU with this destination, firmchar a vector denoting various firm
characteristics, covariates a vector denoting standard gravity covariates
and ε error. Following the literature, we consider a wide range of firm-
specific characteristics in the regression6 and Nitsch and Pisu (2008) include
TFP and the log of number of FTE employees and alternatively value added
per worker and capital intensity per worker. We include added value per
worker, firm size, the number of full-time equivalent employees, profits/losses
and age of the company. As standard gravity covariates, we include (the
log of) nominal GDP of the partner country, (the log of) weighted distance
between Belgium and the partner country, common language spoken in
both countries by at least 20% of the population and colonial ties. As
Belgium only shares borders with countries of the European Union, we do
not include a dummy for contiguity in our analysis.
Results are presented in table 4.5. We start by estimating equation 4.4
as is (column (1)), and then gradually add a more intricate matrix of fixed
effects (columns (2)-(6)). Note how important the effect is of the particular
fixed effects used. Several variables switch signs or become (in)significant
when using a different fixed effects structure. Especially the specification
without any fixed effects seems unreliable. The coefficient for distance has
the wrong sign when compared to theoretical and empirical results from
the gravity literature, suggesting that this specification might suffer from
omitted variable bias. Adding year, firm and product fixed effects (column
(2)) or year and firm-product fixed effects (column (3)) seems to alleviate
the problem. All gravity coefficients now have the expected sign. Adding
firm-destination fixed effects and/or firm-year fixed effects (columns (4)-(6))
does not alter the results much. Some coefficients increase in magnitude,
but overall the results are quite stable.
Looking at the coefficient for trade agreements, we can conclude that the
average trade agreement has a small, but positive effect on firm-level exports.
Specifications including different fixed effect structures have positive effects,
6For example, Van Hove and Abraham (2011) include the number of full-time-
equivalent employees, value added per worker, labour remuneration and machinery per
worker and immaterial fixed assets per worker as firm characteristics, while So¨derlund
and Tingvall (2014) includes MNE status, firm size and TFP, Abraham, Studnicka,
and Van Hove (2015) include value added per worker, number of FTE employees, age
and average wage per worker, Bas (2012) includes firm size (measured as number of
employees), productivity, skill intensity and a dummy for multinational.
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Table 4.5: Baseline model: impact of trade agreements on firm exports.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(exp) Ln(exp) Ln(exp) Ln(exp) Ln(exp) Ln(exp)
TA -0.19*** 0.00 0.02** 0.05*** 0.03* 0.01
(0.018) (0.009) (0.010) (0.020) (0.018) (0.017)
Ln(av pw) 0.44*** -0.04*** -0.01 -0.05*** 0.00
(0.042) (0.013) (0.011) (0.018) (0.010)
Ln(firmsize) 0.20*** 0.36*** 0.38*** 0.36*** 0.39***
(0.021) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010)
Ln(employees) -0.26*** -0.13*** -0.05*** -0.15*** 0.01
(0.022) (0.015) (0.013) (0.020) (0.013)
Ln(profits) -0.02*** 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Ln(age) 0.07** 0.01 -0.05** -0.02 -0.04**
(0.030) (0.026) (0.021) (0.033) (0.021)
Ln(GDP) 0.07*** 0.18*** 0.28*** 0.22*** 0.36*** 0.33***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.018) (0.015) (0.016)
Ln(dist) 0.02 -0.05*** -0.15***
(0.015) (0.005) (0.006)
Comlang 0.07*** 0.01* 0.04***
(0.015) (0.007) (0.008)
Colony 0.10** 0.36*** 0.61***
(0.039) (0.041) (0.070)
Fixed effects no t, f, p t, fp t, fj t, fp, fj ft, fp, fj
Observations 2 488 543 2 480 473 2 238 765 2 410 917 2 179 764 2,150,303
With TA trade agreement, av pw added value per worker, GDP nominal GDP,
dist weighted distance, comlang common language (spoken by at least 20% of the
population) and colony colonial ties. Regressions are performed on the fpjt-level,
with f denoting firms, p CN8 products concorded over time, j destinations and t
years. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
but they are not all statistically significant. While the coefficients in the
specifications with t, f, p fixed effects and ft, fp, fj fixed effects are close to
zero and statistically significant, the coefficients for columns (3), (4) and (5)
are statistically significant and range from 0.02 to 0.05. This implies that
for these specifications, trade agreements are correlated with an increase in
firm-level export flows per product to a destination with a trade agreement
with e(0.02)−1 = 2% to e(0.05)−1 = 5% compared to a destination without
a trade agreement.
These positive results are in line with the predictions discussed in section
4.2. While these effects might seem small in magnitude compared to studies
on the aggregate level (see chapter 2), they are in line with effects found in
the firm-level literature. Using the euro as a natural experiment, Berthou
and Fontagne´ (2013) find that the euro was associated with an increase in
firm exports of 5% for France, while Nitsch and Pisu (2008) find - using
Belgian firm-level data - that the euro increased intra-EMU trade by about
5 to 10%, but the results are “statistically fragile”.
Test for exogeneity of TA. Our specification assumes that the dummy
for trade agreement is exogeneous. To test this assumption, we include one-
and five-year leads of the TA dummy into our baseline model (Wooldridge,
2010). Moreover, guided by the results from chapter three, we also test
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the exogeneity of the TA dummy using the different stages of the lifetime
of a trade agreement. We hence include one- and five-year leads of the
Stage1 dummy. Results are presented in table 4.16 in the appendix. We
find that the coefficients for the lead of TA and Stage1, respectively, are
not statistically significant in any of the specifications of our model. This
suggests that the dummies describing trade agreements are exogeneous in
our model.
Robustness check 1. While it has been shown for example in Soete and
Van Hove (2017) and Baier, Bergstrand, and Feng (2014) that PTAs have
no effects on trade flows, we do include a dummy for PTAs in our analysis as
a robustness check. Results are presented in table 4.17 in the appendix. We
find that the coefficient for the PTA dummy is not statistically significant.
This is irrespective of the fixed effects structure used.
Robustness check 2. The firm characteristics in our baseline model
might be correlated with exports. To test whether there is an endogeneity
bias, we rerun our baseline model, but now include the firm characteristics
of year t− 1 instead of year t into the regressions. Results are presented in
table 4.18 in the appendix. Results are very similar to the baseline model,
but the effects of trade agreements on firm-level exports are slightly larger.
Results for trade agreements for the specifications with (some) fixed effects
range from 2% to 7%.
As in chapter 2, we will now allow for more heterogeneity of the effect
of trade agreements on firm-level exports. We start by zooming in on the
timing of trade policy effects, and look at anticipation as well as lagged
effects. After that, we look at firm heterogeneity and explore whether firms
with different characteristics react differently to trade agreements. Finally,
we look at the impact of trade agreements on the margins of trade.
4.6 Timing of trade policy effects
The day a trade agreement enters into force is preceded by a (long) process
of negotiations, informal and formal meetings, legislative acts, signature
ceremonies and sometimes even protests, document leaks and rumors. It is
therefore not surprising that trade agreements between European countries
and the rest of the world have anticipation effects, and trade flows already
start increasing before trade agreements enter into force officially (see
chapter 3).
Once a trade agreement enters into force, the process of opening up
trade in both countries is not finished either. It typically takes up to five
or ten years before all products are completely liberalized. Moreover, it
takes time for the terms of trade of a country to adjust. This explains why
Baier, Bergstrand, and Feng (2014), Soete and Van Hove (2017), and Magee
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(2008) and many others find that trade agreements keep on stimulating
trade up to five or ten years after their entry into force.
We follow the method of Baier, Soete, and Van Hove (2016) outlined in
chapter three and augment the gravity equation with five dummies for the
different stages in the lifetime of an EIA: announcement (stage 1), start
negotiations (stage 2), conclusion of negotiations (stage 3), signature (stage
4), provisional application of the agreement (stage 5) and official entry into
force (stage 6). Results are presented in table 4.6. To look at the impact
of trade agreements five years after entry force, we follow the method used
in Baier, Bergstrand, and Feng (2014) and add five-year lagged effects7.
Note that adding these lags makes us loose more than three quarters of our
observations, so it is advisable to interpret the results with caution. Results
are presented in table 4.7. We use the same structure of fixed effects as in
our baseline model in both sets of regressions.
We focus on the results using a more rigid fixed effects structure (i.e.
columns (5) and (6)), as these will suffer less from omitted variable bias
and are therefore more correct. We confirm that firms anticipate trade
agreements. Trade flows start increasing once the negotiations start (stage
2). The conclusion of the negotiations (stage 3) is also correlated with
increased trade flows. After that, trade seems to return to its base level,
only to rise again after the (provisional) entry into force of the agreement
(stage 5 and 6).
Results for the timing of trade policy effects are less clear-cut. While
trade agreements seem to have no effects on trade flows after five years
when using an extensive matrix of fixed effects (columns (5)-(6)), they do
seem to have a small positive impact when using a slightly lighter structure
of fixed effects (columns (3)-(4)).
To study the effect of the different stages on the number of firms exporting
to a market, we estimate a similar model as our baseline model, but now
use the log of the number of firms exporting to a destination as our
dependent variable. Results are presented in 4.8. Focusing on the more
robust specification (columns (1) and (4)), we find that the number of
firms exporting to a destination starts increasing from the moment a trade
agreement is announced. The effect is only statistically significant at the
10% threshold though. Coefficients for stages 2 through 6 are more precisely
estimated, and we find that the number of Belgian firms exporting to a
destination with a (potential) trade agreement steadily increases throughout
the lifetime of the trade agreement, reaching a peak after negotiations are
concluded. Once the negotiations are concluded, the number of firms
exporting to a destination with a (future) trade agreement is 12% higher
on average compared to destinations without. These results support the
7As our sample period is only twelve years, it is not sensible to add ten-year lags,
as this would make us loose ten years of data, or almost all our data.
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Table 4.6: Anticipation effects of trade agreements.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(exp) Ln(exp) Ln(exp) Ln(exp) Ln(exp) Ln(exp)
Stage 1 -0.21*** -0.07*** -0.10*** 0.04*** 0.02 0.01
(0.036) (0.017) (0.018) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
Stage 2 -0.42*** 0.00 -0.02* 0.09*** 0.05*** 0.04***
(0.022) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011)
Stage 3 -0.69*** -0.03 -0.06** 0.08*** 0.05*** 0.03**
(0.047) (0.019) (0.022) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014)
Stage 4 -0.47*** 0.01 0.01 0.06*** 0.02 -0.00
(0.064) (0.026) (0.034) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014)
Stage 5 and 6 -0.54*** -0.02* -0.01 0.16*** 0.08*** 0.02
(0.022) (0.009) (0.011) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015)
Ln(av pw) 0.43*** -0.04*** -0.01 -0.05*** 0.00
(0.041) (0.013) (0.011) (0.018) (0.010)
Ln(firmsize) 0.20*** 0.36*** 0.38*** 0.36*** 0.39***
(0.020) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010)
Ln(employees) -0.26*** -0.13*** -0.05*** -0.15*** 0.01
(0.021) (0.015) (0.013) (0.020) (0.013)
Ln(profits) -0.02*** 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Ln(age) 0.07** 0.01 -0.05** -0.01 -0.04**
(0.030) (0.026) (0.021) (0.033) (0.021)
Ln(GDP) 0.03*** 0.18*** 0.28*** 0.23*** 0.36*** 0.33***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.018) (0.015) (0.016)
Ln(dist) -0.02 -0.05*** -0.15***
(0.013) (0.005) (0.006)
Comlang 0.12*** 0.01* 0.04***
(0.014) (0.007) (0.008)
Colony 0.18*** 0.35*** 0.60***
(0.038) (0.041) (0.070)
Fixed effects no t, f, p t, fp t, fj t, fp, fj ft, fp, fj
Observations 2,488,543 2,480,473 2,238,765 2,410,917 2,179,764 215,0303
With stage the different stages in the lifetime of a trade agreement, av pw added
value per worker, GDP nominal GDP, dist weighted distance, comlang common
language (spoken by at least 20% of the population) and colony colonial ties. Re-
gressions are performed on the fpjt-level, with f denoting firms, p CN8 products
concorded over time, j destinations and t years. Clustered standard errors in paren-
theses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
theoretical model of Bergin and Lin (2012) discussed in chapter 3. The
model of Bergin and Lin (2012) predicts that new firms will start entering
the export market the moment a trade agreement is announced. Firm entry
increases steadily during the whole pre-implementation period, to reach its
peak the moment the trade agreement enters into force. Though we find
that firm entry reaches its peak after the conclusion of the negotiations of
the trade agreement and hence not when the trade agreement enters into
force, the difference between the coefficients for stage 4 compared to stage
5 and 6 is not statistically significant.
4.7 Trade agreements and firm characteristics
So far, we have calculated the effect of an average trade agreement on the
exports of an average firm. However, trade agreements might not have a
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Table 4.7: Timing of trade policy effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(exp) Ln(exp) Ln(exp) Ln(exp) Ln(exp) Ln(exp)
Stage 1 0.19*** -0.09*** -0.10*** 0.10*** 0.08*** 0.09***
(0.068) (0.022) (0.022) (0.030) (0.025) (0.027)
Stage 2 -0.12*** -0.00 -0.02 0.16*** 0.10*** 0.09***
(0.038) (0.014) (0.015) (0.032) (0.023) (0.025)
Stage 3 -0.31*** -0.04 -0.06* 0.15*** 0.10*** 0.08***
(0.084) (0.030) (0.032) (0.033) (0.027) (0.029)
Stage 4 -0.43*** 0.06 0.04 0.13*** 0.04* 0.03
(0.072) (0.047) (0.055) (0.038) (0.025) (0.027)
Stage 5 and 6 -0.09 -0.01 -0.05* 0.23*** 0.07** 0.02
(0.070) (0.026) (0.028) (0.041) (0.033) (0.034)
Lag 5 -0.23*** 0.03 0.06* 0.07** 0.03 -0.01
(0.058) (0.028) (0.030) (0.036) (0.028) (0.029)
Fixed effects no t, f, p t, fp t, fj t, fp, fj ft, fp, fj
Observations 400,098 398,212 384,982 388,332 375,061 366,501
With stage the different stages in the lifetime of a trade agreement.Regressions
include firm characteristics and gravity covariates, but coefficients have been om-
mitted to save space. Regressions are performed on the fpjt-level, with f denoting
firms, p CN8 products concorded over time, j destinations and t years. Clustered
standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 4.8: Impact of trade agreements on the number of firms exporting.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(firms) Ln(firms) Ln(firms) Ln(firms)
TA -0.17*** 0.08**
(0.059) (0.034)
Stage 1 0.22*** 0.05*
(0.059) (0.034)
Stage 2 0.54*** 0.07***
(0.041) (0.019)
Stage 3 0.46*** 0.08***
(0.062) (0.024)
Stage 4 0.27*** 0.11***
(0.075) (0.022)
Stage 5 and 6 0.09** 0.10***
(0.045) (0.025)
Ln(GDP) 0.60*** 0.32*** 0.61*** 0.32***
(0.008) (0.033) (0.007) (0.033)
Ln(dist) -0.88*** -0.83***
(0.037) (0.032)
Comlang 1.07*** 0.99***
(0.050) (0.047)
Colony 1.41*** 1.21***
(0.074) (0.075)
Fixed effects t t, j t t, j
Observations 2,016 2,026 2,016 2,026
With TA trade agreement, GDP nominal GDP, dist weighted dis-
tance, comlang common language (spoken by at least 20% of the
population) and colony colonial ties. Regressions are performed
on the jt-level, with j denoting destinations and t years. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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homogeneous impact on all firms, and theoretical models assume that firms
are heterogeneous since Melitz (2003). In this section, we will therefore
allow trade agreements to have a differential impact on heterogeneous firms.
We do this by including interaction terms between the TA dummy and
each firm characteristic.
Results are presented in table 4.9. We use the same structure of fixed
effects as in our baseline model and again focus on the estimations with a
fixed effects structure that controls for more omitted variables. We find
that the impact of trade agreements on firm-level exports is mitigated
by firm characteristics. In particular, productivity, number of employees,
firm size and age of the company seem to negatively influence the positive
relationship between trade flows and trade agreements, but the coefficients
for productivity and firm size are not statistically significant at the 5%
level and they are close to zero. Trade agreements are associated with
increases in firm-level exports, but this positive relationship decreases with
the number of employees and age. Profits do not seem to alter the impact
of trade agreements on trade flows.
To investigate the interplay between firm characteristics and trade
agreements further, we estimate quantile regressions. There are two major
advantages of using quantile regressions over regressions with interactions.
First, we can split up our sample into categories that are meaningful from an
economical point of view. Second, we can allow for non-linear relationships
between the effects of trade agreements and firm characteristics. This of
course comes at the cost of loss of statistical power, as we have to split our
sample. Luckily, our sample size is large enough to cope with a reduction
of statistical power without too much loss of precision.
Results are presented in table 4.10. As cut-off points for productivity
and profits, we use quartiles and deciles of the respective independent
variable. For age, we use the following cut-off points: very young <10
years, young 10-19 years, medium 20-29 years, mature 30-39 years and
old >40 years8; while for firm size, we rely on the definition of small- and
medium-sized enterprises by the European Union (Mulhern, 1995), which
defines firms with 0-9 employees as micro firms, 10-99 as small, 100-499 as
medium-sized, and 500 and over as large. We break up the “small” category
into firms with 10-50 employees (small 1) and 50-99 employees (small 2).
We only present results for age and number of employees, as the quantile
regressions for productivity, firm size and profits did not reveal a differential
impact of trade agreements for these variables. We find that older firms
seem to use the opportunities that trade agreements bring, while young
firms do not, as the TA coefficient is not significant for younger firms
8As these cut-off points are arbitrarily chosen, we redefine the thresholds in a
number of different ways. Results are robust to using different cut-off points with
respect to number of years and using quartiles of the distribution of age.
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and close to zero or slightly negative, while it is positive and statistically
significant for older firms. Firms that have been in business for more than
30 years see an average increase in their exports of 9% to 11%. This is
more than double the magnitude of the effect of TAs for the whole sample.
For firm size, we find that the negative interaction effect is completely
driven by a positive relation between trade agreements and trade for small
firms: firms with 50 to 99 employees export 100 ∗ (e0.12 − 1) = 13% more
to destinations with a trade agreement ceteris paribus. The impact of
trade agreements on firms with more or less employees is not statistically
significant. How can we reconcile the findings that it are mainly older and
small firms that benefit from trade agreements? Typically older firms are
larger in terms of size and number employees. However, calculating the
correlations between the various firm characteristics (see table 4.11) reveals
that this is not the case for Belgium, as the correlation between age and
the number of employees amounts to only 0.20.
112 Chapter 4. Firm-level impact of trade agreements
Table 4.9: Trade agreements and firm characteristics.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(exp) Ln(exp) Ln(exp) Ln(exp) Ln(exp) Ln(exp)
TA#ln(av pw) -0.05** 0.04*** 0.06*** -0.02 -0.01 -0.00
(0.023) (0.010) (0.011) (0.016) (0.011) (0.011)
TA#ln(employees) -0.02* 0.01* 0.02*** -0.03*** -0.02** 0.01
(0.011) (0.005) (0.006) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010)
TA#ln(firmsize) 0.02*** 0.00 -0.00 -0.01* 0.00 -0.01
(0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
TA#ln(profits) 0.00 -0.00* -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
TA#ln(age) -0.02 -0.03*** -0.02** -0.11*** -0.05*** -0.02
(0.016) (0.008) (0.008) (0.021) (0.015) (0.016)
TA 0.26 -0.50*** -0.68*** 0.98*** 0.40*** 0.21
(0.248) (0.105) (0.120) (0.196) (0.146) (0.145)
Ln(av pw) 0.45*** -0.05*** -0.03*** -0.05** 0.00
(0.043) (0.014) (0.012) (0.019) (0.011)
Ln(employees) -0.26*** -0.13*** -0.05*** -0.14*** 0.02
(0.022) (0.015) (0.013) (0.021) (0.014)
Ln(firmsize) 0.19*** 0.36*** 0.38*** 0.36*** 0.39***
(0.023) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010)
Ln(profits) -0.02*** 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Ln(age) 0.07** 0.02 -0.04* 0.01 -0.03
(0.031) (0.026) (0.021) (0.035) (0.022)
Ln(GDP) 0.07*** 0.18*** 0.28*** 0.20*** 0.35*** 0.33***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017)
Ln(dist) 0.02 -0.05*** -0.15***
(0.015) (0.005) (0.006)
Comlang 0.07*** 0.01* 0.04***
(0.015) (0.007) (0.008)
Colony 0.09** 0.35*** 0.60***
(0.038) (0.041) (0.070)
Fixed effects no t, f, p t, fp t, fj t, fp, fj ft, fp, fj
Observations 2,488,543 2,480,473 2,238,765 2,410,917 2,179,764 2,150,303
With TA trade agreement, av pw added value per worker, GDP nominal GDP,
dist weighted distance, comlang common language (spoken by at least 20% of the
population) and colony colonial ties. Regressions are performed on the fpjt-level,
with f denoting firms, p CN8 products concorded over time, j destinations and t
years. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 4.11: Correlations between firm characteristics.
Av pw Firmsize Employees Profits Age
Av pw 1.000
Firmsize 0.055 1.000
Employees 0.012 0.277 1.000
Profits 0.086 0.194 0.260 1.000
Age 0.052 0.056 0.200 0.074 1.000
With av pw added value per worker.
Our findings are consistent with Konings and Vandenbussche (2008)
and Lileeva and Trefler (2010) who show empirically and theoretically,
respectively, that firms respond heterogeneously to changes in trade policy.
The former show how firms with low initial productivity (‘laggard firms’)
experience productivity gains in response to trade protection while firms
with high productivity (‘frontier firms’) experience productivity losses.
The latter shows how firms with lower labour productivity benefit more
from the trade liberalization following the Canada-US FTA than more
productive firms. These findings are also consistent with the view of
the European Union that trade agreements are particularly important for
smaller companies9. This because small firms face the same trade barriers
as their large peers but they have fewer staff and less money to deal with
them. While larger firms have resources to overcome these fixed sunk costs,
this is not (always) the case for smaller companies. A removal of (certain)
trade barriers is therefore especially for smaller companies an opportunity
to start exporting to a new market. However, our results also indicate that
more should be done to stimulate very small and micro-sized firms, as these
firms do not seem to benefit from trade agreements.
4.8 Trade agreements and margins of trade
Decomposition of Belgian exports into margins of trade
There are a multitude of reasons why trade flows change from year to year.
More firms can start exporting, existing firms can start exporting to a new
destination or start exporting a new product, etc. In the following section,
we will decompose Belgian exports into several margins of trade. We
distinguish between two main margins of trade: the intensive margin (IM)
9The European Union, and in particular the European Commission, has made this
very clear recently in the context of the negotiations of the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership, with the demand to include a separate chapter dedicated to
SME issues, and the proposal by the Commission of the new trade and investment
strategy “Trade for all”, which suggests to include effective SME provisions in future
trade agreements (European Commission, 2016a; European Commission, 2016b)
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and the extensive margin (EM). The intensive margin of trade describes how
much an incumbent company exports to an existing product-destination
combination, while the extensive margin describes new export flows. We
can decompose the extensive margin of trade further into five submargins.
The first extensive margin of trade is the firm margin, when a firm starts
exporting for the first time. Once firms are exporting, they can expand
their export activities into different markets and products. A firm can start
exporting a product it was already exporting to a new destination. We will
call this market diversification. Or a firm can start exporting a new product
to a destination it was already exporting to (product diversification). A
firm can also start exporting a new product to a new market (market-
product diversification). Finally, a firm can find a new application for
one of its existing products, by starting to export it to a destination it
already exports other products to (new application). Figure 4.2 presents a
schematic overview of the different margins of trade.
We can now decompose Belgian exports into the different margins of
trade. Figure 4.3 presents the decomposition for 2014. The margins
are calculated by firm by destination, and then averaged over all firms.
We decompose Belgian exports both in terms of the number of products
exported (left), as well as the export value (right). Decompositions for all
Figure 4.2: Schematic overview of the margins of trade.
FIRM (f) DESTINATION (j) PRODUCT (p)
new
existing
new
existing
new = pj diversification
existing = p diversification
existing
new = j diversification
product not
exported to this
market yet
= New application
already exporting
this product to
this market
= Intensive margin
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Figure 4.3: Product-destination margins by firm for 2014.
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years can be found in table 4.15 in the appendix. Note that we do not
consider re-entries as new entries.
The average firm exports five products in 2014. This is a big increase
compared to 2002, when the average firm exported only 2.6 products.
Exporting existing products to existing markets accounts for the lion’s
share of exports of incumbent firms. This in terms of the number of
products as well as the export value. The average firm exports 67% of all
its products to existing product-destination links.10 This number is even
higher in export value: 93% of all exports are repeated transactions, i.e.
firms already exported the same product to the same destination.
The remaining exports consist of extensive margin exports. Product di-
versification and new applications are the most important extensive margins,
with the average firm exporting 0.44 new products to existing destinations
in 2002 as well as 0.44 new applications of products. While both margins
were equally important in 2002, the average firm has doubled the number
of products it finds new applications for, while product diversification has
stayed rather constant. We see a different picture when we look at export
value. Both product diversification and new applications have declined
strongly over time (with the export value in 2014 being less than 2/3 of the
export value in 200311). Market diversification is only half as important
as product diversification in number of products (the average firm starts
exporting 0.19 existing products to a new destination in 2014), but it
accounts for more export value (9,106 euros). The number of products and
10Note that this does not imply that firms export these products to these destinations
for consecutive years. Rather it signals that firms exploit the experience they have
with particular products on particular markets and repeat transactions they made in
the past.
11The export value for the new application margin in 2002 is a strong outlier.
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the export value of market diversification stays rather constant throughout
the sample period. New firms and product-market diversification only
account for a small fraction of export products (0.06 and 0.12 products,
respectively) and export value. This is not surprising, as these activities
represent the activities with the highest risk. As has been pointed out by
Melitz (2003) and many others, starting to export is a risky business as it
is accompanied by high fixed costs.
We can repeat this decomposition only for destinations with which
Belgium has a trade agreement. Comparing both sets of margins yields
interesting results. Figure 4.4 depicts the evolution of the ratio of each set
of margins. Note that while the picture is rather clear-cut in terms of the
number of exported products, it is less so in export value. Comparing the
intensive margin of both sets of destinations, we find that the average firm
exports more products to destinations with a trade agreement compared to
all destinations. The average export value per product is lower, however,
resulting in exports to destinations with an FTA being worth 20% less
than exports to the average destination. Moreover, destinations with trade
agreements seem to be particularly interesting when firms want to launch
a new product, but not so much for existing products. The average firm
tries out more new products on markets with a trade agreement when
it is already exporting other products to that market compared to all
markets (product diversification). If the company is not exporting to that
destination yet, there is not really a difference between destinations with
FTAs and all destinations for the introduction of new products. This both
in number of products and export value. Firms that start exporting for
the first time export more products to destinations with an FTA compared
to all destinations, and this is also translated into a higher export value
for most of the years of our time period. Finally, firms start exporting
less existing products to an FTA destination, both when they are already
present on that market and when they are not.
We also find that there is a lot of product churning. 42-45% of all firms
in the sample change their portfolio of destination markets every year, while
49-59% of all firms in the sample change their portfolio of products every
year.12
12To calculate proportions, we divide the number of firms changing their portfolio
by all firms in the sample for that year. We do not consider re-entering a destination
market as changing the destination portfolio of a firm.
118 Chapter 4. Firm-level impact of trade agreements
F
ig
u
re
4
.4
:
C
o
m
p
a
ri
n
g
th
e
d
iff
er
en
t
m
a
rg
in
s
o
f
tr
a
d
e
b
y
fi
rm
fo
r
d
es
ti
n
a
ti
o
n
s
w
it
h
a
tr
a
d
e
a
g
re
em
en
t
to
a
ll
d
es
ti
n
a
ti
o
n
s.
4
0
%
6
0
%
8
0
%
1
0
0
%
1
2
0
%
1
4
0
%
1
6
0
%
1
8
0
%
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
p
ro
d
u
ct
s
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
Ex
p
o
rt
 v
al
u
e
P
ro
d
u
ct
-m
ar
ke
t
d
iv
er
si
fi
ca
ti
o
n
P
ro
d
u
ct
d
iv
er
si
fi
ca
ti
o
n
M
ar
ke
t
d
iv
er
si
fi
ca
ti
o
n
N
e
w
 a
p
p
lic
at
io
n
N
e
w
 f
ir
m
Ex
is
ti
n
g 
fi
rm
-
p
ro
d
u
ct
-m
ar
ke
t
4.8. Trade agreements and margins of trade 119
Finally, figures 4.5 and 4.6 show the evolution of the entry and exit of
firms, respectively, into new destinations and relate this to the number
of years before/after the entry into force of a trade agreement. Results
are scaled by the average number of firms entering and exiting destination
markets, and so control for the strong upward trend of increasing firm
dynamics. After this, an index is calculated, taking the date of entry into
force as 1. We find that firm dynamics to a destination increase when an
FTA with that market enters into force. We find that more firms will start
exporting to this destination for the first time, yet this does not necessarily
mean that the total number of Belgian firms exporting to this destination
increases as the number of firms exiting also increases.
Figure 4.5: Entry of firms into new destination before and after entry into
force of a trade agreement.
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
t-10 t-9 t-8 t-7 t-6 t-5 t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8 t+9 t+10 t+11 t+12 t+13 t+14
Colombia
Peru
Korea
Algeria
Egypt
Chile
Lebanon
Jordan
Morocco
Israel
Mexico
San Marino
South Africa
Figure 4.6: Exit of firms of destination before and after entry into force of
a trade agreement.
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Impact of trade agreements on the margins of trade
As destinations with trade agreements are not necessarily comparable to
destinations without trade agreements, differences between trade to both
types of destinations could be caused by other factors. In order to control
for these factors, we regress the different margins of trade on our control
variables. We include fixed effects in all our specifications, as we have
shown that the results without fixed effects are not very stable.
In order to include firm characteristics as well as fixed effects, we need
to estimate our regression on the firm-product-destination-year level. This
implies that our margins take the form of dummies indicating whether or
not a certain transaction belongs to a certain margin or not. Our regression
takes the following form:
margin = β0+β1TAjt+βslnfirmcharft+βmcovariatesj/jt+εfpjt (4.5)
with margin a binary variable describing one of the following product
margins: product-destination diversification, product diversification, desti-
nation diversification or new application.13
Given that our dependent variable can take only value zero or one, a logit
or probit estimator would be the best estimator, as they avoid the problem
of predicting probabilities outside of the 0-1 range as linear probability
models do. However, a linear probability model addresses the incidental
parameters problem that non-linear fixed effects estimators suffer from. We
therefore estimate equation 4.5 using ordinary least squares (OLS). Similar
specifications have also been used by Bernard and Jensen (2004) and Muuˆls
and Pisu (2009).
Table 4.12 presents the results. Looking at firm characteristics, we find
that productivity does not seem to be related to diversification, but more
productive firms do seem to find more new applications for their existing
products, ceteris paribus . Firm size affects diversification negatively, while
it strongly boosts new applications. Profits are once more unrelated to
firm-level trade. Finally, older firms seem to diversify their portfolio less.
Looking at the impact of trade agreements, we find that firms start to
export more new products to a market with a trade agreement compared
to the average market. This regardless of whether the firm is already
active on that market (product diversification) or not (product-market
diversification). This is exactly what we expected based on our theoretical
framework and is also consistent with the theoretical model of Eckel and
Neary (2010), which predicts that firms will expand their range of products
in markets with trade agreements.
13See section 4.2 for a schematic overview of the margins.
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If firms are not yet active on the market, then a trade agreement will not
stimulate to start exporting to that market with existing products (market
diversification), rather trade agreements discourage firms slightly to do
so as the coefficient for TA is negative and statistically significant. This
might indicate that trade agreements increase competition on the export
market, and hence firms will not pay the fixed cost to start exporting if
they do not have any experience yet on that market. The presence of trade
agreements does not seem to encourage firms to find new applications for
existing products, as the coefficient for TA is not significant in columns (11)
and (12), and even slightly negative and statistically significant in column
(10).
Finally, we estimate the effect on the intensive margin. Results are
presented in table 4.13. We find that trade agreements increase the intensive
margin, with firms exporting 4% to 5% more on average per product to a
destination with a trade agreement compared to a destination without a
trade agreement.
Table 4.13: Trade agreements and the intensive margin of trade.
(1) (2) (3)
IM IM IM
TA 0.00 0.05*** 0.04**
(0.006) (0.016) (0.017)
Ln(av pw) -0.05*** -0.01**
(0.006) (0.006)
Ln(firm size) 0.50*** 0.50***
(0.003) (0.004)
Ln(employees) -0.15*** -0.06***
(0.008) (0.008)
Ln(profits) 0.00*** 0.00**
(0.000) (0.000)
Ln(age) -0.05*** -0.07***
(0.013) (0.014)
Ln(GDP) 0.20*** 0.34*** 0.35***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.002)
Ln(dist) -0.13***
(0.002)
Comlang 0.05***
(0.006)
Colony 0.30***
(0.013)
Fixed effects f,t fj,t fj,ft
Observations 692,679 607,783 561,815
With TA trade agreement, av pw added value
per worker and GDP nominal GDP. Regres-
sions are performed on the fjt-level, with f de-
noting firms, j destinations and t years. Clus-
tered standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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4.9 Conclusion
This paper explores the impact of trade agreements on firm-level exports.
As such, this chapter complements chapter two and three of this dissertation
that studied the effects of trade agreements on the country- and product-
level. We use a rich panel dataset on Belgian exporting firms for the period
2002-2014 which includes firm-product-destination-level exports and firm
characteristics.
We confirm the trade creating effects of EU trade agreements on Belgian
firms. Firms export on average 4% more of a given product to a destina-
tion with a trade agreement compared to a destination without a trade
agreement.
We also confirm the anticipation effects of trade agreements. Firms do
not wait until a trade agreement enters into force officially to react. But
rather, they anticipate trade agreements, and already start exporting more
once the respective representatives of the respective governmental bodies
start negotiating the trade agreement. Trade agreements also increase
firm entry into markets before the trade agreement have entered into force.
The number of firms exporting to a destination with a (potential) trade
agreement starts increasing gradually from the moment agreements are
announced and the number of firms exporting to that destination reaches
a peak after the conclusion of the negotiations of the agreement. This
suggests that firms are forward-looking and that there might be first-mover
advantages. The number of Belgian firms exporting to destinations with
trade agreement is on average 8 to 11% higher compared to destinations
without a trade agreement, suggesting that trade agreements are an effective
policy tool to remove barriers for firms to export.
Yet, the effects of trade agreements are not homogeneous. Different
types of firms react differently to trade agreements. In contrast to the
commonly held view that the largest and most productive firms are the
firms who benefit the most from FTAs, we find that especially firms with
50 to 99 employees tend to take advantage of the opportunities presented
by trade agreements, as well as older firms (i.e. firms that have existed
for 30 years or more). Very small and micro-sized firms, however, do not
seem to benefit from trade agreements. The productivity and profitability
of firms does not mediate the impact trade agreements have on firms. This
underutilised export potential of very small and micro-sized firms presents
an opportunity for the Belgian government to support and stimulate these
firms to explore the possibilities that trade agreements can offer.
Finally, we find that firms expand their range of products in markets
with trade agreements. Firms start to export new products more often to
a market with a trade agreement compared to without. This regardless of
whether the firm is already active on that market (product diversification)
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or not (product-market diversification). However, if firms are not yet
active on the market, then the probability of a firm starting to export to
that market with existing products is lower if there is a trade agreement
(market diversification). This might indicate that trade agreements increase
competition on the export market, and hence firms will not pay the fixed
cost to start exporting if they do not have any experience yet on that
market.
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Table 4.14: Number of observations with firm characteristics that satisfy
the selection criteria.
Year
Total Firms for which we keep observations Total
active Value FTE Profits/
Age
selected
firms added employees losses firms
2002 19544 14193 10350 10401 15176 7003
2003 18749 13914 10104 10218 14730 7110
2004 18541 13970 10091 10819 14748 7550
2005 18568 14101 10138 10948 14810 7672
2006 18933 14370 10138 11500 15074 7896
2007 19844 15083 10686 12161 15773 8465
2008 20440 15216 10940 11326 16073 7841
2009 18994 14367 10540 10249 15318 7156
2010 18325 9590 7231 7546 10127 5534
2011 16721 12643 9318 9809 13327 7006
2012 17900 13738 9840 10335 14513 7071
2013 17717 13549 9733 10423 14422 7168
2014 17326 11852 8631 9522 12543 6704
For the number of employees, we only consider firms with at least
one employee. For value added, age and fixed assets we retain firms
with non-missing values greater than zero, while for profits/losses
we keep non-missing observations.
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Table 4.15: Decomposition of Belgian exports into different margins of
trade.
a) Number of products
Year
Product-market Product Market New New Existing firm-
divers. divers. divers. application firm product-market
2003 0.16 0.44 0.25 0.44 0.17 1.1
2004 0.12 0.38 0.22 0.45 0.13 1.3
2005 0.11 0.42 0.20 0.58 0.12 1.5
2006 0.10 0.34 0.18 0.50 0.13 1.7
2007 0.14 0.47 0.20 0.60 0.15 1.8
2008 0.17 0.58 0.21 0.71 0.13 1.9
2009 0.16 0.57 0.20 0.79 0.09 2.2
2010 0.17 0.58 0.21 0.94 0.12 2.4
2011 0.11 0.48 0.18 1.27 0.14 3.2
2012 0.14 0.48 0.21 0.81 0.11 2.9
2013 0.10 0.46 0.21 0.83 0.10 3.1
2014 0.12 0.47 0.19 0.81 0.06 3.4
b) Export value
Year
Product-market Product Market New New Existing firm-
divers. divers. divers. application firm product-market
2003 3845 10272 10299 71080 7151 284345
2004 3652 9578 10648 22641 5030 302567
2005 3175 10630 7901 17725 8736 350352
2006 3566 11910 9939 17443 5382 361933
2007 6829 12920 11174 18523 5725 365118
2008 32230 18573 10725 15680 4345 239353
2009 4626 12408 6598 16133 6948 246297
2010 5596 11032 9115 21215 8713 310207
2011 3029 13169 11238 34392 4157 434295
2012 3580 6558 9428 17117 6468 449928
2013 5904 8783 16035 15884 6602 426062
2014 2484 6167 9106 13336 1593 462057
With divers. denoting diversification. See text for the exact definition of the
different margins. Values are simple averages by firm by destination, averaged
over all firms.
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Table 4.16: Endogeneity test.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(exp) Ln(exp) Ln(exp) Ln(exp) Ln(exp) Ln(exp)
Set 1
F.TA 0.24 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01
TA -0.42** 0.04 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.07** 0.05*
Ln(av pw) 0.58*** -0.04** -0.01 -0.06** 0.01
Ln(firmsize) 0.22*** 0.45*** 0.46*** 0.47*** 0.50***
Ln(employees) -0.29*** -0.12*** -0.03* -0.16*** 0.03*
Ln(profits) -0.02*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ln(age) 0.17*** -0.03 -0.05* -0.06 -0.01
Ln(GDP) 0.10*** 0.26*** 0.36*** 0.34*** 0.47*** 0.45***
Ln(dist) 0.02 -0.08*** -0.17***
Comlang 0.08*** -0.00 0.00
Colony 0.29*** 0.49*** 0.75***
Set 2
F.Stage 1 0.00 -0.05 -0.07 -0.02 -0.05 -0.06
Stage 1 -0.28*** -0.04 -0.05 0.04** 0.01 -0.01
Stage 2 -0.44*** -0.01 -0.05*** 0.05*** 0.01 -0.02
Stage 3 -0.78*** -0.01 -0.04 0.07*** 0.03 0.00
Stage 4 -0.32*** 0.01 -0.01 0.08*** 0.03 -0.01
Stage 5 and 6 -0.51*** 0.00 -0.01 0.17*** 0.06*** 0.02
Ln(av pw) 0.58*** -0.04** -0.01 -0.06** 0.01
Ln(firmsize) 0.23*** 0.45*** 0.46*** 0.47*** 0.50***
Ln(employees) -0.29*** -0.12*** -0.03* -0.16*** 0.03*
Ln(profits) -0.02*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ln(age) 0.17*** -0.03 -0.04* -0.06 -0.01
Ln(GDP) 0.06*** 0.26*** 0.35*** 0.34*** 0.46*** 0.45***
Ln(dist) -0.01 -0.09*** -0.17***
Comlang 0.11*** -0.00 0.01
Colony 0.39*** 0.48*** 0.75***
Fixed effects no t, f, p t, fp t, fj t, fp, fj ft, fp, fj
Observations set 1 1,138,563 1,135,409 1,096,348 1,115,698 1,078,631 1,059,443
Observations set 2 1,138,563 1,135,409 1,096,348 1,115,698 1,078,631 1,059,443
With TA trade agreement, av pw added value per worker, GDP nominal GDP,
dist weighted distance, comlang common language (spoken by at least 20% of the
population) and colony colonial ties. Regressions are performed on the fpjt-level,
with f denoting firms, p CN8 products concorded over time, j destinations and t
years. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Using five-year leads (F5) instead of 1-year leads (F) yields very similar results
for both sets of results. Results have been ommitted to save space, but can be
retrieved upon request.
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Table 4.17: Impact of different types of trade agreements on firm exports.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(exp) Ln(exp) Ln(exp) Ln(exp) Ln(exp) Ln(exp)
PTA -0.23*** 0.00 -0.02 0.09 0.04 -0.02
(0.054) (0.021) (0.020) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060)
FTACU -0.19*** 0.00 0.02** 0.08*** 0.04** 0.00
(0.018) (0.008) (0.010) (0.022) (0.019) (0.018)
Ln(av pw) 0.44*** -0.04*** -0.01 -0.05*** 0.00
(0.042) (0.013) (0.011) (0.018) (0.010)
Ln(firmsize) 0.20*** 0.36*** 0.38*** 0.36*** 0.39***
(0.021) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010)
Ln(employees) -0.26*** -0.13*** -0.05*** -0.15*** 0.01
(0.022) (0.015) (0.013) (0.020) (0.013)
Ln(profits) -0.02*** 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Ln(age) 0.07** 0.01 -0.05** -0.02 -0.04**
(0.030) (0.026) (0.021) (0.033) (0.021)
Ln(GDP) 0.06*** 0.18*** 0.28*** 0.22*** 0.36*** 0.33***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.018) (0.015) (0.016)
Ln(dist) 0.02 -0.05*** -0.15***
(0.015) (0.005) (0.006)
Comlang 0.08*** 0.01* 0.04***
(0.014) (0.007) (0.008)
Colony 0.07* 0.36*** 0.61***
(0.039) (0.042) (0.070)
Fixed effects no t, f, p t, fp t, fj t, fp, fj ft, fp, fj
Observations 2 488 543 2 480 473 2 238 765 2 410 917 2 179 764 2 150 303
With TA trade agreement, av pw added value per worker, GDP nominal GDP,
dist weighted distance, comlang common language (spoken by at least 20% of
the population) and colony colonial ties. Regressions are performed on the fpjt-
level, with f denoting firms, p CN8 products concorded over time, j destinations
and t years. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01.
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Table 4.18: Robustness check.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(exp) Ln(exp) Ln(exp) Ln(exp) Ln(exp) Ln(exp)
TA -0.18*** 0.02** 0.04*** 0.07*** 0.04* 0.04**
(0.024) (0.012) (0.014) (0.026) (0.023) (0.022)
Ln(av pw)t−1 0.63*** -0.02 0.01 -0.05** 0.02*
(0.068) (0.018) (0.014) (0.024) (0.013)
Ln(firmsize)t−1 0.20*** 0.25*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.23***
(0.041) (0.013) (0.012) (0.017) (0.013)
Ln(employees)t−1 -0.27*** -0.07*** 0.01 -0.13*** 0.07***
(0.041) (0.024) (0.019) (0.033) (0.021)
Ln(profits)t−1 -0.03*** -0.00 -0.00** -0.00 -0.00
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Ln(age)t−1 0.18*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.09 0.21***
(0.046) (0.045) (0.044) (0.057) (0.050)
Ln(GDP) 0.10*** 0.26*** 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.48*** 0.45***
(0.010) (0.005) (0.006) (0.023) (0.020) (0.021)
Ln(distw) 0.03 -0.08*** -0.17***
(0.024) (0.008) (0.009)
Comlang 0.07*** -0.01 0.00
(0.022) (0.009) (0.011)
Colony 0.31*** 0.45*** 0.69***
(0.077) (0.062) (0.099)
Fixed effects no t, f, p t, fp t, fj t, fp, fj ft, fp, fj
Observations 1,128,272 1,125,166 1,086,759 1,105,812 1,069,451 1,050,787
With TA trade agreement, av pw added value per worker, GDP nominal GDP,
dist weighted distance, comlang common language (spoken by at least 20% of the
population) and colony colonial ties. Regressions are performed on the fpjt-level,
with f denoting firms, p CN8 products concorded over time, j destinations and t
years. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Chapter 5
Market power and bilateral tariff
negotiation outcomes
5.1 Introduction
Why do countries conclude trade agreements? To answer this question,
economists tend to rely mainly on the terms-of-trade theory of trade
agreements1. This theory states that governments acting unilaterally will
tend to overuse tariffs and other trade restrictions to the extent that they
are able to shift the cost of protecting a domestic industry onto foreign
producers. This cost-shifting is made possible through movements in foreign
exporter prices or terms of trade, and the extent of the cost-shifting is
directly related to how much market power a country has for a given good.
We define market power as the inverse elasticity of the foreign export supply
of that country for a given good, with high market power being equivalent
to facing a less elastic export supply curve for a particular good. This
implies that an increase in the tariff of a good with no market power (i.e.
a perfectly elastic export supply) will result in an equal increase of the
price of that good in the importing country, as foreign exporters will just
pass the price of the tariff on to the consumers. For goods with positive to
infinite market power, however, foreign exporters will absorb (some of) the
price increase, resulting in a change of the terms of trade of that country
for this good. Countries with high market power for a good will want to
set a positive optimal tariff on that good, as the distortion caused by the
tariff will be compensated by an improvement of the terms of trade. While
maximizing the domestic government’s objective function, this unilateral
policy is inefficient from an international point of view as it imposes a
negative externality on the trading partners. Moreover, consumer surplus
1See chapter 1 section 1.4 for a discussion of alternative theories.
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is decreased due to higher prices for consumed products and services. The
purpose of a trade agreement is then to undo the policy inefficiencies and
improve the welfare of each country.
While it is typically assumed that countries either have high market
power or not, we define market power in this paper on the product-level,
as market power is directly related to the export supply elasticity, which
is determined on the product-level. Yet, large countries are typically
considered to have higher market power across all goods as they face less
elastic export supply curves on average, while smaller countries have lower
market power across goods on average. Moreover, small countries find it
harder to affect international prices through trade policy for the average
good.
The terms-of-trade theory can easily be generalized to more realistic
settings. The literature has augmented the terms-of-trade hypothesis with a
range of political economy considerations. Grossman and Helpman (1995a)
and Grossman and Helpman (1995b) for example, show how lobbying affects
the relationship between the optimal tariff and market power. The optimal
tariff is no longer only determined by the market power of a country for
a particular good, but now also depends on the presence (or absence) of
lobbies and their preferences. Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2015) show in
their 2-country model how reciprocity and gradual firm entry and exit will
result in a step-like reduction of tariffs as observed through the multiple
liberalization rounds in the liberalization processes of the GATT and the
WTO. Their juggernaut theory of trade liberalization assumes that after
an initial tariff cut, firms in the import-competing sectors will exit, while
there will be firm-entry in the export sectors. This reshapes the political
economy landscape, as the size of the pro-tariff (anti-tariff) lobby will shrink
(rise) in every participating nation. When the next round of trade talks is
held, another reciprocal tariff cut is politically optimal since the pro-tariff
lobby is smaller and the anti-tariff lobby is larger in every member that
participated in the last reciprocal cuts.
Closely related to this literature is the literature on economic determi-
nants of trade agreements. Rather than studying why countries conclude
trade agreements, this literature attempts to predict which country pairs
will form a trade agreement. In their seminal contribution, Baier and
Bergstrand (2004) show that the likelihood of countries forming an FTA is
higher when the partners are closer geographically, more distant from the
rest of the world, larger, more similar in economic size, and further apart in
terms of per capita incomes. Subsequently, Egger and Larch (2008), Chen
and Joshi (2010), Baldwin and Jaimovich (2012), and Baier, Bergstrand,
and Mariutto (2014) have supplemented Baier and Bergstrand (2004) by
studying the “interdepence” and “contagiousness” of trade agreements.
Even though the terms-of-trade hypothesis is more than a century old,
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evidence to support or reject the theoretical arguments has long been
non-existing. This has changed during the last decade, and evidence
supporting the validity and usefulness of the theory is mounting. Broda,
Lima˜o, and Weinstein (2008) present convincing evidence on the positive
relationship between market power and tariffs in a non-cooperative setting.
They do this by examining the tariff schedules of 15 non-WTO countries,
and US trade restrictions not covered by the WTO. Moreover, Bagwell
and Staiger (2011) consider changes in the tariff schedules of countries
who have recently acceded to the WTO, while Bown (2004) and Bown
and Crowley (2013) study the relation between market power and WTO
disputes and antidumping duties, respectively. Exploiting the formation of
an FTA between a set of countries as an exogeneous shock to the terms
of trade of the rest of the world, Saggi, Stoyanov, and Yildiz (2015) show
that non-member countries reduce their MFN tariffs in response to this
negative terms-of-trade shock. Finally, Ludema and Mayda (2013) are the
first to explore the link between market power and domestic and foreign
political economy considerations. They investigate the choice of MFN
tariffs by existing WTO members and control for some political economy
variables. All produce findings consistent with the (augmented) terms-
of-trade hypothesis, and hence support the validity of the terms-of-trade
hypothesis in explaining the purpose of the multilateral trading system.
However, the (augmented) terms-of-trade hypothesis does not only
explain the existence of multilateral trade agreements, it also explains the
presence of bilateral trade agreements (EIAs). Though, up to date, and to
the best of our knowledge, there is no convincing empirical evidence on the
validity of this argument. Two studies try to test the hypotheses derived
from the Grossman and Helpman (1995b) model, namely Damuri (2012)
and Gawande, Sanguinetti, and Bohara (2005), while Stoyanov (2016) tests
predictions of an extension of the Grossman and Helpman (1995b) model.
However, none of these papers accounts appropriately for market power2,
thereby introducing severe omitted variable bias in their results.
This paper wants to fill this gap. We contribute to the literature by
testing the terms-of-trade hypothesis in relation to free trade agreements for
the first time. We do so in a comprehensive manner by combining different
factors in the process of trade negotiations. Concretely, we want to test
whether goods with higher market power are treated differently in free trade
agreement negotiations compared to goods with low market power. To do
so, we cannot simply use the negotiated tariff as a dependent variable, as
2While Damuri (2012) ignores the concept of market power completely, Gawande,
Sanguinetti, and Bohara (2005) do include it in their econometric model to test the
Grossman and Helpman (1995b) hypothesis. However, due to lack of estimates of the
export supply elasticity at the time, they assume the inverse elasticity of foreign export
supply to be equal to 1. The model of Stoyanov (2016) only considers the import
demand elasticity, but not the (inverse) export supply elasticity.
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the purpose of free trade agreements is to abolish tariffs between countries.
Therefore, we exploit the argument developed in Grossman and Helpman
(1995b) that governments exclude products from free trade agreements to
create the best opportunity for exporting interests to overcome opposition
to the FTA from import-competing producers. Alternatively, governments
can also impose quotas or obtain (longer) phase-out periods for products
so that industries have time to adjust. These measures provide excellent
alternatives to using tariffs as a dependent variable, as Grossman and
Helpman (1995b) show that they are related to market power.
We use a novel dataset capturing the complexity of trade agreements on
the product-level. Our dataset contains detailed data on the liberalization
schedule of all products in 15 recently concluded FTAs between countries in
Asia, North, Central and South America, Europe and Oceania. To ensure
enough variation in our data, we include small as well as large countries
in our dataset, as well as developed and developing countries. To measure
market power, we use the method outlined in Broda, Lima˜o, and Weinstein
(2008) for estimating the inverse export supply elasticity. We start by
estimating the impact of market power on the probability of a product to
be exempted from liberalization in free trade agreements on the one hand,
and the speed of liberalization of a product on the other hand. We then
extend our baseline model and include variables capturing lobbying efforts
and reciprocity in negotiations in our estimations.
Our findings provide support for the augmented terms-of-trade hypothe-
sis. We find that products with higher market power are exempted more
often from liberalization and have a slower liberalization path. While
economists often assume that most countries are “small”, i.e. they do not
have market power for any good, our results show that this is not the case.
Even small countries have considerable market power for certain products,
and manage to exclude these products from liberalization in free trade
agreements.
Moreover, extending our baseline model and including variables cap-
turing lobbying efforts and reciprocity of trade negotiations, also results
in findings that are consistent with the theory. We find that products
in import-competing sectors that are politically organized to lobby are
excluded from liberalization more often, while we find the opposite for
products from exporting sectors that are politically organized. Our results
are robust to using different measures of market power and lobbying.
Finally, our findings suggest that countries that are already willing to
go further when it comes to opening up trade in terms of free trade of
goods, seem to also be more open to including more WTO+ and WTOX
provisions. However, our results do not support the idea that countries can
include more WTO+ and/or WTOX provisions when granting the partner
country less liberal tariff conditions.
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This paper is structured as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the theory on
optimal tariffs and market power in more detail. Section 5.3 and section 5.4
respectively discuss the method and data used. Main results are presented
in section 5.5, while section 5.6 presents two extensions to the baseline
model. Section 5.7 concludes.
5.2 The optimal tariff argument
The basic theory underlying the optimal tariff argument can be traced
back all the way to the early 1800s, when British economists heatedly
debated the (potential) repeal of the Corn Laws and other tariffs. While
classical economists had been stressing the benefits of tariff reductions
and freer international trade for decades, controversy arose on the impact
of a unilateral tariff reduction on British general welfare. At that time,
international trade theory was sophisticated enough to recognize that tariffs
could increase national income for a country that could influence its terms
of trade. While the classical economists were united about the significance
of improved resource allocation, they were divided about the importance of
the terms of trade effect. Consequently, economists such as Robert Torrens
and John Stuart Mill expressed caution about, or even outright opposition
to, a purely unilateral reduction of the Corn Laws and other tariffs. Others,
such as Nassau Senior and John Ramsay McCulloch, denied that tariff
liberalization needed to be reciprocated and either ignored terms of trade
considerations or thought they would be minor compared to the benefits
from improved resource allocation (Irwin, 1988).
Today, a similar debate has emerged in the UK. The Brexit has stirred
up many discussions about the impact of trade policy, with proponents of
leaving the EU arguing that the UK could benefit from leaving the EU by
unilaterally removing all tariffs on imports into the UK (Dhingra et al.,
2016). This in order to lower the cost of imported goods. A study by
Dhingra et al. (2016) simulates this scenario, and finds that if the UK
unilaterally removes all tariffs, this would indeed reduce the loss of income
due to Brexit by 0.3 percentage points. However, Brexit would still result
in a loss of income of 1.0% to 2.3% because of reduced trade with the EU.
In this section we provide the basic intuition behind the terms-of-trade
theory, and then generalize the theory to more realistic settings. We do
this by augmenting the theory to allow for lobbying and the possibility to
conclude trade agreements. Section 5.2 derives the optimal tariff for each
country when governments maximize national income with their unilat-
eral tariff choices. Section 5.2 generalizes this optimal tariff relationship
to also include cases where the government’s objective is not social wel-
fare maximization. Finally, section 5.2 allows for the conclusion of trade
agreements.
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Unilateral and non-cooperative optimal tariffs
We focus on a country i that takes as given the policies of the remaining n >
1 countries (Broda, Lima˜o, and Weinstein, 2008). Suppose each individual
in country i has a utility defined over a numeraire good, c0, and a vector
of non-numeraire goods u(c):
U = ch0 +
∑
p
up(c
h
p) (5.1)
Here we consider the simple case where u(c) is separable. Each individual
h with incomes Ih chooses expenditure on each good cp to maximize (1),
subject to ch0 +
∑
p ppc
h
p ≤ Ih, where pp is the domestic price for cp. Given
this utility, the demand for each good p is simply a function of its own price,
i.e., cp = cp(pp). Social welfare is then the sum of the individual indirect
utilities, which includes income and consumer surplus (Broda, Lima˜o, and
Weinstein, 2008):
W =
∑
h
[
Ih +
∑
p
(
up(cp(pp))− ppcp(pp)
)]
(5.2)
To determine income, Broda, Lima˜o, and Weinstein (2008) employ the
standard assumption in the leading endogenous trade policy models, e.g.
Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Grossman and Helpman (1995a). First,
the numeraire is freely traded and produced using only labor according
to a constant returns production function. So, the equilibrium wage is
determined by the marginal product in this sector, which is normalized to
one. Second, the non-numeraire goods are produced under constant returns
to scale using labor and one factor specific to the goods.This means that
each specific factor earns a quasi-rent that is increasing in the good’s price,
pip(pp). Finally, tariff revenues for each good, rp(pp), are redistributed
uniformly to all individuals. All individuals own a unit of labor and a
fraction of them also own up to one unit of specific capital. Normalizing
the population to be one and recalling that the wage is also unity, social
welfare can be rewritten as
W = 1 +
∑
p
[pip(pp) + rp(pp) + κp(pp)] (5.3)
The world price for each traded good g ∈ Gm is determined by the market
clearing conditions
mp((1 + τp)p
∗
p) = m
∗
p(p
∗
p) ∀p ∈ Gm, (5.4)
where mp represents home’s import demand written as a function of the
domestic price, pg = (1 + τp)p
∗
p, and m
∗
p is the rest of the world’s export
supply. From this Broda, Lima˜o, and Weinstein (2008) obtain prices as
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functions of the trade policy, i.e., pp(τp), p
∗
p(τ
∗
p ). A government choosing
the tariff to maximize (3) will set it according to the following first order
conditions:
τpp
∗
p
dmp
dτp
−mp dp
∗
p
dτp
= 0 ∀p ∈ Gm. (5.5)
With the first term representing the domestic distortion caused by the
negative impact of tariffs on import levels. The second term represents
the terms-of-trade effect. If the country has no market power in trade,
i.e., if the export supply elasticity is infinite, then dp∗p/dτp = 0, and the
optimal tariff is zero. Otherwise, the optimal tariff is positive and Broda,
Lima˜o, and Weinstein (2008) show that it equals the inverse export supply
elasticity:
τoptp = ωp ≡
[(dm∗p
dp∗p
)( p∗p
m∗p
)]−1
. (5.6)
Unilateral optimal tariffs and lobbying
The positive relationship between tariffs and market power can be gen-
eralized to more realistic settings. The relationship holds even when
governments are not immune for political pressures and governments accept
contributions from lobby groups instead of acting as benevolent servants
of the public interest. Even though the terms-of-trade argument is often
associated with a welfare-maximizing government, the (partial) positive re-
lationship between tariffs and market power holds also when the government
places no weight on social welfare at all.
When we allow for lobbying of importing firms, the government’s ob-
jective function now becomes aWp + λppip, with the last term representing
lobbying contributions from organized lobbies representing importing firms.
Grossman and Helpman (1995a) show that the non-cooperative tariff the
government chooses in this case is a sum of the inverse export supply ratio
and the lobbying motive for tariffs
τGHp = ωp + λp
zp
σp
, (5.7)
with λp =
Ip−α
a+α
, Ip 1 if a sector is politically organized, a ∈ (0,∞) the
weight the government places on aggregate social welfare relative to contri-
butions from importing firms, α the fraction of the population that owns
the specific input used to produce product p and zp the inverse import
penetration ratio, i.e. domestic sales of good p divided by total imports
of good p. The tariff for an organized group is increasing in the inverse
import penetration ratio, because a given tariff generates larger benefits for
a factor owner if it applies to more units sold. The tariff depends negatively
on the import demand elasticity because the tariff’s distortion is increasing
in σp once we account for the terms-of-trade effect.
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If the government values only aggregate social welfare (i.e. a =∞), λp
will equal zero and the government will unilaterally choose a tariff equal to
the optimal tariff (i.e. τGHp = ωp). If the government does not place any
weight on social welfare and only cares about lobbying income (i.e. a = 0),
then the government will set tariffs differently for products in sectors that
are politically organized compared to sectors that are not. In the former,
the government will set the non-cooperative tariff to τGHp = ωp +
1−α
α
zp
σp
.
Both 1−α
α
and
zp
σp
are positive. This implies that sectors that lobby the
government are effectively able to buy protection through higher tariffs
for their products, as the tariff under this scenario will be larger than
the tariff governments set when they only care about maximizing social
welfare. For the latter products, the non-cooperative tariff will be set to
τGHp = ωp − zpσp . Products from sectors that are not politically organized
while others are, will receive lower tariffs compared to products from sectors
that are politically organized and compared to products from any sector
when the government does not value lobbying efforts ceteris paribus. The
parameter α can be interpreted as measuring the “pass-through” of the
lobbying efforts, with a smaller α resulting in higher tariffs for products in
sectors that are politically organized compared to a higher α.
Trade agreements and optimal tariffs
When we allow for free trade agreements, governments no longer only get
to decide on the domestic tariffs, but also have some bargaining power
in the trade negotiations about the tariffs of the FTA partner country.
Next to importing lobbies, interests of exporting lobbies therefore now also
enter the objective function of the domestic government, as well as concern
for the FTA partner. The objective function of the domestic government
changes as follows (Ludema and Mayda, 2013):
aWp + λppip + ψppi
EXP
p + φppi
FTA
p (5.8)
with λp the political clout of importing firms (as before), ψp the political
clout of exporting firms, piEXPp own export profits, φp the governments
concern about the interests of its FTA partner, and piFTAp export profits
of the FTA partner. We allow λp to be different from ψp. These weights
can represent lobbying efforts as in Grossman and Helpman (1995a) and
Grossman and Helpman (1995b), but they are also consistent with other
political economy models such as the median-voter framework or labor
union lobbying (see for example Baldwin, 1987; Helpman, 1997). The last
term represents the bargaining power the FTA partner has to assure its
exporters of preferential access to country i’s market.
Ludema and Mayda (2013) show that in this case, the negotiated tariff
equation becomes
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τNp =
ωp(1−∑ψpsp) + λp zpσp − 1−φpσp sp
1− λp zpσp +
1−φp
σp
sp
(5.9)
with sp the import share of the partner country, i.e. imports from the
partner country of good p divided by total imports of good p. As before,
the negotiated tariff is increasing in λp
zp
σp
for organised sectors, which
captures the political influence of import-competing firms. However, tariffs
are now also decreasing in
∑
ψpsp, which measures the political influence
of exporting firms. Exporting firms have two reasons to prefer low domestic
tariffs. First of all, to the extent that firms import their inputs from
abroad, domestic import tariffs will equal a higher cost structure for the
exporting firm. Second, domestic protection will induce partner countries to
also protect their industries, hence lowering market access of the domestic
exporters. The influence of FTA partners,
1−φp
σp
sp, is ambiguous in sign.
FTA partners may apply diplomatic pressure on the importing country to
preserve the preferential market access of their exporters. If the concern
for the FTA partner is small, i.e. φp < 1, then the negotiated tariff is
decreasing in the FTA share of imports. While if it is large, i.e. φp > 1, it
is increasing.
To summarize, we expect to see higher tariffs for products that are in
import-competing sectors that are politically organized and products that
have a higher export supply elasticity. We expect to see lower tariffs for
products that are in exporting sectors that are politically organized.
5.3 Methodology
In order to test the terms-of-trade hypothesis for free trade agreements,
we cannot simply estimate equation (5.9) and use the negotiated tariff as
a dependent variable, as studies examining the terms-of-trade hypothesis
in the context of the WTO do. This because the purpose of free trade
agreements is to abolish tariffs between countries, and our dependent
variable would hence consist of a zero matrix. We therefore shift our focus
from tariffs on all products, to products getting special treatment in FTAs.
In one of their seminal works, Grossman and Helpman (1995b) developed
a theoretical framework that identifies the conditions for which an FTA
between two countries can be politically viable. Crucial in their analysis, is
the stance of industries towards the FTA. In their model, industries that
are expected to lose (gain) from the potential FTA, will try to lobby the
government of their country to oppose (support) the FTA. The degree to
which they are successful, depends a.o. on whether they are politically
organized, their political weight, what the stance is of other lobbies and
how much the government cares about lobbies. They show that, for an
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FTA to be viable, the amount of industries in each country respectively
that stands to gain from the agreement needs to be sufficiently “balanced”,
as this creates the best opportunity for exporting interests to overcome
opposition to the FTA from import-competing producers. If not, industries
that stand to lose a lot from the FTA will be able to successfully lobby
their government’s stance on the FTA.
Staging categories can be used to shift this balance. By allowing countries
to exclude certain products, impose quotas or have (long) phase-out periods
that give industries time to adjust, governments can capture the support of
some potential losers, while at the same time winning the favor of exporters
who would benefit from the agreement. This is exactly what we see in
real world trade agreements. Trade agreements are not simply absent or
present between a country pair. Most trade agreements do not foresee in
complete free trade between the partners once the agreement comes into
force. Rather, trade agreements typically consist of pages and pages of
appendices3, describing the liberalization path for each product or tariff
line. This liberalization path consists of a tariff base rate (fixed or ad
valorem or both) from which the liberalization will take place, and the
staging category (in trade agreements with the European Union, there are
typically between 10 and 25 different staging categories) determining the
exact number of months and subsequent percentage tariff reduction. Not
all products however get liberalized completely, and hence these appendices
typically also contain clauses on quotas, entry price systems, exceptions,
etc. for certain goods. Policy makers thus have a lot of options to tailor
a trade agreement to their exact needs and wishes. However, economists
typically neglect this complexity.
We will first look at the relationship between market power and product
exclusions, on the one hand, and the length of the phase-out periods, on
the other hand. We then extend our baseline model and include variables
capturing lobbying efforts and the concern for the FTA partner in trade
agreement negotiations.
Construction of the dependent variables
From the appendices of the trade agreements, we can easily construct a
couple of variables capturing how fast and how much a product will be
liberalized: (1) an indicator variable indicating if a product is excluded
from complete liberalization (2) an indicator variable indicating if a product
was already completely duty-free (3) an indicator variable indicating if a
product is liberalized immediately (4) an indicator variable indicating if
a product is phased-in (5) a continuous variable indicating the speed of
3The tariff elimination schedule of the EU-South Korea FTA, for example, is a
whopping 1050 pages long. This does not include additional appendices on extra
procedures, rules or exceptions.
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preferential liberalization, measured by the number of months to achieve
zero tariffs (6) a continuous variables indicating the customs duties for a
product during the liberalization period. Variables (1) to (5) are constant
over time, while variable (6) is time dependent.
In certain agreements, goods are not liberalized along a linear path
(in equal stages) but are kept at or close to their base rate for a longer
time. Here, the liberalization is kept limited in the first years after the
agreement entered into force. This reflects a higher political sensitivity
than a liberalization in equal stages. In order to take this into account,
we build on Adriaensen and Kerremans (2013) and construct a variable to
measure the liberalization path of a product.
Libpath =
1
tmax
∑
t=0
τt
τ0
(5.10)
with tmax the maximum liberalization time across agreements (in months),
τt the tariff at time t and τ0 the base rate. Libpath has a range between
0 and 1. At its lower bound, products are liberalized immediately, while
at the upper bound the product is excluded from liberalization. For two
categories with an equally long phase-out period, we can expect a higher
score on Libpath in case backloading is involved.
While products are typically defined on the 8-digit or even 10-digit
level in the appendices of trade agreements, these classifications are only
comparable up to the 6-digit level across countries, as there is international
harmonization of products in trade classifications. We therefore need to
aggregate the trade agreement data up to the 6-digit level. This will
allow us to compare data across agreements, but also to match the trade
agreement data with data on trade flows. To do so, we convert variables
(1)-(4) from indicator variables to the proportion of tariff lines within
an HS6-code having certain characteristics4 (i.e. instead of an indicator
variable indicating whether or not a product is excluded from liberalization,
we now obtain a variable indicating the proportion of excluded tariff lines
for each HS6-code). For variable (5), (6), and libpath we can take simple
averages. For variable (5), this of course leads to numbers of months that
does no longer correspond exactly to any staging category.
Estimating market power
Measuring importer market power is conceptually very straightforward as
it is defined as the inverse elasticity of export supply. However, estimating
importer market power has proven to be slightly more difficult. According
4Another option would have been to calculate for each variable the mode by HS6-
code and assign that value to the HS6-code. The number of tariff lines, however, does
not indicate how important a tariff line is in value of trade, hence introducing bias to
the data.
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to Broda, Lima˜o and Weinstein (2008), this is the key reason why the impact
of market power on tariffs has not been examined before. Most estimates
of trade elasticities simply assume that countries face an infinitely elastic
supply of exports and therefore estimate only import demand elasticities.
It is only since the seminal contribution of Broda, Lima˜o and Weinstein
(2008) that a methodology is available to estimate (the inverse) export
supply elasticity on the product-level for a multitude of countries. Earlier
attempts were made by Irwin (1988) estimating the export supply and
import demand elasticity at the aggregate level for the UK, Feenstra (1994)
reporting both elasticities for eight specific products for the US, Broda
and Weinstein (2006) estimating import demand elasticities for a range of
imports for the US but not export supply elasticities and Romalis (2007)
estimating both elasticities at the aggregate level for the US.
Broda, Lima˜o and Weinstein (2008) estimate the import demand elas-
ticity (σip) and inverse export supply elasticity (ωip) using a system of
import and export equations. The system can be derived in a setting where
any imported product is valued according to a CES utility function and
supply is perfectly competitive. They derive the following optimal demand
of country i for a given variety v of a product p and the residual export
supply country i faces for that variety:
∆kip ln sipvt = −(σip − 1)∆kip ln pipvt + εkipipvt, (5.11)
∆kip ln pipvt =
ωip
1 + ωip
∆kip ln sipvt + δ
kip
ipvt (5.12)
with pipt the domestic price of variety v of product p imported by country i
in year t, sipvt the share of variety v of product p in country i, εipvt demand
shocks and δipvt supply shocks. Both equations are differenced with respect
to time t and a benchmark variety of the same product p imported by i,
denoted kip.
Assuming that both elasticities are constant over varieties and the
defined time period, and that demand and supply shocks relative to the
benchmark variety kip are uncorrelated, i.e. Et(εipvtδipvt) = 0, equations
(5.11) and (5.12) yield the following solution:
Yipv = θip1X1,ipv + θip2X2,ipv + uipv, (5.13)
where θip1 =
ωip
(1+ωip)(σip−1) , θip2 =
ωip(σip−2)−1
(1+ωip)(σip−1) , uipvt =
ε
kip
ipvtδ
kip
ipvt
σip−1 ,
Yipvt = (∆
kip ln pipvt)
2, X1,ipvt = (∆
kip ln sipvt)
2, and
X2,ipvt = (∆
kip ln pipvt∆
kip ln sipvt).
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Feenstra (1994) shows that a consistent estimator of θ1,ip and θ2,ip can
be obtained by averaging (5.13) over time:
Y ipv = θip1X1,ipv + θip2X2,ipv + uipv, (5.14)
with the bars denoting time averages. Note that the double differencing
is also useful in controlling for other factors that could otherwise induce
a correlation of the error terms. In order to identify σip and ωip, three
varieties or more are needed per importer-good pair. While data on prices
and shares of a single variety can pin down a relationship between σip and
ωip, they are insufficient to determine the exact value of these elasticities.
Given that the true σip and ωip are assumed constant across varieties of
the same good, Feenstra (1994) shows that the true underlying elasticities
are exactly identified when there are three varieties per ip pair that are
sufficiently different in their second moments.
Our estimation strategy is as follows. We start by estimating equation
(5.14) for each importer-good pair to obtain θˆ1,ip and θˆ2,ip. We then
calculate σˆip and ωˆip using our estimates for θˆ1,ip and θˆ2,ip and check that
the elasticities are economically feasible, i.e. σip > 1 and ωip > 0. When we
obtain more than one estimate of σip or ωip that is economically feasible,
we take the average of both values.
We use unit values and import values as indications of pipt and sipvt,
respectively. As the trade agreements in our sample enter into force at
different times, we calculate separate measures of market power for each
trade agreement using the five years of trade data prior to entry into force5.
The definitions of a good and a variety are dictated by data availability.
The more disaggregated the choice of good, the fewer varieties per good
there are, and hence the more imprecise the estimates (potentially) are. The
more aggregated the choice of the good, the less informative the estimated
elasticities will be. Given that the rest of our dataset contains information
on the HS6-level, we follow Broda, Lima˜o and Weinstein (2008) in defining
a good as a HS4 category, and a variety as a HS6 category.
Estimation strategy
Taking the first-order Taylor approximation of equation (5.9), we obtain
the following tariff equation:
τNp = ωp(1−
∑
ψpsp) + λp
zp
σp
− 1− φp sp
σp
(5.15)
5Take for example the FTAs between the EU and Mexico and the EU and Korea.
The former entered into force in 2000, while the latter only entered into force 11 years
later. When we estimate elasticities for the EU, we therefore use trade data from 1994
to 1999 for the EU-Mexico agreement, and 2005 to 2010 for the EU-Korea FTA. Not
only is this method more precise, it also helps us avoid endogeneity issues because of
reverse causality.
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Replacing the optimal tariff with either the proportion of excluded tariff
lines per HS6 product or the liberalization path of the product, we can
write the general econometric model we will estimate as follows:
depvaripv = β1f(ωip) + Zis + Zi + Ziv + εipv (5.16)
with Zis a vector of variables capturing lobbying efforts, Zi country charac-
teristics, Ziv product characteristics and εipv the error term. Although the
theory predicts a linear relationship between market power and tariffs, we
follow Broda, Lima˜o and Weinstein (2008) by estimating different functional
forms, as there are theoretical and economical reasons to expect the true
effect to diminish at higher levels of market power.
We start by evaluating the relationship between market power and our
dependent variables. To do this in a parsimonious way, we abstract of
any variables capturing lobbying efforts or concern for the FTA partner,
and instead include fixed effects. This has the advantage of allowing us to
use the maximum number of observations. We estimate our model using
country fixed effects, country and sector fixed effects, and country-sector
fixed effects, respectively. As our measure of market power, we use the
coefficients we have estimated using the method outlined in the previous
section. In order to account for the (potential) diminishing impact of
market power, we also include the square of market power in one regression.
To address the skewness of market power, we also estimate the regression
using a semi-log specification, i.e. f(ω) =ln(ω). Finally, to account for the
outliers of our elasticity estimates, we create a dummy variable equal to 1 if
the inverse export elasticity estimate is in the top two thirds of all products’
estimates within the same country and use that in our estimation.
In a second stage, we include variables capturing lobbying efforts. As
political pressure is unfortunately unobserved for our sample of countries,
we have to be creative with the use of proxy variables. First, we follow
Ludema and Mayda (2013) and attempt to capture domestic political
pressure by using a sector dummy for λip and ψip. We interact the former
with
zip
σip
and the latter with sp. We measure the inverse import penetration
ratio as value-added minus exports divided by total imports. Secondly, we
use tariffs as a proxy for λip and ψip, as did Damuri (2012). High MFN
tariffs for a product could indicate that firms were successful in lobbying the
government for protection. We can therefore assume that industries that
were successful at obtaining protection for a good, will want to maintain
protection on this good. Finally, Gilligan (1997) shows that the demand
for protection from an industry is strongly correlated with the degree of
intra-industry trade and the employment in that sector. We therefore use
both these measures as a proxy variable for lobbying efforts. To calculate
the degree of intra-industry trade, we use the Grubel-Lloyd index, as is
standard in the literature. The index is increasing in the degree of intra-
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industry trade, with IITip = 0 inter-industry trade only and IITip = 1
intra-industry trade only, and can be expressed as
IITip = 1− | expip − impip |
expip + impip
with expip (impip) exports (imports) of good p from country i. We use
the same level of aggregation for product p as when calculating the inverse
export supply elasticity, as the Grubel-Lloyd index is fairly insensitive
to the level of aggregation according to Grubel and Lloyd (1975). We
include the interaction of the FTA share of imports with the inverse import
demand elasticity as a measure of the last term of equation 5.15 in all four
specifications.
In a last stage, we include variables to control for concern for the FTA
partner. While Ludema and Mayda (2013) do not operationalize the concern
for the FTA partner, one way to measure φp is to look at reciprocity in
trade agreement negotiations. There is anecdotal evidence that countries
make trade concessions and liberalize trade for one good or in one area
in exchange for similar or equivalent concessions of the partner country.
Van den Hoven (2013) notes for example that EU negotiations with Peru
and other countries in Central and South America have been based on
reciprocity of trade concessions and conditions for goods and services, while
Siles-Bru¨gge (2014) notes that the EU opened up its automobile sector
for Korean exporters in the context of the EU-Korea FTA in exchange for
substantial gains in areas in which EU firms were competitive. Reciprocity
of trade concessions does not necessarily imply that the concessions have to
be made in similar domains, however. Meunier and Nicola¨ıdis (2006) show
how the EU uses valuable access to its large market as a “bargaining chip
to obtain changes in the domestic arena of its trading partners, from labour
standards to development policies, and in the international arena, from
global governance to foreign policy”, making it a “normative trade power”
(Kerremans and Orbie, 2009; Orbie, 2011). The US uses a similar strategy
(see for example Greenhill, Mosley, and Prakash, 2009; Hafner-Burton,
2005; Hafner-Burton, 2013).
We distinguish two types of reciprocity: broad and narrow. We define
narrow reciprocity as all partners of a trade agreement obtaining similar
trade concessions on the same goods (i.e. if one country excludes a product
from liberalization, the partner country will also get a similar concession
for that product). Broad reciprocity involves the exchange of concessions
for one good for concessions on another good or more general concessions,
such as labor and environmental provisions. To measure the impact of
broad reciprocity, we include the number of WTO+ and WTOX provisions
in the trade agreement as a variable in the estimations. This classification
by Horn, Mavroidis, and Sapir (2010) divides the subjects covered by trade
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agreements into two categories, with the former referring to FTA provisions
which fall under the current mandate of the WTO, where the parties to the
FTA undertake bilateral commitments going beyond those already accepted
at the multilateral level. The latter comprises the provisions of trade
agreements that deal with issues lying outside of the scope of the current
WTO mandate, such as commitments on labour standards, environmental
issues or human rights. To measure narrow reciprocity, we include for each
product the trade regime of that product for the partner country. So in our
first set of regressions, we include the percentage of excluded tariff lines
per product for the partner country, while in our second set we include the
liberalization path of the partner country for a given product, and in the
third set the phase-out period of the partner country’s good.
5.4 Data
This paper uses a novel dataset on trade negotiation outcomes. Our
database contains very detailed information on 15 recent trade agreements
(see table 5.1 for a list of all trade agreements included). Our sample
includes free trade agreements between countries in Asia, North, Central
and South America, Europe and Oceania. We did not include any FTA
with an African country in our sample, as data availability for estimating
market power is poor. To ensure enough variation across agreements, we
included FTAs with large countries (such as the US, EU and China) as
well as smaller countries (Panama and Peru), and developed as well as
less-developed countries. We included FTAs between two small countries as
well as FTAs between a large and a small country. We also included FTAs
between developed-developing country pairs, as well as developed-developed
and developing-developing country pairs.
We constructed our database at the HS6-level. This is the most detailed
level for which we can compare both sides of each agreement, as the tariff
lines for a more detailed level are constructed using each country’s own
custom codes (such as the 8-digit Common Nomenclature (CN) for the EU
or the 10-digit Harmonised Tariff Schedule of Korea (HSK)). Moreover, on
this level, it is possible to match all trade agreement data with matching
international trade statistics.
Data on the negotiated tariff liberalization schedules come straight from
the trade agreements themselves6, and have been coded by Adriaensen
6Note that the trade between some of the countries in our sample is subject to the
Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP). This special clause in the WTO rules allows
member countries to deviate from the Most Favoured Nation principle by lowering
tariffs for least developed countries without also lowering tariffs for rich countries (see
also chapter 2). These preferences are, however, not reflected in the appendices of the
trade agreements. This partly because GSP preferences are unilateral preferences that
are revised regularly and can be revoked at any time (e.g. the EU and US withdrew
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and Kerremans (2013). Their paper describes the coding process and their
dataset in more detail. While in principal the coding of these agreements is
rather straightforward, in practice it is not. Some tariff lines have special
clauses or missing values, while for other products there is positive trade
between the two countries, but there is no corresponding tariff line.
We encountered 6 coding possibilities: (1) both base rate and staging
category are given (2) both base rate and staging category are given,
however the staging category includes a clause that prohibits the complete
liberalization of the product such as entry price systems, tariff quota, etc.
(3) the base rate is zero at the start of the agreement and hence no staging
category is necessary (4) it is explicitly stated that the product is excluded
from liberalization (5) either the base rate or staging category is missing or
(6) the tariff line is not included in the appendix.
In this paper, we classify all products in category (2) as excluded (this
in contrast to Damuri (2012) for example, who decided to only code tariff
lines as excluded from liberalization if the quota for the good in question is
less than 50% of its bilateral imports). Moreover, the coding of categories
(1) and (3) is very straightforward. However, the coding of categories (5)
and (6) is difficult as the meaning of and the motivation for the missing
data is not clear.
We complement this dataset with a number of additional datasets.
Data on trade flows comes from COMTRADE. This data includes yearly
detailed HS6-level trade flows for the period 1995-2014. Data on value
added and the number of employees comes from the Trade Production
preferences for Myanmar/Burma temporarily because of labour abuses), while this is
not the case for FTA preferences.
Table 5.1: Free trade agreements included in dataset.
Agreement Signature Entry into force
EU-Mexico FTA 8 December 1997 1 July 2000
EU-Chile FTA 18 November 2002 1 February 2003
EU-Korea FTA 15 October 2009 1 July 2011
EU-Peru FTA 26 June 2012 1 March 2013
US-Korea FTA 30 June 2007 15 March 2012
US-Chile FTA 6 June 2003 1 January 2004
US-Peru FTA 12 April 2006 1 February 2009
US-Australia FTA 18 May 2004 1 January 2005
US-Colombia FTA 22 November 2006 15 May 2012
Panama-Chile FTA 27 June 2006 7 March 2008
Panama-Peru FTA 25 May 2011 1 May 2012
Australia-Chile FTA 30 July 2008 6 March 2009
Mexico-Peru FTA 6 April 2011 1 February 2012
Canada-Peru FTA 29 May 2008 1 August 2009
Peru-China FTA 28 April 2009 1 March 2010
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Table 5.2: Proportion of tariff lines by staging category.
(a) Non-agricultural products
Agreement
Reporter Partner
A I P E A I P E
Australia-Chile 41.8% 47.5% 10.6% 0.0% 0.7% 96.0% 3.3% 0.0%
Chile-Panama 99.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 32.7% 32.4% 34.9% 0.0%
EU-Chile 71.3% 17.1% 11.5% 0.0% 0.5% 93.1% 5.8% 0.6%
EU-Korea 27.9% 69.5% 2.6% 0.0% 17.9% 72.1% 9.6% 0.4%
EU-Mexico 56.7% 11.4% 31.7% 0.3% 14.9% 27.7% 56.6% 0.8%
EU-Peru 27.8% 71.8% 0.1% 0.3% 56.3% 24.5% 19.2% 0.1%
Peru-Canada 49.3% 30.3% 20.3% 0.1% 57.6% 42.1% 0.3% 0.0%
Peru-China 55.9% 4.8% 29.8% 9.5% 8.7% 58.7% 27.6% 5.1%
Peru-Mexico 1.7% 84.5% 13.5% 0.3% 18.6% 68.7% 12.1% 0.5%
Peru-Panama 56.2% 22.0% 21.6% 0.2% 33.2% 24.7% 41.7% 0.4%
US-Australia 7.6% 70.7% 21.5% 0.2% 0.0% 72.8% 27.2% 0.0%
US-Chile 1.0% 95.2% 3.8% 0.0% 0.3% 93.1% 6.7% 0.0%
US-Colombia 0.8% 98.8% 0.3% 0.0% 0.2% 75.4% 24.4% 0.0%
US-Korea 2.8% 76.6% 20.6% 0.0% 0.0% 87.9% 12.1% 0.0%
US-Peru 0.8% 98.8% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 81.4% 18.5% 0.0%
(b) Agricultural products
Agreement
Reporter Partner
A I P E A I P E
Australia-Chile 74.9% 24.9% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 95.2% 4.4% 0.4%
Chile-Panama 99.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.7% 14.4% 47.1% 21.2% 17.3%
EU-Chile 22.2% 7.1% 45.7% 24.9% 0.0% 86.0% 11.4% 2.6%
EU-Korea 13.9% 68.9% 14.8% 2.4% 2.7% 28.2% 65.0% 4.0%
EU-Mexico 12.6% 7.4% 42.2% 37.8% 9.7% 35.2% 25.5% 29.6%
EU-Peru 15.4% 63.9% 3.0% 17.7% 16.2% 36.7% 34.1% 13.0%
Peru-Canada 12.7% 43.9% 33.5% 9.9% 42.4% 49.2% 0.5% 7.9%
Peru-China 16.6% 56.3% 27.1% 0.0% 8.0% 20.2% 64.2% 7.6%
Peru-Mexico 5.5% 29.1% 43.2% 22.2% 10.5% 24.3% 44.8% 20.4%
Peru-Panama 38.8% 28.7% 19.8% 12.8% 17.7% 35.0% 28.9% 18.4%
US-Australia 1.0% 48.0% 24.4% 26.6% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0%
US-Chile 2.1% 79.1% 18.8% 0.0% 0.0% 73.4% 26.6% 0.0%
US-Colombia 0.0% 94.7% 5.3% 0.0% 4.4% 74.5% 21.1% 0.0%
US-Korea 1.5% 44.3% 54.2% 0.0% 0.0% 28.1% 71.0% 1.0%
US-Peru 0.8% 90.9% 4.1% 4.2% 0.0% 50.5% 49.5% 0.0%
With A already duty-free, I immediate, P phased-in and E exception.
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and Protection Database, compiled by Nicita and Olarreaga (2007). This
dataset contains data by sector for 100 countries and 28 manufacturing
sectors. The sectors correspond to the 3-digit level International Standard
Industrial Classification (ISIC). We use correspondance tables to link this
data to our trade flow and trade agreement data. Data on MFN tariffs
before the trade agreement comes from UNCTAD’s TRAINS database.
Finally, data on WTOX and WTO+ provisions comes from Kohl, Brakman,
and Garretsen (2016), who build on and extend Horn, Mavroidis, and Sapir
(2010).
5.5 Main results
Results using the percentage of excluded tariff lines per product as a
dependent variable are presented in table 5.3, while results using the
liberalization path of products are presented in table 5.4. The first set of
regressions (columns (1)-(6)) is estimated using ordinary least squared, while
the remainder of the regressions are estimated using a probit regression.
The first two sets include all products, while the last set of regressions only
uses non-agricultural products. Estimations including country fixed effects,
country and sector fixed effects or country-sector fixed effects yield very
similar results.
We start by estimating a linear relationship between market power and
product exclusions, and then allow for different functional forms of ω. We
find a negative correlation between market power and product exclusions,
this when using a probit estimator as well as OLS. This finding suggests
that products with higher market power have a lower probability of being
excluded from liberalization. This at odds with the theory, as we expect a
positive relationship between both. Including the square of market power
in the estimation does not change the sign of the coefficient when including
all products in the estimation. However, the coefficient for ω turns positive
(though not statistically significant) when excluding agricultural products.
The negative coefficients are probably due to outliers in the elasticity
estimates. When we use a dummy for products with high market power,
the results are positive and statistically significant across all three sets of
estimations: products with high market power have a higher chance of
being excluded from trade liberalization compared to products with low
market power. Excluding outliers7, we confirm these findings: now the
coefficient for ω is positive (though not statistically significant across all
specifications). Including ω2 in the estimation, we find that the coefficient
for the square term is negative, i.e. the impact of market power on the
7We define outliers as values that are higher than the 90th percentile for each
country.
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Table 5.3: Market power and product exclusions in free trade agreements.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Set 1: Probit - All products
ω -0.0138** -0.0138**
(0.006) (0.006)
High ω 0.1661***
(0.048)
Ln(ω) -0.0120
(0.015)
ω2 0.0000**
(0.000)
ω’ 0.1903**
(0.076)
ω′2 -0.0586***
(0.021)
Ln(ω’) 0.0406*
(0.022)
Set 2: Probit - Non-agricultural products only
ω -0.0067 0.0150
(0.006) (0.017)
High ω 0.3263***
(0.084)
Ln(ω) 0.0181
(0.022)
ω2 -0.0005*
(0.000)
ω’ 0.3626***
(0.120)
ω′2 -0.1235***
(0.033)
Ln(ω’) 0.0339
(0.030)
Set 3: OLS - All products
ω -0.0000** -0.0000***
(0.000) (0.000)
High ω 0.0048**
(0.002)
Ln(ω) -0.0013**
(0.001)
ω2 0.0000***
(0.000)
ω’ 0.0031
(0.004)
ω′2 -0.0013
(0.001)
Ln(ω’) 0.0006
(0.001)
Observations set 1 16,669 16,669 16,669 16,669 14,996 14,996
Observations set 2 8,805 8,805 8,805 8,805 7,796 7,796
Observations set 3 20,039 20,039 20,039 20,039 18,014 18,014
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.10. Dependent
variable: percentage of excluded tariff lines by HS6-product. Only tariff lines that
were not already duty-free are considered. ’ denotes variables without outliers (top
10 percentile by country). All estimations include country and sector fixed effects.
Estimations with country fixed effects only, or country-sector fixed effects yield very
similar results. Results can be retrieved upon request. Sectors are defined as chapters
of the Harmonised System.
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Table 5.4: Market power and the liberalization path of products in free
trade agreements.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Set 1: Probit - All products
ω -0.0005 -0.0006
(0.000) (0.000)
High ω 0.0430**
(0.021)
Ln(ω) -0.0197***
(0.007)
ω2 0.0000
(0.000)
ω’ 0.0002
(0.033)
ω′2 0.002
(0.009)
Ln(ω′) 0.0092
(0.010)
Set 2: Probit - Non-agricultural products only
ω -0.0003 -0.0004
(0.000) (0.000)
High ω 0.0511**
(0.023)
Ln(ω) -0.0135*
(0.008)
ω2 0.0000
(0.000)
ω’ 0.0012
(0.037)
ω′2 0.0042
(0.010)
Ln(ω′) 0.0117
(0.011)
Set 3: OLS - All products
ω -0.0000*** -0.0000***
(0.000) (0.000)
High ω 0.0056**
(0.002)
Ln(ω) -0.0021***
(0.001)
ω2 0.0000***
(0.000)
ω’ 0.0018
(0.003)
ω′2 -0.0006
(0.001)
Ln(ω′) 0.0009
(0.001)
Observations set 2 24,214 24,214 24,214 24,214 21,643 21,643
Observations set 3 20,191 20,191 20,191 20,191 17,872 17,872
Observations set 1 24,214 24,214 24,214 24,214 21,643 21,643
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.10. Dependent
variable: liberalization path of products (see text for definition). Only tariff lines that
were not already duty-free are considered. All estimations include country and sector
fixed effects. Estimations with country fixed effects only, or country-sector fixed
effects yield very similar results. Results can be retrieved upon request. Sectors are
defined as HS chapters.
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probability of a product of being exempted from liberalization is indeed
diminishing in market power.
To interpret the magnitude of the results, we calculate marginal effects.
For column (2) of the first set, the marginal effect amounts to 0.011, meaning
that products with high market power are 1.1 percentage points more likely
to be excluded from liberalization than products with low market power.
For agricultural products only, this effect increases to 1.5 percentage points.
When estimating the relationship between product exclusions and market
power using ω’ and ω’2 (column (5)), the marginal effects amount to 0.006,
implying that an increase of the market power of a product with one
standard deviation is associated with an increase in the share of excluded
tariff lines per product of 100 ∗ 0.859 ∗ 0.006 = 0.5 percentage points.
We find a similar story for the liberalization path of a product, even
though the link with market power is slightly weaker and many coefficients
are not statistically significant. Yet, the coefficient for the dummy indicating
high market power is positive and statistically significant in all three sets
of regressions, while the coefficients for ω without outliers has the right
sign in all three sets of regressions. Products for which a country has a
higher market power tend to be liberalized slower, this either by allowing
for longer phase-out periods of the product, or by backloading the tariff
reductions.
Robustness check
Our estimates for market power contain a lot of missing values. Our baseline
results are therefore estimated using only part of our trade agreement data.
Even though we do not have any reason to believe that the missing values
will induce a systematic bias in our results, we do perform some robustness
checks including our full sample. Broda, Lima˜o and Weinstein (2008) show
that log GDP, the Rauch product differentiation index8 and the importing
country’s share of world imports by product are determinants of the inverse
export supply elasticity. We use these measures as proxy variables for
market power in our specifications.
Results are presented in table 5.5. The first set of estimations (columns
(1)-(3)) uses product exclusions as a dependent variable, while the second
set uses liberalization path. Both sets are estimated using a probit esti-
mator. Overall, we find weak evidence that there is no systematic bias
produced by missing values of our elasticity estimates and weak support
for the terms-of-trade hypothesis. We find a positive relationship between
product exclusions and GDP and import share, respectively. However, the
8Data on GDP is coming from World Development Indicators, while data on the
Rauch classification of goods comes from Rauch (1999). We use the conservative Rauch
classification, and construct a dummy taking value 1 if a good is differentiated.
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Table 5.5: Robustness check.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exclusions Liberalization path
Ln(GDPi) 0.0236*** 0.0348
(0.008) (0.003)
Differentiated -0.1542*** 0.1728***
(0.030) (0.012)
Import share 0.2421*** 0.0308
(0.078) (0.049)
Observations 82,426 73,651 76,660 100,204 102,225 100,204
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.10. The
dependent variables are either the percentage of excluded tariff lines by HS6-
product or the liberalization path of a product. All estimations use a probit
estimator and include country and sector fixed effects. Sectors are defined as
chapters of the Harmonised System.
coefficient for differentiated goods is negative and statistically significant.
For liberalization path, we find positive coefficients for all three dependent
variables, but only the coefficient for differentiated goods is statistically
significant, while the coefficients for GDP and import share are not.
5.6 Extensions
Lobbying efforts
Results are presented in table 5.6. The first set of estimations uses the
percentage of excluded tariff lines per product as a dependent variable,
while the second set uses the liberalization path of a product. Both sets of
regressions are estimated using a probit estimator and all estimations include
country and sector fixed effects. Note that the number of observations in
our regressions drops dramatically because of missing observations. While
results should be interpreted cautiously, we have no reason to assume that
the missing values introduce bias into our results, as we cannot discern any
pattern in the missing data.
We find that the positive relationship between market power and product
exclusions is robust to including variables capturing lobbying efforts. All
specifications have positive signs for the market power coefficient, and
negative signs for the squared market power term. The probability of
excluding a product from liberalization in a trade agreement is higher the
more market power a country has for a given good, but the relationship
is not linear, rather it is diminishing in market power. While not all
coefficients reach statistical significance in all regressions, the coefficients
are rather stable across all regressions, with magnitudes ranging from 0.60
to 0.96. Marginal effects range from 0.0178 to 0.0351, implying that an
increase of the market power of a product with one standard deviation is
associated with an increase in the share of excluded tariff lines per product
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of 100 ∗ 0.859 ∗ 0.0178 = 1.53 to 100 ∗ 0.859 ∗ 0.0351 = 3.02 percentage
points.
We find a similar positive relationship between market power and the
liberalization path of a product: products that have higher market power
have a longer phase-out period or are backloaded more often. Yet the
relationship is not diminishing in market power, as the coefficient for ω’2
is positive in all regressions. As before, the relationship between market
power and the liberalization path of a product is less pronounced than the
relationship between market power and product exclusions: none of the
coefficients for ω’ reaches statistical significance.
Looking at the different measures for lobbying efforts, we find no effect
of lobbying on product exclusions when using intra-industry trade and
employment as measures of lobbying for importing and exporting sectors.
We do find positive and statistically significant effects when using tariffs as
a measure of lobbying efforts. Products that had higher MFN tariffs before
the FTA are also more likely to be excluded from liberalization in the
FTA ceteris paribus for import-competing sectors (τ ∗ z/σ). Products that
already enjoyed more protection before the trade agreement hence keep
enjoying a heightened probability of being protected from liberalization
under the free trade agreement. Recalling that ψp ∗ sp entered equation
(5.15) negatively, we find that products that had higher MFN tariffs before
the FTA are less likely to be excluded from liberalization in the FTA ceteris
paribus for exporting sectors (τ ∗ IS). This suggests that both export and
import-competing lobbies manage to influence trade policy. Yet, while the
coefficients are statistically significant, they are small in economic terms.
The marginal effect for τ ∗ z/σ equals 3.34e-10, while the marginal effect
for τ ∗ IS amounts to 0.068.
Lobbies can not only (potentially) influence the probability of a product
to be excluded from liberalization, they can also (potentially) influence
the liberalization path of a product. For the second set of regressions, we
find a statistically significant coefficient for τ ∗ IS, but not for τ ∗ z/σ. We
also find statistically significant coefficients for Empl ∗ z/σ, GL ∗ IS and
GL ∗ z/σ, but the coefficients have the wrong sign as the theory predicts
positive signs.
Reciprocity in negotiations
Finally, we estimate the effect of the concern for the FTA partner on
negotiation outcomes. Results are presented in 5.7. Columns (1) and (2)
present evidence on broad reciprocity, while columns (3) and (4) present
some indications on narrow reciprocity.
We find a negative and statistically significant relationship between
the number of WTO+ and/or WTOX provisions and our two dependent
5.6. Extensions 155
Table 5.6: Free trade agreements, market power and lobbying efforts.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Set 1: Exlusions - probit
ω’ 0.8860*** 0.9653*** 0.7228*** 0.8314*** 0.6618*** 0.5961***
(0.147) (0.180) (0.174) (0.186) (0.121) (0.111)
ω’2 -0.2930*** -0.2996*** -0.2267*** -0.2514*** -0.2307*** -0.2173***
(0.058) (0.068) (0.064) (0.067) (0.046) (0.044)
IS/σ 1.5780 463.8145*** 2.7128 -307.5407*** 3.9442** 12.3564
(1.203) (139.566) (9.298) (81.400) (1.668) (8.752)
τ ∗ z/σ 0.0000*** 0.0000***
(0.000) (0.000)
τ ∗ IS 1.9319***
(0.462)
GL ∗ IS -6.0364
(3.920)
GL ∗ z/σ -0.0000
(0.000)
Empl ∗ IS -0.1400
(0.102)
Empl ∗ z/σ -0.0000
(0.000)
Set 2: Liberalization path - probit
ω’ 0.0177 0.0273 0.0556 0.0362 0.0210 0.0169
(0.055) (0.056) (0.069) (0.069) (0.054) (0.054)
ω’2 0.0055 0.0031 0.0355** 0.0314* 0.0040 0.0049
(0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015)
IS/σ -10.7107** -6.6968 2.2744 -50.6003** -14.1264 -1.0803
(4.889) (16.302) (5.213) (19.762) (11.643) (1.839)
τ ∗ z/σ -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.000) (0.000)
τ ∗ IS 0.6694**
(0.300)
Empl ∗ IS 0.0713
(0.117)
Empl ∗ z/σ -0.0000***
(0.000)
GL ∗ IS -1.4116*
(0.821)
GL ∗ z/σ -0.0000***
(0.000)
FEi yes yes yes yes yes yes
FEs no no no no no no
FEs ∗ z/σ yes yes no no no no
FEs ∗ IS no yes no no no no
Obs. set 1 6,898 4,047 4,914 4,914 6,901 7,232
Obs. set 2 8,804 8,804 5,933 5,933 8,804 8,804
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.10. Only tariff
lines that were not already duty-free are considered. Sectors are defined as chapters
of the Harmonised System. Constant is ommitted to save space.
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variables. Hence, the more WTO+ and/or WTOX provisions are included
in a free trade agreement, the lower the probability a product is excluded
from liberalization and the shorter its liberalization path. This refutes the
idea that countries can include more WTO+ and/or WTOX provisions
when granting the partner country less liberal tariff conditions. Rather,
countries that are already willing to go further when it comes to opening up
trade in terms of free trade of goods, also seem to be more open to including
more WTO+ and WTOX provisions. This in contrast to narrow reciprocity.
The coefficient for Partner is positive and statistically significant for both
sets of estimations. Products that are excluded from liberalization for
one country therefore have a higher probability of also being excluded for
the partner country. Products that have a longer phase-out period in one
country also tend to have a longer phase-out period in the partner country.
Table 5.7: Reciprocity in trade agreement negotiations.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exlusions - probit
ω’ 1.2290*** 1.2290*** 1.6634*** 1.6634***
(0.367) (0.367) (0.422) (0.422)
ω’2 -0.2904*** -0.2904*** -0.3924*** -0.3924***
(0.102) (0.102) (0.113) (0.113)
IS/σ 72.0487 72.0487 -102.8417 -102.8417
(131.069) (131.069) (194.139) (194.139)
WTOX -0.1914*** -0.0782*
(0.040) (0.043)
WTO+,X -0.3191*** -1.304*
(0.067) (0.072)
Partner 1.6091*** 1.6091
(0.314) (0.314)
Liberalization path - probit
ω’ -0.2575*** -0.2575*** -0.2360*** -0.2363***
(0.081) (0.081) (0.082) (0.082)
ω’2 0.0840*** 0.0840*** 0.0695*** 0.097***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
IS/σ 35.6052 33.5957 32.6644 31.3199
(35.683) (35.429) (38.535) (38.361)
WTOX -0.0834*** -0.0565***
(0.011) (0.012)
WTO+,X -0.1511*** -0.1024***
(0.019) (0.020)
Partner 1.3591*** 1.3495***
(0.183) (0.184)
FEi yes yes yes yes
FEs yes yes yes yes
FEs ∗ z/σ yes yes yes yes
FEs ∗ IS yes yes yes yes
Obs. set 1 1,659 1,659 1,256 1,256
Obs. set 2 5,399 5,399 5,019 5,019
With WTO+,X denoting the sum of WTO+ and WTOX pro-
visions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.10. Only tariff lines that were not already
duty-free are considered. Sectors are defined as chapters of the
Harmonised System. Constant is ommitted to save space.
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5.7 Conclusion
Even though the terms-of-trade hypothesis is more than a century old,
evidence to support or reject the theoretical arguments has long been non-
existing. This paper is the first paper to test the augmented terms-of-trade
hypothesis in relation to bilateral trade agreements.
Our analysis proceeds in three stages. We start by evaluating the main
prediction of the simple terms-of-trade theory, and then augment it with
variables capturing lobbying efforts and reciprocity in trade agreement
negotiations. We find support for the augmented terms-of-trade theory in
explaining bilateral tariff negotiation outcomes. Using detailed data on 15
recently concluded FTAs, we find a positive relationship between market
power and the probability of a product to be exempted from liberalization.
Products with higher market power also tend to have longer phase-out
periods, i. e. they are liberalized slower over time. Moreover, including
variables capturing lobbying efforts and reciprocity of trade negotiations,
also results in findings that are consistent with the theory. Our results are
robust to using different measures of market power and lobbying.
While economists often assume that most countries are “small”, i.e. they
do not have market power for any good, our results show that this is not
the case. Even small countries have considerable market power for certain
products, and manage to exclude these products from liberalization in free
trade agreements.
Moreover, our findings suggest that countries that are already willing
to go further when it comes to opening up trade in terms of free trade of
goods, also seem to be more open to including more WTO+ and WTOX
provisions. However, our results do not support the idea that countries can
include more WTO+ and/or WTOX provisions when granting the partner
country less liberal tariff conditions.
Our findings have implications for how trade negotiations are conducted.
While for most countries (or trade blocs) that plan to negotiate a trade
agreement (including the EU, US and Australia), conducting an impact
assessment of economic effects of the potential future trade agreement on
the country is a standard task in preparing for the negotiations, predicting
economically which products will be easy to liberalize and which not, is
not part of this preparation process. Yet, our results show that the market
power of a product and the presence or absence of import-competing or
exporting lobbies are good predictors of the liberalization path of a product.
This paper suffers from one major drawback, however, namely the lack
of data availability on lobbying efforts for the countries in our sample.
While we try to operationalize lobbying efforts as best as we can and we
use multiple measures to ensure the robustness of our results, direct data
on lobbying expenditures by sector is not available for the countries in our
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sample. While the literature has been refining measures of lobbying contri-
butions with respect to trade policy outcomes (see for example Bombardini,
2008; Bombardini and Trebbi, 2012; Kim, 2017), these advances so far
mainly only benefit studies involving the US because of data requirements.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
“This is a fraught time for global trade. In many countries, trade
is under siege, raising the spectre of protectionism. Alongside
the anti-trade rhetoric, there is the notion that we have reached
‘peak trade’ or that globalisation has ground to a halt.”
– Roberto Azevedo,
Director-General WTO
London, June 7, 2016
For a long time, business went well for the small brewery Timmermans
in the small kingdom of Belgium. The brewery was exporting a lot of
its beers and customers were happy. But then, one day, a terrible thing
happened. The citizens of a faraway land elected a new president. The new
president was evil, and he did not like things that were not made in the
faraway land he was leading. This scared the good people of the brewery.
What if they would no longer be allowed to export beers to the faraway
country? What would happen to all their customers in the faraway country
that liked their beer? The uncertainty and bleak prospects were gnawing
at the beer brewers. It were dark and gloomy times.
Today, globalization, trade agreements and international trade are
blamed for a wide range of evils, such as job loss, decreasing incomes,
higher rates of single motherhood and child poverty, higher crime rates,
higher mortality, etc. (Feler and Senses, 2016; Pierce and Schott, 2016; Au-
tor, Dorn, and Hanson, 2016). Or as Donald Trump “eloquently” phrased
it in a campaign speech at Monessen (Pennsylvania) on June 28, 20161:
1The full speech can be found at http://time.com/4386335/
donald-trump-trade-speech-transcript/.
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“America has lost nearly 1/3 of its manufacturing jobs since
1997. Even as the country has increased its population, think
of this, by 50 million people. At the center of this catastrophe
are two trade deals (...). First, the North American Free Trade
Agreement, or the disaster called NAFTA. Second, China’s entry
into the World Trade Organization. NAFTA was the worst trade
deal in the history (...). And China’s entrance into the World
Trade Organization has enabled the greatest job theft in the
history of our country. (...) The Trans-Pacific Partnership is
the greatest danger yet. The TPP, as it is known, would be the
death blow for American manufacturing. It would give up all
of our economic leverage to an international commission that
would put the interests of foreign countries above our own. It
would further open our markets to aggressive currency cheaters
– cheaters, that’s what they are, cheaters.”
Free trade has been under threat since the Great Recession and the
Great Trade Collapse2, with protectionist measures rising steadily since
2008, and a sharp increase since 2012. Global Trade Alert (Evenett and
Fritz, 2016) notes that the number of discriminatory measures imposed
in 2015 is 50% higher than in 2014, and almost double the number of
discriminatory measures imposed in 2009. Liberalising measures have also
continued to increase after the crisis, but they are outnumbered by discrim-
inatory measures by almost three-to-one. Moreover, policy uncertainty has
increased greatly in the aftermath of the Brexit, the election of Donald
Trump in the US and Marine Le Pen’s campaign promise to withdraw from
the European Union to reinstate the French Franc as part of her plan to
boost French competitiveness, amongst others.
All these elements not only hamper trade today, contributing to the
global trade slowdown or even trade plateau3, but also threaten the future
of free trade.
Main findings
In this context of turmoil, we formulated two main research questions.
Firstly, in a time of post-truths and alternative facts, it is important to
have reliable estimates of the effects of economic phenomena. We therefore
2Globally, industrial production fell 12%, and trade volumes fell 20% in the twelve
months following April 2008 - shocks of a magnitude not witnessed since the Great
Depression and the explosion of beggar-thy-neighbour protectionist measures of the
1930s (Eichengreen and O’Rourke, 2010).
3Evenett and Fritz (2016) argue that the global trade slowdown should be called
the global trade plateau, as since the beginning of 2015, world export volumes have
not grown at all instead of growing at a slower tempo than before. Such a no-growth
phase of 15 months is very unusual.
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researched in depth what the trade creation effects are of trade agreements
between the EU and the rest of the world. Secondly, in a time when
bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements cover an ever-increasing number
of trade flows and policy domains, we studied the negotiation process of
FTAs. In particular, we tried to find factors determining the liberalization
process of goods in FTAs. Three findings stand out.
1. Trade agreements stimulate trade between the member countries
of the agreement. We confirm these findings on the country- and
product-level, as well as on the firm-level using Belgian firm data:
trade agreements hold great possibilities for firms, and firms make
use of them. Yet, there is large heterogeneity in the effects of trade
agreements: trade agreements with deeper integration stimulate trade
more, as well as trade agreements that were concluded for economic
reasons. Moreover, it are mainly older firms that take advantage of
the opportunities that trade agreements bring, as well as firms with
50 to 99 employees.
2. Anticipation effects of trade agreements are much more important
than assumed so far. We again confirm these findings on the country-
level as well as on the firm-level. Firms anticipate trade agreements
by starting to export more to this destination from the moment
negotiations of the agreement start. Moreover, we find that the
number of firms exporting to destinations with (potential) future
trade agreements also starts increasing from that moment.
3. Goods that are excluded from liberalization in trade agreements
have a higher export supply elasticity (or so-called market power)
and have a higher probability of belonging to a sector that is import-
competing and politically organized to lobby the domestic government.
When one country excludes a good from liberalization in a trade
agreement negotiation, it is more likely that the partner country in
the negotiations will also exclude the product from liberalization.
Moreover, while it is commonly assumed that small countries cannot
influence world prices for any good, we find that even small countries
have market power for certain goods.
We contribute to the literature in three main ways. First, we present
additional evidence on the importance of heterogeneity in the international
trade literature. While it is now commonly accepted in the literature
that firms are heterogeneous, we empirically show that different types of
firms react differently to trade agreements. Moreover, we contribute to
the literature on the timing of trade policy effects by providing empirical
evidence on anticipation effects of trade agreements. Finally, we contribute
to the terms-of-trade literature by providing the first empirical evidence
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supporting the terms-of-trade theory in the context of bilateral trade
agreements.
Implications for policy and research
This dissertation has several implications for policy-makers as well as for
researchers.
First of all, our findings suggest that researchers studying the effects of
trade agreements should pay more attention to anticipation effects of trade
agreements. While we find clear evidence of anticipation effects, studies
taking anticipation effects into account when evaluating trade policy are
scarce. This might underestimate the effects trade agreements have on
trade flows. Moreover, ignoring anticipation effects will result in misleading
findings about the timing of trade policy effects.
Second, governments should do more to stimulate micro-sized firms and
small firms (i.e. firms with less than 50 employees) to take advantage of
the opportunities that trade agreements bring. Our results show that these
very small firms do not manage to benefit from trade agreements, even
though there are plenty of resources available on the EU-level as well as on
the level of the Member States to help firms export4. Moreover, studies
have shown that export promotion works (see Van Biesebroeck, Konings,
and Martincus Volpe, 2016 for the case of Belgium), and that these positive
effects can be particularly powerful for small firms (Lederman, Olarreaga,
and Payton, 2006). This suggests that small firms might not make use of
the help provided by the EU and the export promotion agencies on the
more local levels. I therefore think that export promotion agencies should
act more proactively with respect to very small businesses. Moreover, as
we have shown that firms anticipate trade agreements, export promotion
agencies should signal the potential of future trade agreement well ahead
of the potential entry into force of agreement.
Third, our research provides a guideline for negotiators of trade agree-
ments. Our results can be used to help understand the negotiation objectives
of the partner country better before the negotiations start. By identifying
goods with high and low market power and import-competing sectors with
strong lobbies, negotiators can predict better which goods will be more
difficult to liberalize.
4The EU provides very detailed information on various trade-related issues through
its European Small Business Portal. Most EU member states also have national,
regional or local trade promotion agencies assisting firms with exporting. In Flanders
for example, Flanders Investment and Trade (FIT) helps firms to export by providing
information, contact persons and a network in (potential) export destinations and even
subsidies for trade shows.
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Future research
While this dissertation tried to answer some questions, inevitably many
questions remain unanswered. We see four exciting research areas that
deserve more attention.
While we advanced the literature on anticipation effects of trade agree-
ments by providing empirical evidence on anticipation effects, our results
only include trade agreements between the European Union and the rest of
the world for the period 1988-2013. It would therefore be interesting to see
if these effects also occur when extending the sample of trade agreements
studied as well as the time period. Moreover, it would be useful to refine
our results: are the effects driven by the intensive or the extensive margin of
trade? Are there other sources of heterogeneity with respect to anticipation
effects? Do media coverage or political uncertainty mediate the magnitude
of the effects? Which types of firms are more proactive and anticipate trade
agreements more? Is the effect similar for all sectors and all types of goods?
Further, we see a potential fruitful nexus between research on anticipation
effects and lobbying in trade negotiations. It would be interesting to combine
both strands of literature, as both are sides to the same coin. Firms that
lobby trade negotiators probably not only do so to obtain desired concessions
in the trade negotiations, but also to obtain information on the progress of
the negotiations and the specific opportunities the future trade agreement
will bring for them. I therefore expect that these firms will be the firms
that enter this destination ahead of time or expand their product range
to this destination, taking advantage of first-mover benefits. At the same
time, firms that anticipate trade agreements are extra motivated to lobby
the government and make sure that their expected gains from the trade
liberalization will materialize.
Moreover, it would be interesting to refine and extend the results of
chapter 5 in a number of ways. Chapter 5 was a very exploratory paper,
and hence there is plenty of room for improvement. First of all, it would
be very interesting to refine the measures of lobbying used in the chapter.
The only paper we could find so far that does so is Hakobyan, Kohl, and
Lake (2017). However, they only look at US trade agreements, because
of data requirements to measure lobbying. This brings us to our second
point; it would be interesting to extend our analysis to include a greater
number of trade agreements. This would allow for the study of differences
in bargaining power of negotiating nations. While it is commonplace for
law scholars to state that the EU or the US possess a lot of bargaining
power and can therefore impose their templates of desired trade agreements,
convincing empirical evidence to support this statement is lacking.
Finally, this dissertation has completely ignored trade in services. While
we did so for data reasons – quality data on trade in services on the country-,
product- and firm-level is not available for a substantial number of years
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or countries – this is an area in the literature with great potential as not
much empirical evidence is available on the effects of trade agreements on
the trade in services, while a growing number of trade agreements include
provisions on trade services.
- The End -
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